A Discourse Perspective on Figurative Expression in Literary Works with Reference to English/Arabic Translation

by
As'ad Jabr Abu Libdeh, MSc.

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Heriot-Watt University
Department of Languages

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Supervisor: Dr Basil Hatim
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To my wife and five children
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Prefatory Notes

For the transcription of Arabic, I have used what I hope is a fairly straightforward system. Long vowels are represented with a superscript dash -; ฯ is kh, ฯ is dh, ฯ is ꚟ. ฯ is gh, ฯ is th, ฯ is z, and ฯ is sh. Hamza is represented with 'j, only when it is part of the phonemic structure of the word.

In order to preserve the distinction between apparently identical phonemes, I have opted for the following system: initial ꚃ is represented with Ꚃ (capital with a dot underneath), otherwise with ꚁ; similarly initial ꚃ is represented with ꚃ, otherwise with ꚃ; initial ꚃ is represented with ꚃ, otherwise with ꚃ; initial ꚃ with ꚃ, otherwise with ꚃ.

Arabic words are put between brackets and reproduced in transliteration when they are part of the text; their equivalents are put between inverted commas. Otherwise Arabic transcription is provided with glosses or translations (not necessarily official) underneath. However, where translation is irrelevant, it will not be provided.

In the case of el-Sādāwī’s novel, I have selected examples from the translation by O. Nusairī and J. Gough (1985), 4th edition. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī.
Appendices

There are six appendices in this dissertation which contain the discoursal themes of the two novels mentioned above. Appendix A, B and C are put in their respective source languages in the body of Chapter Six for reasons of relevance and readability. The first two appendices come from el-Sadawi’s novel "Two Women in One"; the third comes from Hemingway’s "The Old Man and the Sea". A and C combined re-appear under a new name (Appendix D) with their official as well as proposed translations at the end of Chapter Seven for reasons of relevance. Appendix E includes all other discoursal themes from el-Sadawi’s novel. Appendix F contains all other discoursal themes from Hemingway’s novel.
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# Abbreviations

Abbreviations are presented in alphabetical order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>enunciating speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOS</td>
<td>figure of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FsOS</td>
<td>figures of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>face threatening act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTAs</td>
<td>face threatening acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF$s$</td>
<td>ideological discursive formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>proposed text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>source text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>target text</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Acknowledgements

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Abstract

This dissertation is intended to fulfil two main objectives, firstly, to examine the function of figures of speech or figurative expression from a discourse point of view, and secondly, to assess whether English/Arabic or Arabic/English translators take into consideration this discourse aspect, and if they do, to what extent. The division of figures of speech is based on Arabic (Balāgha) Rhetoric.

The dissertation develops along the following lines. It examines the "anatomy" of each individual figure of speech with the aim of establishing their respective merits. It afterwards highlights their collective, social function in a wider sense. The research narrows down their social role concentrating on one main role: creating a bond of intimacy between the speaker and the audience. It further examines the mechanism on which intimacy is based, i.e. politeness. Politeness is a strategy adopted and exacted by a rational speaker on a rational audience and enables him to get them persuaded. It is concluded that each figure of speech presents the speaker with an ideal tool for addressing a particular audience. It follows, therefore, that the having recourse to a particular figure of speech is a stance or an attitude by the speaker towards his audience. Meanwhile, figures of speech collectively present the speaker with a tool which enables him to express a mobility of (discoursal) tones and attitudes.

The dissertation develops the theme of attitude through "critical" discourse. Critical discourse fleshes the attitude of the speaker by denaturalizing the orderliness of talk and by providing social accounts which are intended to probe the social roots of language. Critical discourse also accounts for why things happen the way they do, by whom and the motive for their doing. It, therefore, establishes a link between verbal interaction and three social phenomena which determine and are determined by verbal interaction. These factors are: action, institution and higher social formation. Action is at the social base and is presupposed by social structure, institution is the loci of power
and provides its subjects with motive and with a frame of work to act within, while higher social formation stands for a series of elements and their interrelations which conjointly define the persistence of a social formation and distinguish one society from another.

The study develops an integrated model of critical discourse for the analysis of figurative expression. The model is composed of three components: (i) syntax, (ii) an interpretative guideline, and (iii) an explanatory framework. Finally, figurative expression is examined and a translation assessment based on an empirical approach is made.

The dissertation examines figures of speech in literary works where they abound. Nevertheless its findings can be applicable to other discourse types. This is because it deals with figurative expression as a transaction that is negotiated between the two parties to the verbal interaction.

The implication of the critical approach towards the study of discourse for the translator-trainee is two-fold. First, he should make a thorough linguistic analysis of figurative expression before he embarks on translating, and second, he should consider language as a social practice that has its roots in the society from which it emanates. He, therefore, has to try to account for all factors that might have a bearing on the meaning of the text he is going to handle.

The findings deduced from this study are summed up as follows. First, figures of speech are functional in that they specifically help discourse to emerge and help to distinguish one discourse type from another. Second, figures of speech form an ensemble of thought which can express a body of (discoursal) attitudes and tones. Third, the dissertation corroborates that negligence or unawareness of the discourse aspect weakens the effect of figures of speech and sometimes distorts the meaning. Four, the present studies by both theorists and experimenters of figurative expression
are not sensitive enough to its discourse function, nor are the translators of the two novels which form the data for this study.
Chapter One

PRELUDE

1. Introduction

This dissertation is basically intended to be an empirical investigation into the translation of the various types of figures of speech, specifically from a discourse point of view. The dissertation, therefore, is an integration of two major objectives: (i) a development of a model of discourse and an examination of the function of figures of speech (FsOS) as to how they help in the emergence of a particular discourse type, and (ii) an investigation into whether Arabic/English or English/Arabic translators account for this discourse function on the part of figures of speech (FsOS).

The dissertation is carried out for pedagogical purposes. This orientation might have some impact on its organization. It aims to help translation-programme trainees command a theoretical, clear understanding of two basic components: (i) what discourse is, and (ii) what the usage of FsOS individually and collectively involves: individually, in terms of the figure's "anatomy"; collectively, in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of figurative language vis-a-vis literal language, in terms of the premise FsOS are based on, and in terms of the mechanism on which they operate. This understanding should help them make on-the-spot, sound decisions.

The dissertation is based on the assumption that FsOS are functional (vs ornamental) in that they are capable of simultaneously giving expression to human experience(s) and fleshing out the attitude of the speaker to that experience. Experience and attitude are two sides of the same coin: discourse.

This being the case, the natural order for this dissertation is to start with the theory and conclude with the empirical translation assessment from a discourse point of
view. In the following, I shall expound the present situation with respect to these two components: discourse and figures of speech.

**Discourse.** The current prevailing view on discourse is that it is a stretch of language, oral or written. The current practice is for the linguist to provide an account of one discourse or two contrastive discourses in a descriptive manner (e.g. Widdowson: 1977, Cook: 1989). A descriptive discourse, according to many prominent names (i.e. Fairclough 1985, 1989; Thompson 1984), does not present language as a social phenomenon integral to the society in which it emanates. Rather, it presents language as a phenomenon disjunct from the society. The primary aim of descriptive discourse is the formalisation of language. It also presents language users across different institutions as equal in power. This is not the case in actual daily life.

A descriptive discourse presents verbal interactions as naturalized and opaque to the participants, and does not seek to find out how they, verbal interactions, determine and are determined by the social structures of the society. This results in what Fairclough (1985: 740) calls "orderliness of interaction". By this he means "the feelings of participants in it...that things are as they should be, i.e. as one would normally expect them to be" (ibid).

- The other approach to the study of discourse is "critical" vs descriptive. This approach is not yet a fully fledged one. It aims at elucidating the orderliness of interaction, i.e. the (seemingly) non-ideological representations, and at denaturalizing them. It also aims at establishing links between verbal interactions and the social factors which determine and are determined by them: social action, social institution and higher social formation.

The consequence of naturalization is summed up by Fairclough (1985: 746) in three points. These are (slightly differently modified): (a) ideological practices become dissociated from the particular social base and become based in the nature of things or
people, (b) they therefore become part of "knowledge base", and (c) orderliness of interaction comes to be dependent on a higher orderliness, i.e. it is determined but it does not determine the other social formations.

In this dissertation, discourse will be taken as a social practice which has its roots in its respective society. This society is made up of different (ideological) speech communities (i.e. institutions) which can and do act on one another, and compete with one another. They derive their legitimacy from the social rules (explicit or implicit) of their respective societies. Collectively, they give it its distinctive "flavour" which distinguishes it from other societies. Individually, each institution expresses its point(s) of view via authorized subjects (i.e. individuals) in a way which not only distinguishes it from other institutions but also preserves its own interests.

Discourse therefore, is the language of institutions, of power. It is a mode of action which enables us to see institutions jostling for position with regard to a particular issue. In Kress's (1985) words, it is a mode of talking or thinking. This approach towards discourse enables us to account for reasons for social phenomena, social practices and social relations. Descriptive discourse does not.

**Figures of Speech.** I have opted for figure vs trope because, according to Ricoeur (1978: 52), trope refers to an idea on the word level. In terms of this interpretation, trope includes metaphor proper and metonymy. Figure, on the other hand, refers to an idea on the word as well as on the sentence level. This includes, among other things, analogy and proverbs. In my categorization of FsOS, I shall be adopting a division based on Arabic (Balagha) Rhetoric.

So far the translation methods devised by both prominent theorists (e.g. Newmark: 1977, 1979, 1988) and experimenters (e.g. Beekman: 1969, 1974) for tackling the problems of FsOS can be characterized as being atomistic. They deal with FsOS in their individual capacity and do not attempt to relate one to another, regardless of the fact that
they abound in, say, literary texts (i.e. works) more than they do in others. There is also some lack of sensitivity as to the discrete logic of each FOS. For example, they both propose that a metaphor can be reduced to a simile. This approach does not help in sharpening the awareness of the translator-trainee as to the mechanism on which each individual FOS operates. It also gives the impression that some FsOS are more viable than others.

These methods are also programmatic. For example, Newmark (1988) proposes six methods for the translation of metaphor [used generically]. Metaphor is divided into six types according to "age": dead, cliche, stock, adapted, recent and original. For each age-group a method is proposed; attention is given to these categories in their individual capacity. No attempt at linking related figurative expressions has been made. It follows therefore, that these methods are only adequate for texts where FsOS are sparse. In other texts (e.g. literary texts), these methods cannot be adequate.

In the Arab world, though witnessing a vigorous revival in its literary and linguistic heritage, academics still fall back on the classic scholars for inspiration often resisting even to draw from modern life (e.g. Al-Ṣaghîr: 1983; Abbâs: 1987). This implies that language has not yet been viewed as a progressively important (social) tool which can be effectively used to prompt or pre-empt action, or that it can make a science with rules which are concrete and workable, though they might not be as rigorous as those of science.

Arab academics are partly hampered by the futility of their school curriculum which, while still haranguing them on the value of the classical heritage, fails to quote from modern life. This has had the effect of alienating the great heritage by unwise over-quoting and hampering the growth of their current achievement. It is time for us to contribute to our heritage instead of only leaning on it.
In the West, and though language has been boosted by many a research, FsOS are still surprisingly, albeit in few cases, simulated and idealised (Kellett: 1988), though we are two decades beyond the ethnomethodologists who started to deal with naturally occurring language. In many other cases, only particular FsOS are selected for exhaustive examination. Much of the literature goes towards examining metaphor proper (e.g. Krug: 1987). Other FsOS get much less attention, and though there is awareness of the roots which hold the various types of FsOS together (e.g. Birdsell: 1986), the prevailing disposition is to keep FsOS apart.

The underlying attitude is that metaphor proper is the most expressive and therefore the FsOS which deserves the greatest attention. This might be true; only if we take it for granted that readership is standardized across all speech situations, and that relations between participants remain constant throughout a particular speech situation. But because this is practically not the case, i.e. because there are different audiences and different language users with different relationships binding them, the fact is that other FsOS remain equally viable, though under different circumstances. Besides, relations between participants in any speech situation are negotiable, and this requires different tones (of discourse) to express newly developing relations and, therefore, requires an oscillation between various types of FsOS.

In neither of the two languages involved (Arabic and English) is there any research which, as far as I am aware, examines how FsOS collectively function in a specific and naturally occurring critical discourse. The present research intends to fill this gap. It examines the "anatomy" of the various types of FsOS; and, while recognizing their respective discrete logic, it recognizes their common "figurative root" and groups them in a novel way.

Rather than grouping FsOS in terms of their traditional categories, i.e. metaphor, metonymy, and so on, they are grouped according to their discourse function, i.e. all FsOS which give expression to the same experience and express the same attitude
or point of view on that particular experience will be grouped under the same heading. This heading will be designated "discoursal thread". This approach will help in circumventing the atomistic approach which plagues FsOS, and in accounting for their discourse functioning.

In order to make my investigation as "scientifically" rigorous as possible, I shall adopt a two-pronged method. First, I shall develop a mechanism in order to explain what motivates the language user to have recourse to figurative language in the first place and to a particular FOS rather than to another. This accounts for the social role of FsOS, specifically intimacy. To exact intimacy, a politeness strategy is selected by the speaker. Politeness is the mechanism on which intimacy operates.

Second, I shall adopt a critical, linguistic model for the analysis of data. This will be carried out in the following manner. First, the code of language will be examined; so will be the grammar of figurative expression. The aim is that this approach will yield rigorous, reliable results. Background, social accounts on the data will be provided. Second, critical interpretative and explanatory procedures will be worked out from these accounts in order to account for the social aspect of language: for reasons and motives as to why things happen the way they do. The aim is to refer language back to its social roots. This approach will hopefully account for language as a social practice.

The implication of this approach for the translator is that he should, before he embarks on his work, analyse and relate seemingly unrelated FsOS. Because the discoursal thread usually comprises more than one FOS, the translator has to try to account for every node (i.e. individual FOS) on the thread. Any break of the thread could weaken its effectiveness and indent the reader's consciousness of the discourse function of figurative expression. Rather than relying on tailor-made methods for the translation of FsOS, this approach will help devise a more rigorous, reliable method for the translation of FsOS. In order to make discoursal threads operative, I have selected
two relatively short novels, one Arabic, one English, for data analysis. This is because in novels FsOS abound. Translations of these two novels are formally published and available.

The two novels express two worlds that are unrelated. (Imra'atān ̣fī Imra'ā) "Two Women in One" belongs to the feminist, committed discourse. It was written by an Egyptian feminist writer, Nawāl el-Sādāwī. The novel discusses "urgent" issues that bear heavily on the well-being of woman, the novelist claims. El-Sādāwī urges woman to rise up and fight (the world of man) for her rights- or else.

"The Old Man and the Sea", by Hemingway, on the other hand, was intended to boost individualism. It is an invitation of challenge to the American individual who, by the time the novel was written, had successfully finished off all feuds with all "animate" surroundings. He had finished off the Red Indian, fought the War of Independence and even eliminated buffaloes. There was a sense of danger that his masculinity might decline. This novel offered him an endless challenge with the forces of nature: sea and big fish. The quest, however, is not as urgent as that of el-Sādāwī.

Though I shall lean on literary criticism for some insights, I shall by no means adopt a literary critical approach. Literary critics, keen to prove or disprove a particular point, are selective in their data. I shall be systematic and shall pick out all FsOs that are in the two novels.

The first assumption which underlies this dissertation is that FsOS will express an ensemble of interrelated points of view with regard to a group of interrelated experiences which make up the whole discourse of the committed literary feminist discourse and the comparatively less committed literary discourse. The second assumption is that in both types of discourse FsOS will feature differently, in terms of quantity and quality.
Thus the dissertation will be multidisciplinary, involving more than one investigation. The development will not be linearly organized; rather, it will come back and forth with a string of precis functioning as points of departure to smooth progression.

I shall be using terms such as FOS and figurative expression (or statement) as synonyms to cover different shades of meaning. The first will refer to a formal intact unit such as simile or metaphor, the second to a unit which can be broken down to its basic constituents.

Similarly, after Chapter Three, I shall frequently be using "expression" as a replacement of "statement". "Statement" is too strong to be always ascribed to the enunciating speaker (ES) and will be confined to where it is used by specialists on discourse; "expression" accounts more for the state of mind of the ES and for the relation between him and his audience. Collins English Dictionary defines statement as "something stated, especially a formal prepared announcement or reply". The dictionary defines expression as "the act or an instance of transferring ideas into words". The alteration, therefore, is motivated.

For convenience, I have opted for terms such as enunciating speaker (ES) and audience to refer respectively to the addresser whether male or female, and to addressee, singular or plural. "ES" and "audience" take more account of interaction between the two parties involved than other terms do. However, other terminology such as interactants might creep in because of their frequent use.

1.1 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is made up of seven chapters. The chapters are as follows:
Chapter One. This chapter introduces the whole dissertation in terms of aims, motive, methodology and organization.

Chapter Two. This chapter examines the anatomy of each individual FOS and highlights its discrete logic. It lays the ground for the idea that each FOS requires and establishes its own readership.

Chapter Three. This chapter develops Chapter Two. It divides into two main sections. The first Section proposes a model of action and highlights the social role of FsOS in terms of their ability to give expression to human experience and their ability to arouse and fulfil expectations. It narrows down their social role into one function: their ability to forge a bond of insight and intimacy between language user and audience.

The second section follows up and refines this bond of intimacy into a politeness strategy. Politeness is the mechanism on which the ES relies for making his judgement as to which individual FOS he has to have recourse to in order to exact a transaction with his audience (i.e. persuade them), building on the merits of each FOS. By the end of this section, I shall argue that each individual FOS enables the ES to express a particular attitude towards his audience.

Chapter Four. This chapter is on critical discourse and its ultimate aim is to denaturalize the attitude of the ES towards his audience. It examines four main issues: (i) the basic and smallest unit of discourse, i.e. statement, (ii) institutions as sources and loci of power, and inter- and intra-institutional relations, (iii) the position of the institutional subject as the transmitter of authentic information vis-a-vis his audience as receivers of information, and (iv) the orders or conventions of discourse. These are the rules which, among others, specify who, when, what and where anybody can speak.
Chapter Five. This chapter examines the linguistic assumptions underlying the whole dissertation. It examines the function of language and proposes a three-stage model for the analysis of figurative expression along the lines of critical discourse. The three stages are: (i) the projection of the code of language [descriptive], (ii) a framework (made up of questions) for the provision of an interpretation of the relation between the institutional subject and his audience [interpretative], and (iii) a social account which provides reasons for why things happen the way they do [explanatory]. The chapter ends with an account of data.

Chapter Six. This chapter comprises data analysis with a view to demonstrating whether or not FsOS give rise to discourse or not. It also attempts to speculate if and why FsOS, in the two novels, differ in terms of quantity and quality, and what bearing this can have on distinguishing one discourse type from another.

Chapter Seven. This chapter comprises an empirical translation assessment with a view to demonstrating whether or not translators take into account the discourse aspect of figurative expression. It develops along the following basic lines: translation debates, a critique of various attempts at translating various types of FsOS, and an empirical translation assessment of the data. The chapter ends with conclusions and recommendations.
Chapter Two

FIGURES OF SPEECH

2. Introduction

This chapter examines the "anatomy" of various types of FsOS in order to establish whether each kind, though related to others, has a unique logic; and whether the mistaking of one for another produces "innocuous" consequences. FsOS in Arabic (Balāgha) Rhetoric divide into two main blocks: (al-Majāz al-Lughawī) "figures of language" and (al-Majāz al-ʿAqli) "figure of reason and intellect". There is also Kīnāya, a rather "fluid" figure that belongs to neither but which is not less interesting (see figure (i)).

Figures of language are traditionally divided into similarity-based FsOS, and contiguity-based FsOS. The first, the raison d'être of which is similarity, includes (isti-ṣāra) metaphor proper, (tashbīh) simile, and (tamthīl) analogy. The second, which is based on contiguity, is (al-Majāz al-Mursal) metonymy. I shall first examine the first category in the order mentioned above: metaphor, simile, and analogy, as this order with simile, the source, in the middle more readily facilitates the unravelling of the intertwined relationship between simile and its two branches, and allows, as it were, more freedom of movement from one to another.

2.1 (Isti ara) Metaphor Proper

Metaphor has for long taken pride of place among all other FsOS for its "arresting" effect on the audience; so much so that Aristotle in "Poetics" for example used metaphor generically to subsume all types of FsOS. Similarly, ʿAbdul Qāhir al-Jurjānī (died C 10) devoted most of his influential book (Asrār al-Balāgha) "The Secrets of Eloquence" to
(Majaz) Figurative Language in Arabic (Balaghah) Rhetoric

- Kinaya
- (Al-Majaz Al-Lughawi) Figure of Language
- (Al-Majaz Al-Aqili) Figure of Reason and Intellect

(Mujawara) Contiguity

(Tashbih) Similarity

(Al-Majaz Al-Mursal) Metonymy

- (Tamthil) Analogy
- (Istisara) Metaphor Proper
- (Tasbih) Simile

(Mufida) Expressive

(Ghair Mufida) Unexpressive

Figure (i)
similarity-based FsOS but started with (istiṣāra) metaphor proper for, among other things, its beauty, richness, and omnipresence (1983a: 40-2). Realising that it occurs in all types of word, i.e. noun, verb, adverb, adjective, and adverb 2, he singled it out for detailed discussion although it is but a (faraj) branch of simile, and he discussed it along with an exhaustive host of examples, comparing it once to simile and elsewhere to analogy, highlighting its merits and praising its imposing effect on the audience. He defined, and more importantly, confined metaphor to a transfer of meaning (vs transfer of name). Those who came after him, (e.g. al-Sakākī, died C 13) followed him in his approach, and even subdivided metaphor into eight sub-categories each time according to a different criterion (1983: 373) 3.

This being the case, it is quite natural to start with metaphor. I shall first deal with it as it is conceived of by Arab rhetoricians and then move to the theories of metaphor which have been dominant in the West, and end the discussion with a related issue, i.e. dead metaphor. Throughout this dissertation I shall be using metaphor in its Arabic or "proper" sense. I also propose to use al-Jurjānī’s definition of metaphor as my point of departure.

2.1.1 The Act of Borrowing Paradigm

Al-Jurjānī (1983a: 29) defines (istiṣāra) metaphor as:

A word which is in the language has a known basic meaning, is temporarily lent as it were, to something other than the original object.

For the explication of the mechanics of "istiṣāra" I shall take the "act of borrowing" as my paradigm and stick to the classical examples used by al-Jurjānī himself:
Among the commonplaces of "borrowing" are the following. First, it requires the presence of three entities: a lender, a borrower, and an entity (e.g. an object or an epithet) in the possession of the lender and which the borrower desperately needs for a particular "occasion". It is essential that the entity be a salient trait of the first and meeting the needs of the second so that he can make use of it on that occasion. These three things are called (arkān) the pillars of "istiāra". It is quite logical of course to take the (mustāär minhu) lender as more important than the (mustāär lahu) borrower as the former stands for himself and for the (mustāär) borrowed entity. Applying these criteria to the above example (2), we can say that "lion" is the lender, "man" the borrower, and "bravery" the borrowed entity.

Second, that the borrowing of "bravery" from "lion" to "man" is provisional; this means that metaphor confines the act of borrowing to borrowing of meaning rather than designation as this entails permanent reference. Instantly after the interpretation of metaphor, "man" does no longer belong to the species of lion.

Third, "borrowing" and as a politeness marker entails that one of the two parties to the "borrowing act" should provisionally make no "public appearances" and the other remain explicit. Naturally, it is the borrower who disguises himself and poses as the lender pretending that the borrowed entity is a perfect fit for him. In this case, the "borrowing act" is explicit and "istiāra" is called "taṢṭiHiya". But sometimes even the posing-as-lender borrower is made absent and the act of borrowing is implicit; for this reason "istiāra" is called "makniya". Of course, "istiāra" becomes more expressive, more arresting when this occurs. In this case, and to guard against attributing for
good the borrowed entity of the lender, (shai’un min lawāzimīhī) one of his belongings is retained, witness to his identity. Consider the following examples (3 and 4):

3- She is in the grip of fate.

where "she" is locatively put into the grip of (al-qadar) fate, an abstract entity, which is (implicitly) likened to a person (i.e. personified) who is then made absent and where (qabDa) "grip" characteristic only of human beings is retained signalling his presence.

Whereas in

4- You should have examined the cow before you bought it.

where the speaker, or the ES who is having an argument with her bridegroom about marriage, likens herself to (al-baqara) "cow" but nevertheless deletes all trace of her identity.

Fourth, for the recognition and occurrence of (istiāra) borrowing, the two parties involved should come from remote domains. Consider "man" and "lion", "person" and "fate", and "bride" and "cow" in the above examples.

Fifth, the deletion of the lender has the important consequence of creating the (iddiāa) pretence by the ES that the lender and borrower are of the same species; and that the borrowed entity is as becoming of the second as it is of the first.

Sixth, the "act of borrowing", in order to maintain its make-believe status, will contain a label, a (qarīna) context which can be (lafziya) cotexual such as "grip" in (3) which signals the impertinence of attributing "grip" to "fate", or (Ḫāliya) contextual
such as in (4) where the audience can identify from the absence of an actual cow, the intended referent.

Seventh, "borrowing" entails intentionality; otherwise why borrow? This occurs at the anterior of the borrowing act as it lies with the person who initiates communication in order to express a certain attitude with regard to the borrower (and to the audience). (5), (6) and (7) combined preserve well and express his interest so that he may not be taken as a liar.

According to al-Qazwīnī (died C 14) "istiāra" is absolved from lying on two accounts: that it hinges for its decoding on (ta'wil) analysis in that the audience have to work out some sort of relation between "man" and "lion" in the example above; and that the (naSb al-qarīna) provision of the context bears witness that it should not be taken at face value (1949: 190). The claim by anyone that "man" is a lion in (2) or that fate is a person is absurd and irrational. For this reason, a sort of inference related to the intention of the ES as to what he really means should be worked out by the audience. For with "istiāra" he provides a (qarīna) context to acquit himself; a predetermined liar does not. Instead, he creates a confusion (in the mind of his audience) rubbing out all traces of ill-intentionality.

The paradigm of "borrowing act" has hopefully fleshed out the logic and commonsense of "istiāra" as understood in Arabic (Balāgha) Rhetoric. Nevertheless it has at the same time made it necessary, if not inevitable, to reformulate a more succinct definition for "istiāra". Indeed, "istiāra" is defined by al-Sakākī (1983: 369) as that [statement] where someone explicitly states only one of the two extremes of (tashbīh) simile intending the other, on the pretence that (al-mushabbah) the lender has become of the same species of (al-mushabbah bihi) the borrower giving evidence
to that effect by attributing to the second what [originally] belongs to the first and blocking [but harbouring] (tashbih) similarity by way of solely stating it [the extreme].

Thus the definition explicitly states that metaphor is a one-extreme or a one-party FOS; this is probably its most outstanding characteristic. But at the same time it gives rise to a serious problem: it makes the reconsideration of "Zaid is a lion" unavoidable as both the lender and borrower are present in the statement.

Al-Jurjānī, touching on this delicate issue, rightly argues that this is a case of simile and that it is different from all cases of one-party "istiārah" statements. He builds his rebuttal on two points (1983a: 300-6). The first remarks that the bringing together of "mushabbah" and "mushabbah bihi" (i.e. lender and borrower) by the ES attests that his intention is to establish direct contact and strike similarity between the two parties, rather than to borrow. The second, and this is purely linguistic, concerns (isnād) predication. When someone says "Zaid is a lion" what is confirmed is lionity; for "Zaid" is (mubtada') subject and "lion" is (khabar) predicate, i.e. the ES does not assume the knowledge of his audience that "Zaid" is in possession of that particular trait, i.e. bravery. On the contrary, when someone says "the lion came" with "lion" referring to an absent-in-the-statement man, he assumes lionity as pre-established in the mind of the audience, and establishes the "coming" act as a predicate instead. So the difference between both is a difference of presupposition, i.e. how much knowledge the ES assumes his audience has.

However, al-Jurjānī (ibid. p. 304), states that should anyone insist, despite all this, that the "man is a lion" type is a type of "istiārah" we cannot but, though with reluctance, respect his desire. It should be noted, however, that it is a weak form of "istiārah", a "near istiārah". Thus the door was left ajar for other less convincing
arguments; though it is now established in Arabic Rhetoric that the "A is B" type is (tashbih baligh) an expressive or eloquent simile.

This is one of the gravest discrepancies between Arabic and Western rhetoric with respect to the conceptualization of metaphor proper. The discrepancy becomes harder and almost unjustifiable if we bear in mind that in pure linguistic terms, B (when undefined) is attributive, i.e. functioning as an epithet to A; a fact which gives credit to al-Jurjani's way of thinking. For example, "lion" in "that man is a lion" is attributive to "man" just as "ill" is attributive to "man" in "that man is ill" (see p. 154) Another discrepancy is that in the West, the oscillation still exists between the overgeneralization of Aristotle and the particularization as initiated by al-Jurjani in Arabic Rhetoric with respect to metaphor proper. A third discrepancy is that in the West, metaphor proper is very often taken as a case of name transfer; this is a serious matter because it has had the grave consequence of turning metaphor from the state of a nonce-statement serving a "momentary" purpose into a regular, permanent, and unintentional transfer which has its own rules for production and which serves but a language lacuna. This problem was inherited from Aristotle's definition of metaphor and into the trap of which some big names fell (e.g. Ullmann 1957: 220).

(Istiāra) Metaphor proper is of two kinds (al-Jurjani 1983a: 29-47). The first is (istiāra ghair mufida) the purposeless, unexpressive istiāra where the transfer remains within the same species such as when "hoof" is used for "foot" without good cause. The second is (istiāra mufida) the purposeful, expressive istiāra where the transfer is carried over from one domain to a remote one, such as the examples above. This kind of istiāra in turn divides into two kinds: one kind involving little (ta'wil) interpretation and analysis, and another involving extensive interpretation and analysis. This is because, among other reasons, the extremes of the first have an actual existence in real life (consider for example "lion and "man"); whereas the second deals with an abstract state, a state that does not exist:
5- And many a stormy morning I have cleared away and saved my people from when its reins were lying in the hand of the north wind.

where the ES attributes a hand to the north wind, (and reigns to the morning), although there is no corresponding part to which the designation could be applied as "lion" is applied to "man" in the example above. The poet attributes to the wind an unlimited control over the morning corresponding to the unlimited control a man has over a thing which he can turn hither and thither as he wishes. It is not easy to work out without extensive analysis what is compared to what- except that the wind is likened to the owner of the hand which gives him the ability to manoeuvre things around. This means that what is expressed is rather an attitude towards himself, his ability. This type is the most challenging and the most fascinating of all types of istibara.

But it should be noted that isti ara does not divide into discrete categories. From the examples cited above, it can be concluded that we are operating on a slope, a continuum where instances shade into each other. What is common to them all is that they are based on (surf) convention. Otherwise they remain unintelligible. This convention requires that it is not wise to say that "lion", for example, can be used to mean ruthlessness - simply because lions are not renowned for being ruthless. Before convention becomes established simile is preferable (ibid. pp.308-11). Consider the following chain of figurative language:

6- She is in the grip of fate
6-a Fate is her father
Where the ES, a feminist writer, negotiating the possibility of her audience misunderstanding her (for it has not been established yet that "fathers" are the same as "fate"), states explicitly the two extremes of the simile in (6-a).

By way of summary, (istiwāra) metaphor proper in Arabic Rhetoric is based on the logic of borrowing. This requires it to be, for politeness purposes, a one party FOS. It is essentially based on viewing something in terms of something else that comes from a different domain of life (such as lion and man) on the grounds of similarity. Similarity, however, is harboured in the psyche of the ES.

2.1.2 Theories of Metaphor

Having established the essentials of metaphor (proper) as conceived of in Arabic Rhetoric, I shall now review the most renowned theories in the West which deal with metaphor. These are: the substitution and comparison theories; the interaction theory; the verbal-opposition theory; and the pragmatic approach. Individually, each of these theories has its contributions and limitations which make it border but not transcend the other. Collectively, they span a period stretching from Aristotle until the present time. Because of this, they provide us with an overall and clear picture of the issues that have been occupying western thinking with regard to metaphor.

2.1.2.1 The Substitution Theory

Though this theory dates back to Aristotle, it still has its advocates in the twentieth century (e.g. Henle 1958). This theory claims that the metaphorical word (e.g. "lion" in "That man is a lion") has two senses: the literal or dictionary meaning and the figurative or that special meaning on which metaphor hinges. It also claims that if we substitute "brave" for "lion", the substitution would not be unacceptable. In brief, the metaphorical meaning is paraphraseable. Henle, however, admits that paraphrase can not exhaust the metaphorical meaning. This nevertheless does not raise his stakes as he
continues to say that by paraphrase metaphor loses its "epigrammatic quality" which reveals that his interest in metaphor does not go beyond the concerns of "economy" (ibid. pp.194-5) 6.

This theory is flawed on more than one account: it presupposes a one-to-one correspondence between words and objects (i.e. between L-i-o-n and the brave animal in the jungle called lion), and it presupposes a ready tailored paraphrase even to the most abstruse of metaphors. Furthermore, it also seems neglectful as to why and when we need paraphrase. This is a matter of great importance. We usually need to paraphrase something which is undeliberately vague to make it more determinate. This is not the case with metaphor which is intrinsically indeterminate and deliberately perplexing- though it should not be extremely perplexing. (Indeterminate because in the above example we do not know with absolute certainty if the man described as a lion is only brave or if he is also in possession of other royal nobilities such as kingship and reverence; and perplexing because of the contradiction between its terms). Otherwise why should the ES make the effort of looking for the metaphorical "lion" and ignore the literal "brave". In fact the elements of indeterminacy and perplexity are not by way of mistake but are deliberate and targetted at an audience (who can be of one member) capable of decoding it.

I am not of course accepting the theory that metaphor is necessarily more vague than literal language. We are able to understand "John is eating" even if we are not told what he is eating. The reason is simple: this is irrelevant- just as it is irrelevant (sometimes) to know exactly whether "lion" means only "brave" or any other royal nobilities. As Nowottny (1962: 59) puts it:

We should note that metaphors direct us to the sense, not to the exact term...[by doing this] metaphors allow us to supply an uncontaminated image from our own experience of the physical world (bold mine).
The substitution theory has a slightly more developed offspring called the comparison theory. This is predicated on the Aristotelian claim that metaphor is a compressed simile. It claims that the intention of the ES is to make a comparison, in the example above, between "man" and "lion". The result is that the metaphorical statement "that man is a lion" is more or less the same as "that man is like a lion" (in bravery) with the words in brackets making the ground or point of similarity common to both man and lion more explicit.

The comparison theory also claims that metaphor is more economic than simile. The absurdity of this claim does not lie only in the matter of economy (otherwise human communication should take the form of telegrams), but also in the fact that metaphor represents a temporarily complete fusion between the two terms involved, whereas simile maintains the distance. This means that each of them has its own "logic", as will become clearer in section 2.2 on simile.

2.1.2.2 The Interaction Theory

This theory emerged as a reaction against the substitution theory. It was first advocated by Richards (1965) and later developed by Black (1962, 1979). This theory admits of a greater role for metaphor which is seen as the omnipresent principle of language, and as such, irreplaceable by paraphrase. Instead of taking metaphor as a paraphraseable word-game, Richards (1965: 94) emphasized that metaphor involves "an interaction of thoughts, and a transaction between contexts". When we use metaphor "we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is the resultant of their interaction". These two thoughts are what he called tenor and vehicle, and which in cooperation give rise to a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either. Tenor corresponds to the proper term or principal subject; vehicle to the resembling entity or the way of saying it (man and lion in "the lion is coming" with "lion" referring to man). (From now
on I shall adopt these two terms as they are uncontaminated, and can refer to entities beyond the field of Rhetoric). In brief, metaphor is made up of a double unit the elements of which are inseparable except for theoretical purposes.

Black (1962: 39-41), on the other hand, is keen to demonstrate that in the metaphorical statement, interaction between its primary and secondary subjects (i.e. Richard's tenor and vehicle) takes place at the level of systems rather than words or things- with the second (i.e. "lion") "projecting" upon the first (i.e. man) a set of "associated implications" comprised in the implicative complex and which are predicatable of the secondary subject. In "that man is a lion" the ES views "man" and "lion" as two systems of corresponding structures. "Lion" projects upon "man" a network of commonplaces that are conventionally associated with it such as bravery, kingship, being worthy of respect, non-treachery, etc.; and this "projecting upon" organizes our view of the primary subject "man" highlighting some of his traits and suppressing others (such as animality).

This one-to-one correspondence between structures or between primary and secondary subjects puts Black unwittingly in the ranks of the substitutionists which he deliberately tries to supersede. The interaction theory, however, makes an advance on the substitution theory on the grounds of paraphraseability and intentionality as it allows more room for "context".

2.1.2.3 The Verbal-Opposition Theory

In "Metaphorical Twist" Beardsley (1962) is primarily interested in how metaphors create meaning and how they help in establishing a property as a "staple" meaning (i.e. narrowing down the connotations of a term from several to one- when the disappearance of these is not ad infinitum). Beardsley claims that a term has two sets of properties: the central or dictionary meaning, and the marginal or connotative meaning. He also claims that meaning evolves when there occurs an opposition between a term and other
terms in the statement. For example, the metaphorical statement "She is a rabbit" contains a clash between the human "she" and the non-human "rabbit". The logical opposition allows us to conclude that the statement does not mean that she is really an animal, for this is absurd; but that she is soft, fragile, and/or timid, etc. The recurrence of a context which highlights, say, "soft", makes "softness" a staple meaning of "rabbit".

To conclude, these theories collectively accounted successfully for the semantics of metaphor: the meaning of metaphor is the resultant of two entities (i.e. tenor and vehicle) that are both present in the statement, and that come from disparate domains. The substitution and comparison theories conceived of the relation between the metaphorical and literal as one of respectively substitution and comparison, and placed emphasis on how to paraphrase the metaphorical word with minimal loss of meaning; the interaction theory placed emphasis on the interaction between tenor and vehicle and viewed it as occurring between contexts; and the verbal opposition theory placed emphasis on the clash between tenor and vehicle and how the resultant meaning changes into a "staple" meaning.

Each theory solved a problem that originally gave rise to it; and all these theories essentially paid attention to what the individual components of the metaphorical statement say (vs mean). But they failed to account for the "human" component of metaphor, i.e. the individual who has recourse to using metaphor and what he means. It is probably this failure which gave rise to the pragmatic theory or approach by, among others, Levinson (1983) and Searle (1979).

2.1.2.4 The Pragmatic Approach

In general terms, "pragmatics" deals with the intentions of the language user. Language is viewed as a mode of action; and for this reason more emphasis is laid on what the language user means rather than on what his actual words say. This attitude
has been expressed by many sub-disciplines, (e.g. the speech act theory), which are wholly devoted to elaborating on language as a form of action.

In his speech act theory, Austin (1962) investigates the ability of utterances to perform action, a function which transcends the meaning of the individual lexical items comprising the utterance. For example, "I name you X" (when uttered under the proper conditions) performs the act of naming, and "It's hot in here", can lead to, say, performing the opening of the window. Individual words of these sentences do not, on their own, perform any action. Rather, it is the speaker who means or intends those actions to be performed.

Speech act theory was later developed by Searle (e.g. 1970) whose major contribution is probably the ascribing of three aspects to an utterance. These are: (i) locutionary act: the uttering of a meaningful utterance according to a set of rules prior to the utterance, (ii) illocutionary act: what the initiator of that utterance is performing, whether he is promising, asking, warning, and (iii) perlocutionary act: the effect of that utterance on the audience, whether they are persuaded, or, say, scared. I shall be re-visiting speech act theory in section 3.1.

While not denying that semantic theories play a role in the characterization of the literal meaning, Levinson (1983) calls for pragmatics to provide an interpretation of metaphor. This is because metaphor depends for its interpretation on factual and real world knowledge of referents, and not on dictionary meaning. In "I saw a lion" where "lion" refers to a "man", it is our knowledge obtained from outside the utterance, not semantics, that tells us that "lion" is king, brave, etc. Levinson also stresses the role of the audience in working out the relevance or irrelevance of metaphor to a given context and therefore, its interpretation. He claims that conversational maxims can play a role in the recognition of metaphor. For example, either the semantic impertinence of referring to a man as a lion, or its irrelevance (when there is no lion in
sight) is a flouting of respectively the maxims of quality and relevance, and this creates a trigger alerting the audience to the presence of a metaphor (see 3.3).

Searle (1979) also makes an invaluable contribution which lies in the distinction he makes between the literal meaning of a sentence and the meaning of a speaker's utterance. He places the metaphorical meaning on the second level which is, he rightly adds, dependent on the first. For example, in the example quoted above, it is the speaker and not the words who says that the woman is, for example, soft; but we cannot arrive at this meaning without knowing the literal meaning.

Moreover, (unlike Black), Searle's emphasis that both vehicle and tenor play a role in narrowing down the contextually relevant feature is particularly useful. For according to the first, "You" in "You are a rabbit" can be interpreted as having the same meaning whether the referent is a man or woman. According to Searle, it is most likely to attribute timidity to man and softness to woman. This means that in order to narrow down the possibilities of interpretation, we have to alternate between the tenor and vehicle.

Despite its advances on the previous semantic theories, the pragmatic approach remains, regrettably, reliable only on individual and isolated instances of metaphor, many of them are even simulated. More serious than that, is the fact that the pragmatic approach is atomistic in its view of action. It views action as emanating wholly from the individual, and is often conceptualized in terms of the strategies adopted by the individual speaker to achieve his goals or intentions.

By way of summary, I have proceeded in my argument through three stages of development in the conceptualization of metaphor. In the first stage the weight of metaphor was laid on the word; in the second on the sentence; and in the third, where the meaning of the sentence is relegated, on the speaker's intention, i.e. on the statement.
2.1.3 The Nature and Power of Metaphor

From the above exposition it can be concluded that metaphor is characterized by momentariness (of reference), intentionality (towards an audience), and awareness of sort-crossing. "Sort-crossing" refers, according to Turbayne (1962: 21), to the awareness of the ES that the tenor and vehicle do not belong to the same species and therefore, metaphor is not weak, but a fully fledged one. The first criterion safeguards a proper interpretation of metaphor and guards against taking it as a matter of nomenclature, and helps to weed out ambiguities (see next section on Dead Metaphor); the second guards against taking discourse as purposeless; and the third guards against non-recognition of metaphor.

This has been demonstrated by al-Jurjānī (1983a: 29) who claims that (isti ara) metaphor involves (iddā) the pretence that the (istiārī) metaphorical word is of the same species of the word as it is used originally in language. Turbayne has (1962: 17) also echoed the same view when he claimed that metaphor involves "the pretence that something is the case when it is not, and I implicitly ask my audience to do the same". Turbayne (ibid. p. 21) also states that metaphor gives you two ideas not "in one" but "as one"; and that the metaphor is capable of "shifting attitude", which can result in effecting a change in facts.

Metaphor, however, does not derive its power solely from the pretence it involves, but also from being the most succinct (qālib) form when compared to other FsOS. This trait assigns to it a brevity which is but a consequence of the fusion of terms signalling an attitude by the ES towards an entity- rather than a means luring him to have recourse to this figure whenever words fail him on a given occasion as it is sometimes claimed. To demonstrate this important issue I shall discuss the "fate" metaphor mentioned above:

7- She is in the grip of fate.
"Fate" in this example is likened to the heroine's father thus attributing to him all connotations of fatality, ruthlessness and arbitrariness; and then in a second move is turned by the locative "in" into a landmark, a place. While magnifying him, this results in a dwarfing of the heroine herself and makes of her a defenceless prisoner (to incite sympathy for her). What has been achieved in a few words cannot be accomplished by many statements.

In the following section, I shall deal with a related issue, i.e. dead metaphor, as this will shed new light on metaphor.

2.1.4 Dead Metaphor

The traditional definition of dead metaphor is that it is a "single unit" metaphor (e.g. Henle 1958: 188). As is clear, the term suggests that there is no interaction between the literal and the metaphorical meanings which in this case unite into one. But as to when death of metaphor occurs, the majority claim that this happens due to the process of ageing and/or due to public overuse. Newmark (1980: 85), for example, divides metaphor according to age: dead, cliché, stock, recent, and original. This is an overgeneralization. For while "X is a wolf" is still effective, tens of metaphors die the day they are born. There is also confusion as to what can be categorized as dead metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 22), for example, take "The leg of the table" and "Time is money" as equally dead metaphors. This involves a sort of misunderstanding. To disambiguate the whole issue, I shall deal with the following three groups of metaphors:

8- The leg of the table.
8-a The foot of the mountain.
8-b Lip-stick.
9- Time is money.
9-a Don't waste my time.
9-b I have no time to give you.
10- That man is a pig.
10-a That man is dirty.

According to the principles elaborated above for the metaphoricality of metaphor, the first group is a case of name and permanent transfer and involves no sort-crossing. Stern (1931: 168) calls this type of transfer "unintentional transfer". The transfer involved in the examples above (i.e. group 8) is according to function and position (of leg), position (of foot), and shape (of cosmetic device) respectively. This is not a case of metaphor but rather a case of catachresis, the function of which is to fill a language lacuna; and therefore, is not of any interest as far as this dissertation is concerned.

On the contrary, the second group of examples (9) make a network of related metaphors which express "time" in terms of "money" (or something valuable); but since they have been absorbed in language, their users are victims to the language system because they are not aware of the sort-crossing involved. They are what Turbayne (1962: 21-7) calls "trespassers", i.e. they are not aware that they are using metaphors. The difference between this group and the first is that these were originally metaphors but are now naturalized and hidden; we acquiesce to the make-believe. It is this kind of metaphor that can be called "dead" metaphor. Of those who showed interest in dead metaphor are Reddy (1979), and Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

In "Conduit Metaphors", Reddy deals with metaphors whereby the language user creates ideas as objects and puts them into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who automatically takes the object/idea out of the word/container:

11- I gave you that idea.
Through a large number of examples Lakoff and Johnson try to demonstrate that dead metaphors make networks of interrelated metaphors and underlie the whole of our conceptual system. For example, "Time is money" enables us to see "time" as a resource which, among other things, can be quantified and/or assigned value per unit. This type of dead metaphor does not lie within the scope of this dissertation.

Example (10), on the other hand, makes a different case: it meets all the requirements of a metaphor. The fact that "dirty" has been entered into the dictionary does not attest that it is a dead metaphor (for why opt for the dehumanizing "pig" rather than simply "dirty"), but rather that it has acquired a "staple" meaning (see 2.1.2.3). This type of metaphor can be called dormant, established; but not dead. It is worth pointing out a remark by Cooper (1986: 111) in this connection that with duller metaphors, the audience's interest is more confined to what "the actual speaker has in mind"; and "the more people agree in how they receive a metaphor...the more it sounds appropriate to speak of it being understood and interpreted".

Jamieson (1980) also claims that the use of clusters of established metaphors which do not tantalize with freshness signal a special relationship between the ES and the audience. For example Pope Paul VI, who wanted to identify himself with the church to prove himself a legitimate heir to the late pope, used an extended but established metaphor to suggest that he was the legitimate heir to the papacy (e.g. church is a body, Christ is the head, the pope is his vicar); while an American presidential candidate used more culture-bound metaphors that suited especially an American (Catholic) society. He used metaphors such as "The president is not a Santa Claus" to differentiate himself from the former governor and from other politicians.

Throughout this section on metaphor, I have argued, among other things, that metaphor is an intentional use of language, and that it divides into live, established,
and dead metaphor—when given a synchronic reading, i.e. ignoring time considerations. While the first two types remain distinct from literal language, the third dissolves in and becomes part of it. Having done this, I shall devote the following two sections to examining metaphor's two foster-sisters, simile and analogy.

2.2. (Tashbih) Simile

In this section I shall deal with the following issues: (i) the nature of and the difference between figurative and literal similes, (ii) the logic of simile vis-a-vis metaphor, (iii) empirical studies and the pair simile/metaphor.

In Arabic Balâgha, a simile is a FOS which obtains when

similarity between two entities (or more)
sharing a particular trait is drawn for the achievement of a targeted end, and it is signalled by an explicit or retrievable particle such as "like" or "ka".

In simile the terms involved refer to their conventionally known referents, and it can be made up of as many as four constituents: vehicle, tenor, simile particle, and ground or common trait. Consider the following example:

12- The feminine ending attached to her name linked her to girls' lists like a link in a chain.
In both texts $A$ stands for tenor, $B$ for vehicle, $C$ for the comparison particle, and $D$ for the ground or common trait. $A$ and $B$ are indispensible, $C$ can be disposed of, and $D$ is optional and should be worked out without difficulty.

As is clear from the example the tenor and vehicle come from two remote domains. This is essential for the recognition of simile and for its distinction from the literal comparison (i.e. as...as) or literal simile such as:

13- The face of Bahiah is like the face of Zakiyah.

where no category-crossing is involved. The difference between the literal and the figurative simile is that the first is controversial and can be denied by those who hold a different view; whereas the second can be verified by empirical proof.

There are three simile particles: (ka), (mithl), and (ka'anna); the first two of which can mean any of: "as", "like", or "look like". The third means "as if" or "as though". When compared with the other two particles, it does not look as prestigious. This is because, unlike the other two particles, it usually involves only one entity in two different postures. It, therefore, betrays an element of uncertainty on the part of the ES. For example, we say: (ka'anna fulān[an] jālis[un]) "As if X is sitting", where X's two different postures are compared one to another. Without necessarily conceding that it is inferior to other particles, (as according to Cruise (1986), every lexical item possesses what he calls "criterial traits" which make it discrete from every other item), it can be concluded that (ka'anna) "as if" has its own logic (see p. 236)

As for the second point, i.e. the logic of simile and metaphor, it has been pointed out that the comparison theory took metaphor as a compressed simile. This is a false assumption on several grounds. First, because as we have seen, metaphor is a case of (momentary) fusion, and as such is a case of classification. In "She is in the grip of
fate" (where the reference is to her father) both vehicle and tenor have been made one and the same thing with the result that it can be said that "fathers" are of many kinds, one of which is fate. Simile, on the other hand, is a case of comparison. In the example above (11), the feminine ending is compared to a chain on the ground that both can perform the job of oppression; and both are kept apart by "like".

Second, simile is neither semantically impertinent nor at the mercy of the context for its disambiguation (such as "The rabbit is coming"- with "rabbit" referring to a girl), for it is never ambiguous. In fact tenor and vehicle retain their literal meanings.

Third, structurally a metaphor is not always convertible to a simile as the substitution theory suggests. Consider the following example: "Numbers are my only friends" where if "like" is inserted a totally different version would obtain. And even if only by way of experiment a simile was transformed into a metaphor (or vice versa) without causing structural damage, the result again would be two different versions. Let us consider the following chain of similes (underlined) hypothetically changed into metaphors. The Arabic source text will be followed by a translation from the official target text (A), and then similes will be changed into metaphors (B); the corresponding similes/metaphors will be marked by the same numbers:

14-a Everything about them became confused. Their every aspect could be identified to its opposite.

A smile was like (1) a frown,
greeting like (2) a menace.

32
truth like (3) a lie,
virtue like (4) a vice, and
love like (5) hate.

14-b Everything about them became confused. Their every aspect was identified to its opposite.

A smile (1) was a frown,
greeting (2) a menace,
truth (3) a lie,
virtue (4) vice, and
love (5) hate.

A close scrutiny of (14-a) reveals that the tenors "smiles", "greetings", "truths", "virtues", and "love" border but are not identical to their respective vehicles. Whereas in (14-b) there is characterization of tenor and vehicle. This gives birth to two different versions of judgement. In (14-a) men are being accused by the ES, a feminist writer, of malfunction. Malfunction can be cured; all kinds of diseases can be cured, at least in theory. In (14-b) men are being depicted as naturally evil. This can not be medicated. As a consequence, it can be argued that the "logic", the usage of the simile/metaphor pair, is different.

As for the third point, several empirical studies have been carried out to see whether or not simile is inferior to metaphor, and to assess the change of attitude each can effect on the audience. Reinch (1971) has concluded that both FsOS produce desirable rhetorical effects, with the balance shifting more in favour of metaphor. Metaphor, however, does not further enhance the credibility of the ES.

There is yet another point to be made. This has to do with the fact that his experiment was restricted to an audience of students. This could have a crucial impact on the reception of metaphor and of the preference of conviction to politeness or vice versa.
This conclusion is not, however, subjective. Siltanen (1981) has concluded that sex metaphor was most effective with, as it is more appealing to, a young audience. It induced them to identify themselves with the speaker and eventually change attitude (i.e. become persuaded). She concludes her article with a rhetorical question as to whether death would not be more frightening especially to old men and women. There is no logical reason why some types of simile should not be more appealing than others to certain groups or communities.

2.3. (Tamthāl) Analogy

Analogy was studied in Arabic (Balāgha) Rhetoric in terms of its relation to (tashbīh) simile on the one hand, and in terms of its relation to (isti‘āra) metaphor on the other. This resulted in two types of analogy: (tamthāl al-tashbīh) the complex simile and (tamthāl al-isti‘āra) analogy proper.

Complex simile can be defined as a kind of simile teased from the complex of many a thing, and where the terms retain their original meaning as set in the language. Like simile it is always signalled by the comparison particle:

الآن شيء غريب يحدث لجسدها وهي تبتعد عن الأرض، إنها
بصبح أقل تهاز، كأنها تخفف في كل خطوة من أقوال علب.

15- Now something strange began to happen to her body as she moved away [up the mountain]. It was getting lighter. It was as if she were shedding her body with every step.

What is compared in this case is not just two entities: her body with something else. Rather, it is a comparison between her body which is being relieved (from an invisible burden) with every step it moves up across the mountain and something that is jettisoning its cargo thus saving itself from certain danger. Once any of these elements is missed, the complex simile is broken up. It is quite clear that this type of simile needs more analysis.
for its interpretation than the simple, common one i.e. it is more demanding. But it is more interesting, more ecstatic. Moreover, it is quite illustrative as it is more dramatised.

As for analogy proper, it obtains at the sentence level. It also involves a lot of analysis because its ground does not lie in the words involved themselves, but rather in the (muqtaDa) corollary of these words. This kind of analogy has the merit of producing two images in one: an illustrating descriptive one which is not intended, and an analogically expressive one which is intended (i.e. corollary). Such is the case when someone is addressed as:

16- أراك تقدم رجل وتطعض آخر

16- I see that you are moving one foot forward and one foot backward.

This kind of analogy (which transforms in the process of time into a proverb) is said to someone who is hesitant whether or not to carry out a certain action. It expresses a state of conditions that obtains in actual life. For this reason it is very often used to help resolve controversies as it is quite evidential. Because of the evidentially "factual" nature of analogy the danger sometimes exists in taking it as a case of personification. Let us consider the following example:

17- "واضع الفلك بعييننا"

17- Gloss: "And make the ark before "OUR EYES."

The taking of "Our Eyes" in the above Qur'anic verse (in which God addresses Noah) as a case of metaphoric personification results in anthropomorphism. This is because the comparison is being confined to God and another person watching, rather than to the corollary of the act of watching itself. As a metaphor it reads: Make the ark with our eyes looking at you. As an analogy it reads:
God watching: Noah making the ark :: Craftsman: apprentice making what his master has asked him to do.

In actual words, this can mean that Noah was commanded to make the ark under the complete supervision and inspiration of God just as an apprentice carries out his duties exactly as he has been taught and told to do by his master. While mastery of work and craftsmanship is guaranteed, it does not necessarily require the master's looking all the time with his eyes on the apprentice (for good craftsmen train their apprentices thoroughly and these listen well). This is how the taking of the same statement as a case of analogy makes it compatible with commonsense and helpful in interpreting away (religious) dogmatic difficulties.

To summarize, I have demonstrated in the three sections above that each of the three FsOS (i.e. metaphor, simile and analogy) has its own unique logic, so much so that when confused it might not produce innocuous results. Metaphor is characterized by conflating tenor and vehicle, simile by preserving distance between them, and analogy, a hybrid of both, by naturally carrying some of the "genes" of either. These three figures, however, have the common denominator of being based on similarity. In the following, I shall discuss the common ground underlying the three FsOS.

2.4. The Ground or Point/s of Similarity

Among those who based the FsOS mentioned above on the relation of similarity are al-Jurjānī (1983a) and Beekman (1974). The general agreement among them is that underlying these figures is one (or more) dominant trait that is common to both tenor and vehicle. This common trait is called ground, and it can be worked out through the senses when the common attribute or trait lies in the vehicle or through (aqāl) intellect when it is a corollary of the attributes. The missing or misunderstanding of the point of similarity between them could undermine the whole logic of the FOS as we have seen in (17).
But there is yet another more important issue and this is related to the very raison d'etre of similarity: is it pre-existing or has it yet to be discovered? In fact, similarity should not be taken as simply and merely pre-existing, in the sense that anyone can discover some sort of similarity between things. This is trivializing of similarity on the one hand, and on the other hand it makes all people seem equal in their talents. This is quite absurd. Instead, it can be argued that similarity is pre-existing but cannot be discovered except by those upon whom some sort of creative imagination has been bestowed which distinguishes them from others. When discovered it is then passed on to the audience for working out the connection. To say that it is simply pre-existing or that everything is like everything else in some respect can amount to saying that these figures are null and mere tautologies. How can it be claimed that, say, "Encyclopedias are like gold mines" or "I have a gold mine at home" are tautologies? Or that anyone can discover the relation of similarity between the tenor and vehicle? The ability to unearth similarity between objects simultaneously gives pleasure and facilitates interpretation; the failure to do so on the part of the audience puzzles them and thwarts understanding.

It can be concluded from the exposition above, that analogy makes the most abstruse case because it is embedded in a relation that cannot be worked out without extensive analysis. Furthermore, the ground is lacking. Both types of analogy are multi-faceted, and the point of similarity can be worked out only through intellect, though with some difficulty. Simile, on the other hand, is signalled by the comparison particle and very often has the ground provided.

According to al-Jurjānī (1983a: 110-11) there are two factors which determine the remoteness of similarity. The first relates to the attribute and to the object in which that attribute resides and to their recurrence: the closer to our senses the object, the closer the attribute, and the more familiar it becomes. This factor can lead to the figure being established. If we compare the chain simile (12) with the smile/frown simile (14)
above we can argue that the former is less familiar because smiles are daily scenes. At the same time it can be strongly claimed that the latter is more familiar, more recurrent than, say, "Numbers are my only friends". The second factor relates to the degree of "particularization" of the figure: the more particularized the figure is, the less vague. The following simile is an example:

Their legs never parted in the way human legs normally do. Rather, it was a worm-like movement whereby girls' feet moved while their legs and knees remained clamped, and their thighs pressed together as if they were protecting something they were afraid might fall.

It describes in detail the way an Egyptian girl walks: the movement of feet, legs, knees, and thighs; and the reason for that worm-like movement is explicitly stated. This, while making the figure more interesting, makes it more demanding for processing.

So far I have analysed the three FsOS which are based on similarity: (istībāra) metaphor proper, (tashbīh) simile and (tamthīl) analogy as well as the relations (of similarity) underlying them. In the following two sections I shall first consider (al-Majāz al-Mursal) metonymy which is based on a completely different concept. Metonymy is defined in terms of its relationship with similarity-based group. After metonymy, I shall consider kināya.

2.5 (Al-Majāz al-Mursal) Metonymy

Among those who based transference on the relations of similarity and contiguity are al-Jurjāni (1983a); Prescott (1959); Ullmann (1951); Stern (1931); and Jakobson (1956). These, apart from Jakobson, share almost the same view. Jakobson diverges
from the rest not with regard to the relation itself, but rather with regard to his conceptualization of metaphor and metonymy. He relates them respectively to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of discourse, and tries to account, through them, for its development. This is not relevant. What is relevant, however, is that he coincides with al-Jurjānī in keeping metonymy intact; others divide it into metonymy and synecdoche. This will later become clear.

Like metaphor, metonymy is also a FOS which involves transference from one entity to another, i.e. using a term to refer to a referent other than that most commonly evoked by it. Both require consciousness and intentionality on the part of the ES for their success. Such is the case when reference is made to (yad) "hand", the organ, by respectively manual power and "beneficence" in the following examples:

19- All hands on deck.
20- I owe him a hand (Lahū indī yad[unj]).

For this reason metaphor and metonymy are manifestations of the same linguistic phenomenon of transference.

Metonymy, however, differs from metaphor with respect to its fertility and richness, and with respect to the relation underlying it. As for the first, metaphor, as has been shown, colonises all language territory as it occurs in all word types. Metonymy obtains only in nouns which only, as Ricoeur (1975: 56) puts it, "correspond to", or "connect with", one another. From the point of view of some philosophers (e.g. Ricoeur 1975), they form what is called respectively metonymy and synecdoche. "Hand" for example, according to this point of view, is a synecdoche of "man" in (19) in a part/whole relationship; and a metonym of "beneficence" in (20) in a causal relationship. But the division is hazy as there is a great deal of overlapping between the two. For example, in (19) "hand", the symbol of manual work can also stand in a causative relationship with "men", as it is the organ which makes of them labourers.
For this reason it can also be considered a metonym. It is because of this reason that the distinction will be ignored. This is not, however, a subjective judgement. Sinclair (1987: 35) demonstrates that "metonymy and synecdoche are variations on the range of meanings available in a single word or phrase". He does not suggest that there is any separation between the two; on the contrary, they are convertible one to another.

As for the second point, while similarity is the sole relation with metaphor, the relation with metonymy is free; thus the Arabic word "mursal". It is most commonly referred to by (mujāwara) "contiguity". As the term suggests, the relation is not as stringent as it is with "similarity". Despite being a fuzzy and rather loose category, "contiguity" allows terms (expressing two separate phenomena) to stand one for the other on the basis of several types of relationship on which I do not believe it is necessary to elaborate. This happens, as al-Jurjānī (1983a: 366) puts it:

\[
\text{وأَنَّ حَرِيضَةَ عَلَى الدَّاخِلي}
\]
\[
\text{إِنَّمَا هُوَ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْحَكَم}
\]
\[
\text{يَنَاذِيَ إِلَى الْشَّيْءِ مِن}
\]
\[
\text{غَيْرِهِ، وَكَمَا يَسِيقُ الْشَّيْءَ}
\]
\[
\text{بِراَثَةِ مَا يَجاَوِرُهُ وَيَنْصِبُ}
\]
\[
\text{بِلُونِ مَا يَدَادِيهِ}
\]

just as a thing will be redolent of the smell of what is adjacent to it, and tinged with the colour thereof.

As a result of this fuzziness, there ensued a serious consequence: the (istinād) interrelationship between the two referents involved (i.e. hand and beneficence) is not as strong as it is with metaphor. In "I saw a lion" (where "lion" refers to a man) the tenor and vehicle cannot be interpreted without referring one to another. On the contrary, in (Lahū sindī yadu(n)) "I owe him a hand", the interrelationship is weaker, so much so that according to al-Jurjānī (1983a: 372):

\[
\text{وَكَذَا كَلَّوَّ اَلْدَعَةُ مَدْغَةٌ أَن}
\]
\[
\text{حِيَ الْبِدٍ عَلَى النَّعْمَةِ أَمَل}
\]
\[
\text{وَلَهُ مِنْ مَجَازٍ لَّمْ يَكْنَ}
\]
\[
\text{مَدْعِيََ بِحِيَالِهِ الْمَلَكَ}
\]

if a pedant argued that the use of "hand" is a particular dialect or a new linguistic creation and not a figurative use he would not be claiming something that reason would reject.
Should he try with the case of istiña, he will be seeking [to do] a highly improbable thing.

For illustration let us consider the following example:

21- She hid behind a wall panting. Soon the taxi drove with the three heads [of her father, uncle, and husband] and disappeared in the traffic.

The metonym underlined expresses a part/whole relationship with its primary referent: "heads" reducing the whole of, say, father, to its most significant distinguishing organ, i.e. head. As is clear, a pedant can argue that (al-ruūs) "heads" can be taken literally, rather than figuratively.

The weak interrelationship between the two terms involved results from what can be called "distance elimination", (i.e. that people have for long observed that it is the organ of, say, the hand which stands for physical or manual effort, and therefore, they ignored the difference between both). This distance elimination probably explains the process of reification which metonymy produces: metonymy expresses phenomena as facts. It also explains why it requires little effort by the audience to dismantle the "fragile" and weak relation between the primary and secondary referents- unlike metaphor. It is probably due to this that al-Jurjâni was rather uninterested in metonymy and fascinated by metaphor, so much so that according to Abu Deeb (1979: 190) his analysis of the first was primarily for the sake of highlighting the nature of the second.

Al-Jurjâni, however, is not alone in his attitude towards metonymy. Prescott (1959: 215-6) is even more discriminating as he states that "the ability to do this [associate
ideas by similarity] separates man's mind from the brute's which seems to proceed only through contiguity". He also claims that the "association by contiguity goes on by a kind of mental habit which tends to routine thinking, while association by resemblance is active and progressive" (ibid.).

It is true that metaphor and metonymy are the realizations of two different mental activities: one is active, the other idle. But a rationale can be worked out for Prescott and al-Jurjānī, especially the latter. Both are working and dealing with these figures within the context of poetry—where aesthetics and creativity predominate, while factual statements become secondary. It must be pointed out, however, that al-Jurjānī did not go as far as labelling metonymy as a single-unit figure as Abu Deeb (1979: 190) claims. All that al-Jurjānī has claimed concerns the weak relationship between the primary and secondary referents. After all, a scrutiny of metonymy would reveal that it does contain semantic impertinence when interpreted against its context. More than that it can make a device by means of which the ES can express some attitude when used effectively. Let us examine the following example in which a feminist writer describes the daily life of the Egyptian people:

She walked along, observing people on the treadmill of life struggling for a mouthful of bread.

Is it not the case that the use of (luqmat al-3aish) "mouthful of bread" instead of "sustenance" is more expressive, and hence shows more sympathy towards the people described? Is not the taking literally of "mouthful of bread" as irrational, and illogical as the taking literally of "man" to be a "lion".

The degrading of metonymy on the basis that it requires but a little measure of thinking can be taken to underly the assumption, which is wrong, that all real life
situations require the same amount of thinking; that all sorts of audiences have got the same level of education; and that aesthetics invariably overrides factual statements. This is absurd. This matter is pursued not within the framework of superiority or inferiority of metonymy, but rather within the framework of its viability. For without bearing this in mind, metonymy is not worthy of the designation "figure of speech".

Ironically, it is that weak interrelationship between the two extremes of metonymy which produces reification, durability, and the factual "touch" it maintains. According to Stern (1931: 355-6) metonymy requires for its eventual birth two conditions. First, that there must have been some sort of contextual connection between the primary and secondary meanings of a word (e.g. between "hand" and "beneficence"). Second, that there must be a period of preparation in which terms occur together with sufficient frequency to allow a firm association to be established between a word and the notion that comes from its secondary meaning. This preparation or "incubation" period allows us to conclude that metonymy is based on past experience. This in turn accords it credibility, and has the consequence of making it context-free, with respect to its intelligibility. It is this past experience which probably brought misfortune and bad reputation to this FOS-making the use of it characteristic of the brute's mind.

2.6 Kināya

Linguistically, kināya is derived from the root "kana" which means to refer indirectly and/or euphemistically to something in terms of something else. Such is the case when reference is made (in Arabic) to dignity in terms of keeping one's head or eyes raised high, or to genitalia in terms of that "between the legs".

Kināya is a FOS based on the same mechanism as metaphor, analogy, etc. in that it evokes a series of associations between two entities where A presents the reality of B. It also derives its logic from the meaning of the speaker rather than the meaning of the
sentence 17. However, in kinaya the latter is invariably literally true, though insignificant. This insignificance creates some sort of irrelevance (when it is interpreted against its context) pushing the audience to burrow for some relation between the two layers of meaning: the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the speaker. This relation is one of entailment, with the second being a (malzûm) corollary of the first, which is, in its own right, (lazim) factual and can be intended. Thus kinâya is a FOS based on a "smoother" kind of transference and which has one foot in (Haqiqa) literal language and another in (majazi) figurative language. For this reason the ES has the status of someone who claims something and provides the evidence for its substantiation. Let us consider the following example:

23-She had never walked up a mountain road, as she was doing now, *Her life had always run on flat, horizontal lines.*

Taken literally, the underlined words would remain true but trivially descriptive. But once we take into consideration that this is an evaluative statement about the life of the heroine we are obliged to make associations between (khaT ufiqi) "flat horizontal lines" and (malzumuha) its corollary, i.e. that it entails routine and dull life. To arrive at this conclusion, we have, according to Abu Deeb (1979: 166), to invoke our knowledge of cultural and social context on the one hand, and a set of logical and factual links relating them on the other. Thus the logic of kinaya is based on the interdependence and interrelationship of two factual statements each leading to the other: the first descriptive, the second evaluative.

In terms of accessibility, kinaya has been divided, according to the number of steps it requires for its decoding, into two types: near kinaya, and remote kinaya:
24- X has a lot of ashes under his cauldron.

25- لمرأة التي ترتل أذى بيدها، فضحتها على وجهها...

25-a لكن عينيها ظلت مرفعتين إلى أعلى

25-b وأنفها له ارتفاعه حادة

25- She laughed snapping her fingers, so he slapped her face
25-a ...but her black eyes were still upturned.
25-b and her nose kept its sharp upward tilt.

In a culture the members of which do not use wood for cooking and cauldrons as the normal size pots, and who do not emphasize hospitality to guests as a moral value, the statement would remain meaningless. It would even change into satire as Abu Deeb (1979: 76) suggests. For it can mean that X has a large family or that they are greedy. In addition to this is the fact that to arrive at the meaning of the speaker, the audience has to make a series of associations. Within the context of praise these associations can be coded as follows:

X burns a lot of fire --->
A lot of cooking is done --->
Many people must be there to eat the food --->
X is frequently visited by people --->
These people must be guests; otherwise why cook? --->

conclusion: X is a hospitable man.

where ---> means "entails".

On the contrary, (25) is easier to process on the ground that it involves fewer steps and that the image of dignity/humiliation does exist in others' cultures; though they
might use different organs of the body. For example, English uses "head" instead of "eyes".

Given that kināya is the most deeply culture-based FOS, as the examples demonstrate, I propose a somewhat different classification of kināya: culture-bound kināya, and universal kināya. The first remains confined to, and almost unintelligible beyond, a certain culture; the second, dealing with a wider range of cultural concepts, can be said to make more recognizable constructs in more than one culture (consider 24 and 25 respectively).

To sum up, in the section on metonymy I have underlined the importance of the "rehabilitation" of this FOS and demonstrated that the weak interrelationship between the primary and secondary referents simultaneously renders it difficult to recognize and accords it a touch of reification. In kināya, I have highlighted its cultural dimension. In the following section, I shall examine (al- Majāz al-Aqlī) the figure of reason and intellect which is defined in terms of its relation with figures of language.

2.7 (Al-Majāz al-Aqlī) The Figure of Reason and Intellect

It has been demonstrated in the preceding sections on metaphor and metonymy that they both occur at the level of the word, and that they involve a figurative usage of a particular word to refer to a referent other than that to which it conventionally refers (in language). For this reason they are called (al-Majāz al-lughawi) figures of language.

The figure of reason and intellect, on the other hand, does not occur at the word level. Rather, it occurs at the sentence level, though neither the sentence as a whole nor any of its constituent words are exploited to mean other than what they conventionally mean. The figurative usage occurs when (isnād) the ascription of (fāsiliya) agency in a sentence is made to other than the legitimate agent. For this reason the figurative "intention" is not arrived at by way of language (for words retain their meanings), but by way of (aql)
reason and intellect. For example, (Halaqtu sha'irī) "I cut my hair, lit." is figurative because agency is given to "I", not to the barber who normally cuts the hair. Because this category lacks a clearly cut one-to-one corresponding category in English, I shall first introduce "ascription".

According to al-Jurjānī (1983a: 338-9), an indicative sentence (i.e. a statement "khabar"), whether negative or positive, is either transitive or intransitive. The former divides into two types: first, that which has a definite object (i.e. patient) such as "hitting" in "I hit Zaid", where what the ES confirms and ascribes to himself is merely hitting; "I" and " Zaid" had already been in existence before the act of hitting took place, second, that which has an absolute object or patient such as "create" in "God created the world", and where "created" ascribes the "world", not the creation act, to "God". Before this act the world was not in existence. The deliberate ascription of agency to other than the legitimate and actual agent would be figurative. For example, in "Nature provided the bee with antenna to find out its way", the ascription of the "provision" act to "nature" by a (jāhil) common, illiterate man or a Darwinist is not figurative: the first uses it out of ignorance, the second out of belief in what he believes to be the case. But the ascription by a Muslim is figurative, and benign; but should he cling to his claim if he were to be reminded, he could be taken as an apostate. As such, the conscious use of the above statement does not impair his faith.

Thus intimate knowledge is a prerequisite for passing a sound judgement by the audience on the ES's intention. This knowledge should obtain by way of background knowledge about him. Let us see how this can be negotiated in a "natural" text by both the ES and by the audience:
26-a  Can *that body which dissolved in the universe* create *in that vanishing point another body* attached to the earth?

26-a  She felt the new pulse deep within her like magical life born out of nothingness.

where (A) refers to agent, (V) to verb and (P) to patient.

These are two consecutive statements. In (26) the ES can be accused of rejecting faith for having ascribed the act of creating a foetus (i.e. a new body) to his mother. But given the fact that the statement takes the form or mood of a rhetorical question it can be argued that the ES was in a situation of exasperation. This might absolve the ES from some responsibility. However, (26-a) provides an answer to the question the ES asks and casts fresh doubts about her faith-rejection, not only because the answer is positively yes, but also because it includes another instance of figure of reason and intellect in which she ascribes the creation of "magical" life to "nothingness". However, this is mitigated by two factors: that the ascription is embedded in a subordinate clause and this is bound to alleviate its effect; and that the subordinate clause itself stands as a whole as a vehicle to the main clause "She felt the new pulse deep within her". These two factors uphold her resilience to any charges of apostasy.

2.8 Precis

In this chapter, I have examined the various types of figurative language as they are conceived of in Arabic (Balagha) Rhetoric. FSOS divide into two main blocks: (al-majaz al-lughawi) "figures of language" and (al-majaz al-aqli) "figure of reason and intellect". There is also kitāb, a FOS which has its discrete logic.

These FSOS share the common factor that their meaning lies on the plane of the speaker, rather than on the plane of the sentence. It follows, therefore, that what
primarily concerns us is not what the words say, but rather what the speaker means. Meanwhile, each FOS enjoys a discrete logic and a measure of independence.

Figures of language are named as such because terms therein either refer to other than their own conventional referents (e.g. metaphor), or acquire a new connotation (e.g. simile). In the figure of reason and intellect words retain their literal meaning. Nevertheless agency is ascribed to other than the legitimate agent, and therefore, the audience has to burrow for the intended meaning through his intellect.

Figures of language divide into similarity-based and contiguity-based FOSs. To the former belong metaphor, simile, and analogy. Though these figures shade one into another, they should not be mistaken one for the other. They are defined in terms of their relationship with metonymy which is based on a completely different, fuzzy concept, i.e. contiguity. Similarity and contiguity serve as a conduit for the truth of the figure. As if the speaker, keen to prove his truthfulness, quotes two entities which resemble or connect with each other. "Evidence" will be developed in Chapter Three.

Kinäya is half literal, half figurative, and is not less evidential. Furthermore, these three categories are defined in terms of their relationship with the figure of reason and intellect.
Notes to Chapter Two

(1) According to Aristotle "metaphor consists in giving a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or species to genus, or from species to species, or on the grounds of analogy". See Aristotle (1982). Poetics, in Barnes (p. 2332).

(2) See also Brooke-Rose (1958) where she discusses exhaustively the grammatical structure of metaphor, highlighting its richness.

(3) I am aware that there are some minor differences between al-Sakakī and al-Jurjānī, especially those relating to transference in (istiāra makniya) implicit metaphor, or what is normally called "metaphor in absentia".

(4) Istiāra taＳriHiya and makniya, i.e. explicit and metaphor in absentia, are but two out of at least six categories; these are being chosen for their immediate relevance. For an extensive list of examples of istiāra categories see Abbās, F. H. (1987).

(5) Al-Jurjānī (1983a: 309) points out that if similarity has been established by (surf) convention between two entities (e.g. knowledge and light), similarity will be intelligible; see also Nowottny (1962: 61) where he claims that metaphor's success hinges on convention.

(6) I am aware that the use of metaphor involves "economy"; but economy is not an end to the metaphoriser, rather it is a consequence of his metaphorising.

(7) For an able critique of the substitution and comparison theories see Black, M. (1962).

(8) I failed to understand what Stern precisely means by "unintentional" which recurs frequently throughout his book (e.g. p. 170, and 284). Stern distinguishes between two types of language function: one involving no audience and aims at filling a lacuna, and another, involving an audience, and aims at creating a transaction between speaker and audience. I take "unintentional" as referring to the first language function.

(9) According to Turbayne (1962: 1-2) "Catachresis is giving the thing which lacks a proper name that which belong to something else which includes the use of ordinary words in a technical sense".
In this connection, al-Jurjānī (1983a: 304-8) defines the cases in which a simile can or cannot be converted into an (istiāra) metaphor. There are three cases. First, where the vehicle is undefined such as (Huwa asad) "He is a lion" and where the insertion of the simile particle does cause structural damage, simile is convertible; whereas when the vehicle is defined such as (huwa al-asad) "He is the lion" and the insertion of the definite particle does not cause any structural damage, simile can by no means be converted into or considered as a case of (istiāra) metaphor. Second, where the vehicle is particularized such as (Huwa baḤr[un] al-balāgha) "he is a sea of eloquence"; such instances can be taken as (istiτa) metaphorical usages. Third, in cases where the relation between tenor and vehicle has already been established such as (Al-ṣilm[u] nūr) "Knowledge is light"; such instances can be taken as (istiāra) metaphorical.

This obtains with what is called "synaesthetic metaphor" which occurs when the tenor and vehicle in a specific instance come from two different domains of senses; for example, in "his words are sweet [like honey]" the tenor comes from the domain of hearing, the vehicle from the domain of taste. In this example sweetness does not lie in "sweet words" themselves, but rather in what sweet things entail.

Syntagmatic axis can be defined as the way the constituents of a sentence are horizontally arranged; the paradigmatic axis refers to the vertical arrangement of words or the words which could have been used but actually were not used.

For Jakobson's typology of metaphor and metonymy, see Jakobson, R. and M. Halle (eds.) (1956); For the application of Jakobson's theory see Lodge, D. (1977); Osterwalder, Hans (1978).

See al-Jurjānī 1983a; see also Brooke-Rose (1958).

In Arabic (Balāgha) Rhetoric (al-Majāz al-Mursal) metonymy is of several types. Among them are: causality such as (Ra'aynā al-ghaith) "Our cattle grazed rain water" where (al-ghaith) "rain water" is the cause of pasture, or "They sent their eyes" where (ṣuyūn) "eyes" refers to, and is the organ which makes of someone a spy; spatial such as (Is'al al-qarya) "ask the village" where (al-qarya) "village" refers not to the place, but rather to the residents; temporal (past or present relationship) such as respectively "People in Jordan eat wheat" where "wheat" refers to bread as a final product, i.e. as transformed into bread made from wheat flour, or "People wear cotton" where "cotton" is viewed in terms of the past, i.e. what was cotton, but what is now items of clothing; for an exhaustive review of (al-Majāz al-Mursal) metonymy categories see AL-Ṣaghīr, M. (1986).

(17) See in this respect al-Jurjānī (1983b) where he distinguishes between what he calls (al-maḥā) "meaning" and (maḥā al-maḥā) "the meaning of meaning".
Chapter Three

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF FIGURES OF SPEECH

3. Introduction

This chapter addresses two interrelated main issues. Firstly, it aims at highlighting the social function of FsOS in a wider sense: in terms of their capability of giving expression to human experience; in terms of their capability of arousing and fulfilling appeal and expectations in the audience by virtue of each being a "form"; in terms of evidentiality; and in terms of modality or the degree of power the ES applies to his audience and of his commitment towards his (figurative) statement. Secondly, it aims at narrowing down the social role of FsOS into an investigation of particularly intimacy, i.e. how FsOS draw people together. Intimacy will be based on "politeness", a mechanism on which the ES bases his attempt/s at persuading his audience. At the end of the section I will argue that each FOS is more appropriate than any other FOS to a particular audience in that it fleshes out a particular attitude towards that particular audience.

3.1 Language as a Mode of Action

The discrepancy between what words can say and what they can mean has long been recognized. Al-Jurjānī (1983b), for example, distinguished between what he called (al-ma珊a) "the meaning" and (ma珊a al-ma珊a) "the meaning of meaning". By the first he meant the meaning of individual words or a string of words, by the second he meant the meaning of the speaker.

This theme was later articulated in a more elaborated and sophisticated manner by Searle (e.g. 1970). In his speech act theory, which was later developed by Austin (e.g. 1953...
Searle recognized that an utterance is an act of doing intended by the speaker to produce a certain effect on the hearer/audience.

Searle's major contribution, however, is probably the ascription of three aspects to the speech act. These are (i) the locutionary act or the mere act of saying of a meaningful utterance according to a set of rules that exist prior to the utterance itself, (ii) the illocutionary act or what the ES is doing with his utterance, and (iii) the perlocutionary act or the effect of the doing on the hearer which might or might not follow. For example, the mere saying of "Indeed, she is in the grip of fate" is the locutionary act; whether the ES is narrating, assessing, or confirming a state of affairs relating to "she" is the illocutionary act; and whether or not the hearer is impressed by the speaker's utterance is the perlocutionary act.

But of course not every utterance can count as a successful speech act. According to Searle (1970), for an utterance to count as an act of doing, i.e. a speech act, it has to meet what he calls "the felicity conditions". These are real world conditions which have to do with the speaker, with the hearer and with the request itself. For example, for someone wishing his utterance, (e.g. Indeed, she is in the grip of fate), to count as a successful speech act he has to be in authority (e.g. a feminist writer who is an expert), the hearer should be conceived of as capable of giving the sort of help he is requested to do (minimally to understand what he means) and of recognizing that it is in his, the hearer's, interest to listen or understand and that the act is not impossible to accomplish.

Speech acts were later classified into direct speech act (e.g. I name you X) and indirect speech acts (e.g. It's hot in here, i.e. open the window). I shall elaborate on the distinction in the second part of this chapter.

Despite the fruitfulness of speech act theory which advocates a language-as-action approach, it is plagued by the difficulty of having to account for a long list of speech
act classification and the difficulty of allocating a specific illocutionary act for a given utterance. For example, in the above utterance it is not easy to tell whether the speaker wants to "state", "narrate", "warn" or even make an "assessment" about a current state of affairs relating to a particular "she".

Fairclough (1989: 9-10) notes that the main weakness of speech act theory is its individualism, i.e. it sees action as emanating from the individual who is viewed as capable of improvising a new strategy each time a new occasion arises. He also points out that it is unworkable when tried for the analysis of naturally occurring, extended discourse.

Hatim and Mason (1990: 64) also point out that speech act theory has the disadvantage of being naturally oriented towards the oral mode of discourse. In the oral mode of discourse, the speaker and hearer are both present and their intentions, and therefore their linguistic contributions, can be re-calculated. This kind of feedback is lacking in the written mode of discourse where the audience maintains only a shadowy presence and the writer (i.e. the ES) has but to intuit as to his audience's reaction. This fact has a bearing on the shape of his linguistic contribution.

In an earlier work, Burke (1954: 176-7), working on the written mode of discourse, specifically literature, has pointed out that language is not a naming at all, but a system of attitudes and a programme of action:

Speech in its essence is not neutral. Far from aiming at suspended judgement the spontaneous speech of people is loaded with judgements. It is intensely moral...spontaneous speech is not a naming at all, but a system of attitudes, of implicit exhortations. To call a man a friend or an enemy is per se to suggest a program of action with regard to him (bold mine).
In another work, Burke (1966: 63) also points out that all language is action or, to use his own words, symbolic action. (In the following, I shall be heavily drawing on his useful insights without necessarily ignoring Searle's approach to language). "Symbolic" means the use of symbols or language to talk about or socialise acts; "action" is the conscious act of uttering meaningful utterances. When people socialise acts, they colour them with their own beliefs and infuse them with implications of right or wrong. They explain why that particular act has been done the way it is done, and how it has been done in the best or, alternatively, worst way possible.

Acts can be symbolic, i.e. verbal (e.g. Help!), or practical (e.g. the passing of tea to somebody). Symbolic action is a milder type of action in the sense that when someone utters a statement (e.g. Indeed, she is in the grip of fate) he is acting symbolically, i.e. he is confirming a miserable state of affairs relevant to "she" and can be taken as asking for help; and in so far as somebody else responds in some way or another (e.g. he shows or declines from showing sympathy) he is also acting symbolically. It is in this way that the gap between the verbal and the non-verbal is sized up and bridged (ibid.).

Burke (1945: xv) has also designed a model of action which he calls "dramatism". This is a form of thought which tells us what communication is doing for people as they act symbolically together. It is an all-embracing technique for the analysis of language and which is made up of five components or pillars. These pillars, or the "dramatistic pentad" as he (ibid. pp. xv-xxi) calls them, are: act, scene, agent, agency and purpose.

"Act" refers to what was done; scene to where or when it was done; agent to who did it; agency to how he did it; and purpose to why he did it. These pillars figure in all statements and make a whole ensemble of thought (and of action). They arise out of statements and terminate in them. They can be identified individually quite easily in
some cases, and in others they collapse one into another and need more careful examination for identification. It all depends on the motive for their identification, and from what angle the pillar is looked at.

"Oppression", for example, is usually considered as a means for "conditioning" someone [agency]; but it can also be taken as an "act" perpetrated by someone [act]; as a place where the act itself is perpetrated [scene]; as an agent, since agents can also be instruments [agent]; or even as a purpose, in schemes proclaiming a motive for subjects [purpose]. For demonstration I shall dramatise the following consecutive figurative statements:

1- She opened her eyes in the morning startled by the alarm clock.
1.(a) The large eyes of her father, looming from over the bed, pulled her out of her bed, and out of her bedroom.
1-(b) They followed her outside the home, on to the tram, and into the college.
1-(c) His big palm shoved her into the dissecting room.

It is evident that the ES infuses the figurative statement(s) with his attitude which can be anything but an "innocent" description of the state of affairs of the heroine. The underlined FsOS make a near indictment of the agent who, from the point of view of the feminist writer, applies oppression to his "poor" daughter with malicious ill-intentionality. (From the point of view of the father, this is not oppression; rather, it is some sort of social restraint, or a means towards getting his child disciplined). The daughter can even identify oppression with the place in which it takes place and take it as a scene. Or, and this is highly likely, she can make of it a casuistry, an
agency for a future revolt against this "oppressing" father. Should this happen, she makes of herself an agent instead of a victim; and of her father a counter-agent.

The five components of dramatism are wide-ranging and convertible one to another, and "agent", "act" and "scene", probably interest us most for they can be ambivalent. "Agent" can refer to, in addition to individual human agents, collective bodies (e.g. the police), and even to "functional" or moral words such as motives, and states of mind (e.g. suspicion, fear). "Act" refers to a purposive, pre-planned motion. (The stumbling of someone over an obstruction is sheer motion). It extends to refer to professions, policies and strategies, in so far as they are carried out with intent. Thus the performance of fatherly duties, with the intent to discipline, falls within the domain of this category. "Scenes" are interesting in their capacity as containers of both agents and acts; and they can even leave their imprints on one of the participants by providing motives for actions: "oppression" (in the scenic sense) creates an attitude preceding the actual act of rebellion; and when this happens "scene" transforms into an "act". This is because an attitude is essentially a preparation for an act; it is an "incipient" or "symbolic act" (ibid.p.20).

Referring to the same example above, let us examine how the dramatistic pentad yield results affecting the audience. Dramatically the example can be presented as follows:

Scene: the girl's own private room [which is in her family house].
Agent: father metonymically dissected: large eyes pulling and following; big palm shoving.
Act: [apparently] watching and caring.
Purpose: to effect discipline.
Agency: by means of his inherited and delegated authority as a father.
These pillars are supposed to be typically representative, i.e. the scene is an "honest" representation of what typically takes place in a Middle Eastern society such as Cairo; the act is typical of all fathers (in Cairo); the agent, all fathers more or less typically do the same type of "watching" activity with the aim of getting their daughters disciplined, and so forth. The act of surveillance starts and takes place in the "poor" girl's room. It ends in the dissecting room where the girl is put under another authority. Thus she is under direct control in terms of both time and place. The act being carried out by a responsible father on his little child involves pulling, following, and shoving. This is an act unacceptable to her (and to her likes) as she sees it restricting her freedom. Nevertheless it is acceptable to her father (and other fathers) who sees it differently. Thus we are before two opposing points of view in relation to the same action: one view views it as an act of oppression (implemented for the sake of securing authority), another as an act of discipline (implemented for the sake of maintaining social order, and therefore, for the sake of the child).

As a mode of action, language is the "entitling" of non-verbal situations (Burke 1966: 370-1). Words, titles, utterances or statements sum up thoughts and experiences. But we usually start with whole utterances rather than with words in isolation to link the verbal with the non-verbal; and this is because words in isolation remain vague and indeterminate. In terms of this approach, each of the two novels (Imra'atūn fī Imra'a) "Two Women In One" and "The Old Man and the Sea" is the summation of the experiences of their respective hero or heroine as well as the site from which the attitude of the ES emanates. They are respectively the experiences of woman vis-a-vis man voiced out by a sympathetic writer (i.e. ES), and the experiences of an old man vis-a-vis sea voiced by an admirer. Both ESs require their respective audiences to sympathise with or admire their heroine or hero.

The application of the literal and figurative categories of language to particular situations constitute strategies for handling or acting these situations. The use by someone of literal language category is a strategy adequate for a particular situation and which
fulfils a pre-conceived end that is otherwise inadequately achieved. On the other hand, having recourse to figurative language is another strategy adequate for another type of situation, and the failure to use it would label the user as inept and ineffectual (Burke 1967: 293-304). The full implication of this claim will become clearer as the argument unfolds, especially given that figurative language should be restricted to serious occasions, a phenomenon which means that they involve more effort by both the speaker and the audience (see section 3.2.1 on "intimacy"). Within the FsOS family we have noticed that each FOS is characterized by a feature that uniquely makes it more adequate for a particular audience in a particular situation-type, and for the expressing of a motive by the ES: metaphors are more convincing with students (probably because they are educated), sex metaphors are more appealing to the young while death metaphors are more feared by the elderly; similes, on the other hand, are more appealing in discourse types which address a different audience.

The selection of a particular FOS rather than another by the ES hinges on his motive. Motives are expressed through what Burke calls "socialization" (which materialises in the form of speech or writing); and are naturally made as cogent and as appealing to the audience as possible. Otherwise the socialization process would not reach fruition. These motives or attitudes are a necessary prelude for action: attitudes of criminality precede the actual committing of a crime.

Motives are assigned with reference to our orientation in general. They are "shorthand for situations" (Burke 1954: 29). Situations are characterized with reference to a general scheme of meanings that are contradictory. For example, a certain type of situation might be characterized as oppressing when a class of people such as parents apply social rules to the members of another class (i.e. children). Children in this case feeling the pressure, divide into two groups: one complying, the other resisting. Those who comply take what their fathers do as leading to social fulfilment, those who resist take it as impeding that very fulfilment because it intervenes with their
personal freedom. Both start a process of socialization, each trying to rationalize their attitude as best as they can.

The stance of the members of the first group is in support of the status quo and it coincides with the orientation of their fathers. The attitude of the non-complying, on the other hand, can get more accentuated as it involves more conflict and their adaptation to the situation requires more effort. Thus motives or situations are characterized by contradictory expectations of pleasure and displeasure.

Both parties, however, can be equally creative\(^1\), though each in a different way. Those who comply help in the persistence of social practices, and, by behaving in that way, invite others to copy them. Those resisting, on the other hand, help with the creation of new social practices which might, one day, overtake the already established social practices.

The more the same type of experience, or situation recurs, the more it is stabilized and the easier it is to recognize. Both parties whether complying or rejecting are conditioned not only as regards what they should and what they should not do, but also as regards the language they use and the reasons for their acts. Fathers in this connection do what they do motivated by a sense of duty, children by a motive of personal freedom. Once an attitude towards a certain situation is taken by someone the range and quality of his observation is delimited. It very often gives rise to bigotry: fathers are looked up to or down on, and seen as heroically protecting or, alternatively, tyrannically oppressive.

A type of experience arises out of a relationship between man and his environment, and it therefore emerges carrying the imprints of its environment. For example, "oppression" is a concomitant of cruelty; malfunction is a concomitant of ineffectuality; strength is a concomitant of plenty and exercising. This means that the individual has to adjust or adapt to his environment, though this adaptation need not be a good one. Of course,
environmental conditions (e.g. a cruel father) call forth certain universal experiences as being more relevant to them (such as cruel fathers vis-a-vis children, man vis-a-vis woman, teacher vis-a-vis student and so forth). Such selections are patterns of experience.

Burke (1931: 141-2) has also pointed out that the social use of metaphor is based on the premise that all human action involves purpose or motive in the full sense of the term. He also pointed out that FsOS are based upon our understanding of the nature of things, upon experience. This experience is, to use Burke's (1966: 68) words, "a vestige of", or "survival from", the past. Without this "past" FsOS would remain unintelligible. For example, it is convention or past experience that makes the connection between fate and brutal fathers, between ships and sails, and between raised eyes or raised heads and dignity.

It is probably for this reason that FsOS have been recognized as especially capable of structuring human experience. They are highly and primarily attitudinal though not necessarily void of content. This is a characteristic they acquire by making re-connections between entities in a non-finite way. In their attitude-carving capability it is more appropriate to see them operating on a continuum where they shade one into another. They range from the miraculously most succinct and ecstatic (e.g. metaphor), to the relatively more elastic, comparatively less aesthetic (e.g. analogy, simile), through the attractive half-literal, half-figurative kinaya, and the dull but reifying metonymy. This comprehensibility accounts for their ability to cover (probably) all types of discourse. The abundance of any particular FOS can reflect a tendency by the ES to achieve a pre-conceived target.

According to Krug (1987: 114-24) metaphor gives structure to experience because it has three (overlapping) dimensions: the expressive or stylistic aspect; the community or culturalizing aspect; and the image action or performative dimension. The expressive aspect allows for an individual characterization of the moment at hand:
"Indeed, she is in the grip of fate" can be taken to mean that "she" is in danger. The culturalizing aspect allows for identification with a sense of lived history: when someone is in danger he must be rescued (by an expert). The performative aspect allows for a programme of action: everything should be done by an expert as soon as possible to rescue him, otherwise... These three dimensions form a conceptual whole by which an individual in a particular moment comes to experience and act upon the thoughts of someone seeking to rescue a vital group from within the whole community, and hence the whole community. Other FsOS would do the same, though with differing emphases.

3.1.1 Figures of Speech: Form, Evidentiality and Modality

Considering FsOS as "tiny plots" capable in themselves of harking the main plot forward or back, Burke (1931: 127-8) has labelled them "minor or incidental form". He defines "form" as "an arousing and fulfilment of desires" (ibid. p. 124). It is correct in so far as it "gratifies the need which it creates" (ibid. p. 138). "Form", therefore, is the appeal. It appeals irresistibly in the sense that once you hear it you cannot resist participating—just as "once upon a time" creates a mood receptive to fantastic tales and can charm a child into sleep. You listen to it even though you might be in disagreement with its subject matter. As Burke (1962: 58) puts it "you are drawn to it not in your capacity as a partisan, but because of some universal appeal in it". As a "form" a FOS gains your assent by making you will its fruition.

Form has yet another important function: it allows the mind to follow the FOS as a process, i.e. in its particular characterization of the moment at hand. In this way, we restore the connection between form and subject matter; and "form" becomes a way of experiencing. For example, the fate metaphor "Indeed, she is in the grip of fate", while arousing our appetite to listen to the tale of "she", allows us to experience the agony of that particular "she".
I would like to point out that FsOS, as a form or a way of experiencing, cannot be fully appreciated without bearing in mind what Burke (1957: 32) calls the "dialectic nature of substance". This means that reality is dualistic in nature and that terms are defined in terms of one another: "black" in terms of "white", "violent" in terms of "peaceful" and so forth. In terms of this principle, "fate" metaphor suggests that in some other place "fathers" are not as oppressing as they are where the events of the novel take place.

So far, I have argued that FsOS are capable of giving expression to the human experience, and that they are invested each with an amount of appeal which is irresistible and which draws people together. This argument allows us to arrive at the conclusion that the use of a particular FOS is a strategy revealing a motive by the ES who must be seeking to persuade his audience to at least listen to him, if not to take his side. Persuasion, however, is not ad hoc. It must be grounded in evidence, otherwise it will not be effective. Evidence is a necessary prerequisite for showing the degree of the commitment of the ES towards his statement (to dignify himself) and towards his audience.

The general idea about evidence is that it structurally takes an independent existence. The ES has to invoke an authority, which ranges between the indeterminate hearsay "it is said" to epistemic lexical items such as "must" in "it must be raining", or epistemic qualifiers such as "believe" or "think" which show differing degrees of commitment (e.g. Aijmar 1980).³

These characteristics (and others) qualify the ES's statements and gauge the degree of belief or commitment he is investing in his statements. But the evidence in these cases lies outside the statement in that the audience has, for the verification of the reliability of the ES, to go beyond the statement and invoke the outside world. Evidence resides as an independent fact. In "It is raining" for example, the
hearer has to go outside or look through the window to establish that it is the case, i.e. he has to invoke some authority external to the statement.

The case with the FsOS is completely different; for they are intrinsically evidential. Evidence with FsOS is part of the argument, not outside the argument, serving as a conduit not for truth but rather as a persuasive tool. Evidence with similarity-based FsOS, for example, lies in the similarity the ES sees between the two entities involved; with meyonymy it lies in the relation of contiguity; with the figure of reason and intellect it lies in the extraordinary step of the ascription of agency to other than the legitimate agent; and so forth. It is commonplace knowledge to all rational members of the society that chains oppress. Consider the chain simile "The feminine ending attached to her name linked her to girls' lists like a link in a leather chain" where similarity is quite clear between a chain linking, say, a dog to his owner and a feminine ending linking a girl to the list of girls' names. But of course whether or not there is really oppression is a different issue. This is not the function of FsOS. This principle of course applies to the "fate" metaphor, and, to give another example, to metonymy: "The sail is coming" where "sail" stands for "ship". Is it not the case that when the ship referred to is seen, its sail is seen at one and the same time?

FsOS, in this respect, function very much like enthymemes offering truncated verbalizations "to express more involved relationship" (Sinclair 1986: 89). Enthymematically, "she is in the grip of fate", for example, can be analysed as consisting of two implicit premises and one explicit:

2- Explicit: She is in the grip of fate.
Implicit (i.e. epistemic): fate is arbitrary, hazardous.
Implicit: She is in serious trouble.
Simile is even more obvious. It consists of two statements: one full, the other elliptical:

3- "The feminine ending attached to her name linked her to the girls' list like a link in a leather chain" can be charted as follows:

3-(a) Explicit: The feminine ending is tying her.
Implicit (i.e. epistemic): Only inferior creatures are usually tied.
Implicit: She is looked down upon (and hence oppressed).

The elliptical form runs in a parallel way as follows:

3-(b) Explicit: The leather chain restrains.
Implicit (i.e. epistemic): It restrains animals.
Implicit: Animals are inferior.

This is different, for example, from syllogisms where all three parts are present, and hence involve less participation by the audience. A syllogism is a logical deduction consisting of two (explicit) premises and a conclusion. This can be presented as follows: Muslims are hospitable (explicit), X is a Muslim (explicit), X is hospitable (conclusion). Without bearing in mind the attitude of the ES towards the entity described (i.e. tenor) and the epistemically believed-in-premise that fate is arbitrary, the ascription of arbitrariness and fatality to "father" remains hollow or, to say the least, descriptive.

It is probably due to the "form" characteristic, to the inbuilt evidence in FsOS, and to their enthymematic nature that they are invested by meaning and significance. It is probably due to these advantages that the audience are less able to resist the charm of
FsOS on the one hand, and on the other, that the ES selects to have recourse to them banking exactly on this.

But I would like to re-emphasize that the ES does not present his FOS as an accepted truth. Instead, he presents it as a revelation, or as a new comprehension about the nature of things; as if he claims that he sees the nature of things through their relationships. As if he wishes to say, that he has discovered a new link between fathers and fate (as opposed to an already established link between fathers and, say, guardians). After all, the entities involved in a FOS remain after its decoding each in its semantic domain. I would also like to re-emphasize that the ES is not free to make any sort of connection, of relationship, between any two things. Indeed, he has to observe certain conventions and cultural strictures. Should he try to go beyond them, it is highly likely that he would alienate his audience- being unable to understand him.

On the basis of this, I would like to argue that the power the ES acquires by using the FOS is not originally his. Rather, he acquires it by some sort of "delegated efficacy". The ES invokes or quotes the convention, the mind of the collective society as his source of information and refers his audience to them. As if he is saying: "it is not me who has judged that fate is arbitrary, or that it is sail that makes the shipness of ship; it is you, the members of the community. I am just unearthing (or repeating) the connections between, and the qualities of, things". He is like a lawyer who, keen on persuading the jury of the justice of his case, quotes the texts of unwritten though well-known laws which the jury themselves have participated in working out, by virtue of being members of the same community.

Of relevance to this is the observation to the effect that proverbs possess what is called "independent existence" i.e. that proverbs can be used for persuasion as they structurally are (Abbas 1987: 195). For example the proverb:

4- أَلْصَف ضِعْتِ اللِّيْلْ
4- In summer you have lost [the opportunity to get some] yoghurt.
which was originally targeted at a woman who, in her hesitation to avail herself of some certain opportunity, missed out on that opportunity. But it can still be targeted at anyone, male or female, singular or plural, who risks and loses an opportunity which should not have been lost. There is no reason why this cannot be extended to all FsOs. With some reservations on the issue of structure, any restraining agent can be labelled "fate", beautiful cheeks "red roses", or "like red roses", a beneficent man is a "hand", and so forth.

This can be most appreciated if we recall Burke's observation that all linguistic acts are ritualistic; a ritual provides a framework which alerts expectancy. This is especially the case with FsOS as they are more "regidified", i.e. more conventional. For example, "A hit B" alerts us that "A" is the entity which did the act of hitting because it is in the initial position, "hit" is a form of action inflicted upon "B", and "B" is the entity which received the act of hitting. This experience, however, can be expressed via different linguistic modes such as passivization (e.g. B was hit by A), sentence-clefting (e.g. It was A who hit B, or even "It was B who was hit by A). Whereas a successful FOS should only use an archetypal vehicle, i.e. a symbol renowned for given properties, to convey the same message.

Also of great relevance is the fact that FsOS require no shared background knowledge for their decoding. The bearing of this is immense; but it does not lie in the possibility of them being accessible to everyone; for not everyone is able to unearth the connection between tenor and vehicle. Rather, its bearing lies in the fact that they acquire a trait of what Joos (1962: 23) calls "casual style", whereby he means that language is exchanged between friends.

Thus it can be argued that FsOS exhibit a special case of modality encompassing the ES's commitment towards his figurative statement on the one hand, and towards the audience on the other. Both commitments overlap. In either case, I would like to point out, we are operating on a continuum of conviction, of politeness, and of
aesthetics, as far as the first is concerned; and on a continuum of imposition or stagemanaging, as far as the second is concerned.

I have argued so far that the different types of FsOS make one of the best modes for the expression of human experiences because they are based on (naturalized) ideological assumptions about the nature of things, that they arouse and fulfil expectations, that they possess inbuilt evidence in them, and that they possess traits which qualify them to be exchanged between friends. In the following section, the concept of power which is an indispensable component of modality will be developed. This will be followed by the second major part of this chapter where I shall narrow down the social role of FsOS through one line of inquiry i.e. intimacy. Intimacy concerns how the ES draws the audience closer towards himself in an attempt to get them persuaded, and is based on politeness.

3.1.2 Language and Power

It has been pointed out that power relations are grounded, among other things, in language, and that people exercise language constraints one upon another. This constraint is exacted by the constrainer on the constrained by virtue of the former's institutional power (Fairclough 1989: 46). In principle, language power can be an individual issue where particular eloquent and talented individuals can manipulate certain situations to achieve their ends. Or it can be some kind of power conferred upon the individual by virtue of belonging to a certain family, role, or by virtue of, among other things, his post.

The first point of view overstates the extent to which people manipulate language: for placing power in the hands of the individual amounts to viewing him as the site from which action emanates. He is also to be conceived of as capable of inventing a new strategy for every occasion to achieve his intentions. This of course can occur: people act strategically and use conventions instead of merely following them. But in many cases
people use as well as follow already established sets of rules. This point of view has some advantage in that it views the individual as both capable of taking the initiative (because he is well-trained) and of following the "teachings" of the institution (because it is in his interest to do so).

It is the second, collective and standardised form of power conferred upon the individual that is most relevant. It extends to subsume both individual power, not in the individual's personal capacity but as part of a bigger whole such as the institution, and the power of the institution as well.

"Power" by definition is asymmetrical, i.e. it obtains between two parties in such a way that when any measure of power is lost by one of them the same measure is gained by the other. Power is based on the assumption that people are hierarchically ordered, i.e. there are constraining subjects, and there are constrained subjects. The exercise of power in discourse by the first class on the second constrains content, subjects, and relations between subjects (ibid.). These three overlap and co-occur in practice.

It constrains content by a process of selection, i.e. the constraining subjects determine what to include and what to exclude, they present events from a certain "angle", and they choose deliberately from the linguistic forms to present what they want to present. As Burke (1931: xii) puts it "if you wanted to co-ordinate a society by building up a warlike group, you might decide that its members should hear only war-like music".

As far as selecting a particular linguistic form is concerned, there is also a difference between requesting something via an imperative (e.g. open the window) or indirectly via an indirect speech act (e.g. "Could you open the window?" which could be taken as a question vis-a-vis a request) or even via a hint (e.g. "It's hot in here"). These modes of making a request should yield similar results when adequately used;
but each reflects a different kind of relationship between the ES and his audience. The first mode displays a greater measure of power and puts on display a greater degree of social distance between the two parties involved. The second mode is deliberately invested with politeness to induce the constrained subjects into co-operation. The third mode is even more polite (but has a wider prospect of being ignored).

In terms of subjects, there are constraints on the identities of the people who are qualified to occupy subject positions. Constraining subjects should have an authority or be in a position of power so that their discourse (i.e. socialization act) is accorded by force, and so that the constrained subjects are coerced or induced to acquiesce.

Types of authority differ from one situation to another, though age, sex and experience are variables that can affect or effect persuasion. For example, a woman talking about her folk being oppressed or abused by fathers or husbands can be more convincing than a man—especially if she is an author: she has more experience and can identify herself with them. Similarly, a male author narrating the story of an old man who goes on a challenging sea-fishing trip is quite convincing. In general terms, writers are more reputed for their ability to experience and to communicate. They can comfortably occupy the position of constraining subjects, and at the same time, sit their audience in the seat of learners.

In terms of relations, formal situations are characterized by an exceptional orientation to, and marking of, position and status. Power and social distance are overt, and consequently there is a strong tendency towards politeness. Politeness is based on the recognition of differences of power, degrees of social distance, and is oriented towards reproducing them without change. Constraining subjects have to set in advance the target of which they are in pursuit. If it is to communicate a message, clarity overrides; if otherwise to navigate through the statuses of their audience, politeness overrides. Of course, there are many situations which require both.
3.2 The Social Role of FsOS: Intimacy

In "The Social Role of Metaphor", Sapir, et al., (1977), using metaphor generically, examine different types of FsOS and address the issue of how they are used for persuasion, and what role they play in the social life of people. For example, Howe (1977: 163) demonstrates through a host of examples how metaphor served well the people of a village as a means of expressing their experiences as well as their attitudes towards the various aspects of their life: leaders are light (i.e. they guide their people), they are trees (i.e. strong) which bear fruit (i.e. they are nutritive); village is a body (i.e. the organs of which cooperate) which has vertical posts (i.e. principal chiefs), secondary posts (i.e. secondary chiefs); big people are big timber (i.e. firmly in place), and so forth. All these metaphors which are grounded in their experience and a natural product of their interaction with the environment, cannot but be persuasive.

The recognition of the social role of metaphor, however, dates as far back as Aristotle. Recognizing its role in making people intimate, he suggested that slaves must speak "plainly" to their superiors. This is because metaphors serve to "strike" people (Cited in Cooper 1986:153). Cohen (1978) claims that "the maker and appreciator of metaphor are drawn closer to one another". Cooper (1986:18) claims that metaphor "has the power to provide or thwart understanding". Neither of these, however, elaborates any further on the point. In the following part, I am going to develop the theme of intimacy, and consider how it is effected by all types of FsOS; and how it makes a strategy which the ES adopts to get his audience persuaded. This is one of the contributions of this dissertation.

Intimacy, a near synonym of solidarity, occurs when interlocutors overlook and ignore power relations (Fowler 1979: 15). A lecturer calling one of his students "X" instead of "Mr X" can be taken as a move on his part to show solidarity or a move of
alienation. The lecturer's intentions can be put to the test when the student calls him by his first name; should the former show signs of acceptance (through facial expressions, for example) the move can be considered as one targeted at winning him; otherwise it is one of alienation.

Intimacy is encoded in language in many ways. Among them is the switching from second person plural into second person singular (in Arabic), i.e. from (antum) "you" into (anta) "you"; the switching from the language of one's own age/sex group or from standard into vernacular: a politician, to get a group of farmers persuaded can speak their "rural" dialect.

I would like to make two points here. The first relates to the fact that intimacy takes place between someone of a high status and a subordinate, or at least between two equals. An attempt by an inferior to initiate intimacy with his superior can be interpreted as taking liberties. The second is that intimacy with regard to literal language is more superficial, and the understanding of the gesture depends on a factor operating on the exterior of the statement. The switching also can be taken as a marker signalling the intentions of the ES and putting the audience on guard.

Intimacy in the case of FsOS is different. It is an innate characteristic that further qualifies them to resist, more than any other device, elimination and/or detection. I shall first explain how intimacy obtains in FsOS.

3.2.1 The Paradigm of Intimacy

Intimacy, as has just been demonstrated, has the ability to thwart communication or otherwise draw people together creating a "bond of insight" between the ES and his audience. Mac Cormac (1985: 161) remarks that:
The inventor of the metaphor ...and the hearer...
are united in an **intimate bond of insight**. Both
share the intimacy of a new suggestive possibility
and perhaps an emotional feeling that is not
normally shared in the ordinary use of
language (bold mine).

He confirms that when confronted by metaphor, we can not resist attempting to
understand it; for all successful metaphors can stimulate emotions, produce
perplexity and create intimacy. Mac Cormac, however, confines himself to metaphor
proper; though obviously he bases his specious argument on the theme that metaphor is
a form. Given that all FsOS are "forms" that differ only in terms of their beauty and
succinctness Mac Cormac's argument, it can be argued, can be extended to subsume all
FsOS.

Cohen (1978: 6) also made a big contribution when he provided us with the first clue
as to how intimacy obtains. According to Cohen, intimacy occurs in the following
manner: first, a speaker metaphorizes (i.e makes a concealed invitation to the hearer to
see what he sees); second, the hearer expends special effort to understand this special
utterance (accepts this challenging invitation); third, and when he understands it
according to to certain rules (by virtue of being a member of the same speech
community) a transaction happens and a bond of intimacy develops. This might be
involved in any communication; but the use of FsOS especially highlights the point.
This is because only figurative use can be inaccessible to all but those who share
information about one another's knowledge, beliefs, intentions and attitudes.

The audience, of course, has to assume the seriousness of the speaker (otherwise, why
engage him in that trouble?) and to spend extra time trying to understand him by
employing a number of assumptions about what the speaker believes, and what the
speaker believes the hearer believes. This involves an important obligation on the part of
the ES not to make his linguistic contribution (i.e. figurative statement) beyond the reach of (the intellect of) the audience; otherwise his attempt at cultivating intimacy might backfire and end solely with puzzlement.

Thus Cohen saves us the trouble of setting up a paradigm for intimacy: an invitation is sent (to a friend, or at least an acquaintance), processed, and once accepted a transaction is complete, and a party is held. The obligations, expectations of the parties involved, as well as their respective statuses, are also set. So is the form: the card of invitation which should be, we know from experience, appealing and of better and unusual substance. With the exception of the signature, this card might be void of any writing; nevertheless it remains expressive. A card with a crossed heart or a red flower on it, is an effective love letter. This is exactly the case with FsOS: they differ in beauty, in substance, in length and hence in effectiveness and in versatility. Nevertheless each one of them can be taken as a form in and by itself.

Of yet more interest is the fact that very often the writing on the card is not the ES's, but the publishing company's (here the mind of the collective society). This is, however, of little, if any, consequence. For what matters is not who has written, but rather who has chosen and selected, and why that kind of selection in particular. He must have selected them because they are the most effective and the most persuasive. After all, publishing companies always go for the best (clichés).

Before proceeding further, and by way of summary, it can be argued that the exploitation of FsOS by the ES to cultivate the intimacy of the audience involves the following: (i) it occurs between higher to lower, or at least between equals, (ii) it creates perplexity and/or challenge, (iii) it involves effort by both the ES and the audience and therefore it should be saved for serious occasions, (iv) it is purposeful, not only in the sense of drawing people together (like phatic communion), but also in the sense of containing an inbuilt programme of action, (v) it functions as a politeness marker.
3.2.2 Intimacy and Politeness

The use of FsOS by the ES to cultivate the intimacy of the audience relates more to the social relations existing between them and reflects the ES's attitude towards his social context. More specifically, his assumptions about (i) the people he is communicating with, (ii) the real world situation in which he is communicating (does he seek to convey information, how serious is the information, etc.) and (iii) his decisions as to whether he wants to obliterate or reinforce the status distinctions between himself and his audience.

These can coincide or conflict with each other. If the speaker's primary aim is communication he must be clear; if otherwise to manoeuvre among the respective statuses of his audience his aim is more the expression of politeness. However, should they conflict with each other, politeness supersedes. A statement, however, need not be polite and vague, or conversely clear and not polite. Both functions can co-exist, and sometimes clarity is politeness. I shall now explicate general theories and principles of politeness. Politeness is viewed as the mechanism on which intimacy is based.

I would like to point out that "politeness" will be used in its technical sense which incorporates but transcends the commonplace meaning of "courtesy". In its technical sense, "politeness" is a strategy exploited by a "rational actor" for the purpose of achieving a particular target from a particular type of audience under certain circumstances governed by a set of social variables or factors. The full implications of this definition will be clear as the argument unfolds.

3.2.3 Views on Politeness

As a social concept, politeness is the conformity with politic behaviour. As a linguistic concept, politeness is the encoding of that phenomenon in language. As
Lakoff (1973-b) observes, what counts as socially polite should also be linguistically polite.

There have been several approaches to politeness which have the common denominator of being based on the cooperative principle of Grice (1975). Keen to account for how conversationalists can mean more than they say, Grice proposed the cooperative principle which comprises the following maxims:

(i) the maxim of relevance: be direct and explicit,
(ii) the maxim of quantity: say exactly what is required, no more no less,
(iii) the maxim of quality: say the truth, be sincere,
(iv) the maxim of manner: be clear.

Assuming that interactants are rational in the sense that their interest lies in promoting conversation, Grice claims that the non-observance of these constraining maxims creates what he calls implicatures: non-explicit messages intended by the speaker to be inferred by the hearer. For example, if someone asks a friend of his for some money and the friend says "It's the end of the month", the maxim of relevance is violated; and the person who wanted money can infer that his friend has no money for lending.

Grice (ibid. p. 47) suggested that there might be other maxims such as "Be polite" that are also observed by participants. This maxim can also create implicatures. Many views on politeness developed, all of which capitalized on Grice's maxims. Among these are the conversational-maxim view, the conversational-contract view, and the face-saving view. The following is a brief account of these views.

3.2.3.1. The Conversational-maxim View.

This view is championed by Lakoff (1973-b) and Leech (1983). Lakoff, formulated two rules which he called rules of pragmatic competence. These rules dictate whether
an utterance is pragmatically well-formed or not, and the extent to which it deviates if it does. The rules are (i) be clear, and (ii) be polite. The first is exactly Grice's cooperative principle. The second is spelled out in three rules:

1- Don't impose
2- Give options
3- Make A feel good, be friendly.

The first rule generally applies when formal/impersonal politeness is required (e.g. technical discourse). The second rule applies when informal politeness is required (e.g. "I guess it's time to leave", where "guess", said in full confidence, leaves the final decision to the addressee). The third rule applies where intimate politeness is required (e.g. the use of expressions which denote pragmatic hesitation, i.e. the speaker is not really short of words, such as "I mean").

An advantage of these rules is that they are based on the assumption that they apply to both speech and action alike. A polite situation is such because it is in accord with the dictates of one or more of the above rules, as is a polite utterance. However, Lakoff does not attempt to define politeness and apparently takes it to mean offence-avoidance. Moreover, these rules are sometimes compatible, and sometimes they are in conflict with one another. Lakoff admits that they are designed to function in situations which might differ one from another, and that the situation assessment is solely made by the speaker. Politeness is, therefore, unidirectional flowing from the speaker to the addressee.

Still within the framework of the same view, Leech's (1983) view is an elaboration of the Gricean maxims, though on a grander scale. He treated the politeness principle as one major component of what he calls the interpersonal rhetoric (the other two being the cooperative principle and the irony principle). By "rhetoric" Leech (1983: 15-6)
means the skilful use of language to achieve a particular goal such as an effect on the mind of the hearer.

Leech (ibid. p. 83) ascribes to the politeness principle more credence than to the cooperative principle. He admits that the cooperative principle regulates our linguistic contribution but the politeness principle "has a higher regulative role than this to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place". With this view in mind, Leech proposes seven interpersonal maxims. These are (ibid. p. 132, slightly adapted):

1- Tact Maxim : Minimize hearer costs; maximize hearer benefit.
2- Meta Maxim : Do not put others in a position where they have to break the tact Maxim.
3- Generosity Maxim : Minimize your own benefits; maximize your hearer's benefit.
4- Approbation Maxim : Minimize hearer dispraise; maximize hearer praise.
5- Modesty Maxim : Minimize self-praise; maximize hearer-praise.
6- Agreement Maxim : Minimize disagreement between yourself and others; maximize agreement between yourself and others.
7- Sympathy Maxim : Minimize antipathy between yourself and others; maximize sympathy between yourself and others.

Standing distinct and most relevant among these maxims is the Tact Maxim on which the validity of the second hinges. In effect it advocates, as far as language is concerned, that the ES has to minimize the processing effort the audience have to endure.

In addition to these maxims, Leech also minutely elaborates on scales for the determining of these maxims. These are not easy to apply. Furthermore, he claims that some acts are inherently impolite (e.g. commands), others are inherently polite (e.g. offers). However, it is not difficult to fault this claim: a teacher ordering one of his students to hang a prize-winning picture can by no means be impolite. An (ironic)
offer, to give another example, for someone to help himself is by no means polite. Besides, it seems the case that Leech’s predominant occupation is social politeness rather than linguistic politeness.

### 3.2.3.2 The Conversational-contract View.

Like Lakoff and Leech, Fraser (1981, 1990) based his concept of politeness on Grice’s maxims. This approach holds the view that interactants enter and continue within a conversation with terms spelling out rights and obligations set in advance. These rights and obligations determine what a party expects from the other, and are susceptible to change as context changes. Some are imposed by conventions (e.g. turn-taking). These are negotiable. Some are imposed by institutions (e.g. a witness in court is expected to speak only when questioned). These are hardly negotiable. Other terms are the result of former encounters. These determine the nature of messages in terms of force and content (e.g. an employee is not free to criticize his employer.

Politeness on this view is the norm: an ongoing activity; therefore it goes unnoticed. Only impoliteness is taken notice of; and it occurs when the cooperative principle is violated. In terms of this view, there are no inherently polite or impolite utterances as Leech claims. Though this account of politeness seems reasonable, it does not satisfactorily account for why interactants alternate between commands and indirect requests.

### 3.2.3.3 The Face-saving View.

Developed by Brown and Levinson (1978) this approach is the most comprehensive, balanced account even from the point of view of those who worked on politeness (e.g. Kasper: 1990, Fraser: 1990). Therefore, it will receive more elaboration. I shall
elaborate on three points: the premise on which the view is based, politeness strategies and the factors which determine the weightiness of an act.

**Premise.** In this approach the cooperative principle of Grice occupies a neutral place within which conversation takes place. The point of departure of Brown and Levinson is that direct talk is the most efficient way of transacting messages. Any deviation is motivated and constitutes intended messages of politeness. the speaker of "I would really like it if you would shut the door", for example, is simultaneously making a request and expressing the intention to be polite. Whereas the command "Shut the door" is, under the same circumstances, impolite. Under different circumstances, it can be polite.

The organizing principle of their view on politeness is that all acts are intrinsically face-threatening though in differing proportions, i.e. they involve some effort. They also claim that interactants are especially polite when one party wishes another to do something for him. This is because this wish or want places some kind of burden on the face of one or both parties to the socialization act, with the ES wishing his wants fulfilled and the audience wishing their face preserved.

"Face" has to do with public self-image and ties in with humiliation and embarrassment. It consists of two related aspects: (i) positive face or the wish that one's actions be desirable and approved, (ii) negative face or the wish that one's actions be free from others' imposition. Any interference with either of these two aspects can result in some "face" loss. This is what is called a "face threatening act" (FTA). An FTA in effect ensues when someone asks another to do or not to do something (ibid. p.66).

FTAs can be threatening to both the face of the ES and the face of the audience in proportion relative to the nature of the FTA: apologies are threats to ES's face; suggestions to the audience's face; while requests and offers are likely to threaten the face of both parties.
Figure (ii) Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies (1978: 65)
For this reason it is quite rational that the ES will make his request as minimally face threatening as possible in order to persuade his audience into doing it. Among the conditions which encourage the audience to carry out the request are two: (i) that it be "clothed" in the most appealing way, and (ii) that the request be presented in the best possible mode of reasoning available. We have come to the conclusion that each FOS is a "form", and that this property arouses and fulfils the appetite of the audience. We have also come to another conclusion that underlying all FsOS is an enthymemematical property which provides one of the best ways of reasoning possible. Enthymemes guarantee inferences from goals (e.g. intimacy) to means (e.g. making a request in a particular manner, directly or indirectly) that will satisfy those goals while the satisfactoriness of the statement is preserved.

Strategies. There are two main strategies for making a request, whether it be a practical act such as: "open the door", or a symbolic act, such as the invitation of someone by another to share with him his experiences (e.g. the chain simile). Neither of these strategies, needless to say, is more polite than the other if employed under the most adequate conditions. These two strategies are (i) on record strategy, and (ii) off record strategy (ibid. pp.73-6) (see Figure (ii)).

(i) On record strategy obtains when a request is directly made. It is the most effective, and has the advantage of making the request adequately explicit and non-manipulative; hence more difficult to be evaded. But at the same time it "corners" the audience and is, therefore, more face threatening. For this reason, it is used either in situations where the request is in the interest of the audience (e.g. oh come on, take a biscuit), or where a relationship of friendship obtains between the two parties involved, and therefore, relations of power are irrelevant (e.g. quick, give me a pound), or where the ES is vastly superior to the addressee and can cause face damage to him without fearing to lose his own. This strategy divides into sub-categories: redressive and non-redressive on record sub-strategies.
The former, and as the name indicates, means that "face" should be given to the audience in such a way as to signal that no face threat is intended; and it takes one of two forms:

(a) positive politeness. This is oriented towards satisfying the positive face of the audience. One way of doing this is by means of identification, i.e. when the ES indicates to the audience that he is a member of their group and that his wants are not different from theirs. This minimizes the force of the FTA. Thus "cow" in the "cow" metaphor (i.e. "You should have examined the cow before you bought it" where "cow" refers to the heroine herself), should not be taken as an insult to women, but rather as a signal alerting them to the treatment they receive from men.

(b) negative politeness. This is oriented towards satisfying the audience's negative face desire not to be imposed upon. It entails that the ES self-effaces and maintains a social distance between himself and the audience. Such is the case with indirect speech acts where the ES makes his request not through the imperative but rather through the interrogative: "could you pass me the salt?", for example, does not function as an information-eliciting device about someone's ability to pass the salt, but rather as a request to pass the salt. Such a linguistic effort expresses the ES's desire to avoid self-imposing.

There is tension in negative politeness between the desire to baldly go on-record, and the desire to go off-record (i.e. to be indirect). Fortunately, conventionalized indirect speech acts make a compromise (ibid. p. 135). These provide the ES with an "out" functioning as redressive action in negative politeness. This is because they show that the ES bothers to show some respect to the audience's negative face desire. At the same time, and by virtue of being conventionalized, these indirect speech acts are on record in that they unambiguously state the intent of the ES: the above example is rarely taken as a question (nevertheless in case of embarrassment the ES
can deny that he has made a request). These conventional indirect speech acts therefore, encode the clash of wants: to make a request, and to avoid an imposition.

There are, of course, degrees of conventionalization: some speech acts are more indirect than others. Furthermore, there are viable hints which can, in their contexts, function as conventionalized speech acts. For example, "this is excellent coffee" said by a guest to his hostess makes a viable hint. This is because in effect it means "I want another cup", given the real world conditions against which the hint is interpreted, i.e. that the act requested is thought to exist, that the addressee can do the act required, etc.

(ii) Off record strategy. This strategy obtains when it is not possible to assign a clear interpretation to the indirect speech act. This means that the ES reserves an "out" both for himself and for the audience should things go wrong with his request: he does not commit himself to just one particular interpretation on the one hand, and on the other hand, the audience has the opportunity to ignore his request. In the light of this, if the ES wishes to carry out an FTA, but wants to avoid responsibility for it, he can do it off-record and leave it up to the audience to interpret it. Shared background knowledge is crucial in determining which of the interpretations the audience has to go for.

The mechanism involved in this strategy is a two-stage process. First, The ES should provide the audience with a trigger alerting them that some kind of hint has been made. Second, he should provide them with a mode of inference to recognize what is said from what is meant (ibid. p. 216). A viable trigger is some violation of one or more of the Gricean maxims; and a viable kind of inference made is practical reasoning (i.e. enthymemes).

Having accounted for Brown's and Levinson's view on politeness in terms of premise and strategies, I shall now turn to examining the factors which determine the seriousness of an FTA.
Factors which determine the seriousness of an FTA. In addition to these elaborated strategies of politeness which account for the minimisation of the force of the FTAs, Brown and Levinson (ibid. pp. 79-89) elaborate on the factors which determine the seriousness of an FTA. These factors, all of which are context-external, are:

(i) the social distance of the ES and the audience,
(ii) the relative power of the ES, and
(iii) the absolute ranking of imposition in the particular culture

The first has to do with, among other things, the frequency of interaction between the ES and the audience. This relation is symmetrical. The more frequent interaction between addresser and addressee the narrower the social distance, and the more informal the relationship between them. If the social distance is great, the speaker is expected not to opt for an on-record strategy. He will either go for negative politeness or even go off-record.

The second has to do with the degree to which the ES can impose his own plans and self-evaluation at the expense of the audience's. This relation is asymmetrical: the more powerful the ES, the weaker the audience, and vice versa. The more power the speaker enjoys over his addressee, the higher his politeness strategy is likely to be and vice versa.

The third factor has to do with the degree to which that particular imposition (i.e. FTA) is going to interfere with the audience's wants of positive or negative face. This differs across cultures. Ideally, the more important to the speaker is his request, the more likely he will use a top politeness strategy (i.e. bald on-record).

I would like to point out that these factors do not operate in a linear fashion. Instead, the speaker considers them in combination in the assessment of the weightiness of his
act. If he enjoys power over his interlocutor [i], and his FTA is heavy [iii] but the social distance [ii] is relatively great then he is likely to mitigate his FTA by redressing his on-record strategy or even by going off-record.

Furthermore, these factors do not remain constant throughout the entire transaction. Rather, they are negotiable and alter as the above variables adjust to new emerging relations within the situation. These (context-external) variables are crucial for the determination of the FTA.

Relating this issue to our data, it can be argued that as far as the first factor (i.e. distance) is concerned, the social distance between the respective writers of "Two Women in One" and "The Old Man and the Sea" and their audiences is great. The two novels belong to the written mode of discourse, and therefore no feedback can be obtained from either audience to indicate their response towards the socialization act the writers are carrying out. There might have been some former exchanges (i.e. novels) between them which might have helped the audience identify their, the writers', attitudes. The novelists are highly likely to have taken into consideration the diversity, the degree of literacy or illiteracy of their audiences.

As for power, the second factor, it has been pointed out that authors are reputed to be good communicators, and for being able to express universal experiences. This accords them with power and gives them the edge on their audiences who are, thanks to their fluctuant experiences, well receptive to the writers, unless otherwise ideologically committed. Besides, authors possess an added power by virtue of belonging to specific institutions. This determines the position of the audience as constrained subjects. Nevertheless, the authors have to comply with the conditions of (i).

The third factor (i.e. the ranking of the imposition) is interesting because it poses a relatively different problem. The first two are more stable, more universal across different cultures; this is not the case with (iii). To allege in a Middle Eastern country
such as Egypt for example, that woman is oppressed, and to call for the equality between man and woman or for her emancipation, would be a serious request, i.e. FTA. The writer who calls for this should brace himself for confrontation by many forces or institutions, such as the religious, the social, the moral, and probably, the "official" institution, i.e. the police. For this reason, such a request will rank relatively high on the imposition continuum in the Middle East. In the West, this request might rank extremely low because "material" requests rank higher. FTAs in the other novel, though ranking high, do not have the same urgency and will not cause the same upheaval.

Despite the usefulness of these factors, the fact is that there are other factors which also co-determine the weightiness of an FTA. These factors are, according to (Kasper: 1990), context-internal. Context-internal factors are linguistic act-specific. They, therefore, differ from one act to another. For example, the context internal factors for requests are identified as the speaker's and writer's rights and obligations as well as the likelihood of hearer's compliance and speaker's difficulty in carrying out the request. Whereas in apologies the severity of the offence and the obligation on the offender to apologize constitute context-internal constraints on the choice of the politeness strategies.

More importantly still, Saville-Troike (1989) claims that both discourse type and genre exert decisive constraints on the participants' linguistic behaviour. Novel genre, for example, exerts different constraints than the genre of political speeches. The physical setting of genre also plays a role: in a mosque people have to speak euphemistically about things related to sex. On the other hand, if the primary aim of discourse type is the efficient transmission of information, it is highly likely that clarity will override every other consideration; otherwise politeness will override. However, according to Kasper (1990), the impact of discourse type is only beginning to be systematically examined.
There are other factors which have a bearing on politeness such as the role, the age and the sex of participants (e.g. House and Kasper 1981). However, I believe that these factors have to do more with politeness as a social phenomenon, rather than as a strategy.

**3.3 Figures of Speech and Politeness**

Before adopting any of the above strategies, the ES naturally weighs up their respective advantages and disadvantages. By going baldly on record, the ES is both maximally efficient, and maximally face threatening. By making a redressive action, he is more obliging than before, but comparatively less effective. By going for negative politeness, he indicates more self-effacement, and hence shows more politeness. In this respect he can go off-record, while his indirect speech act stays on-record thus giving more chance of manoeuvring both for the audience and himself. Or he can go completely off-record resorting to hints, thus giving even more freedom, nevertheless taking more risks that his request be ignored. Hints, like indirect speech acts, are of differing degrees of conventionalization; and at the same time universal features of all languages.

The principles involved are two (ibid. p.148). First, the rational ES chooses the strategy which best satisfies his wants and minimizes the force of the FTA. Second, the more linguistic effort the ES shows, the more polite his linguistic contribution. On the basis of the latter principle, the following examples will be presented in descending order of politeness (FsOS which operate in the same way will be given identical numbers):

7- Metaphor: You should have examined the cow before you bought it.

7- Metonymy: She walked along, observing people on the treadmill of life struggling for a mouthful of bread.

7- Reason and Intellect: Can that body which dissolved in the universe create in that vanishing point another body attached to the earth?
8- Kināya: She left with her eyes raised.

8- Analogy (proper): I see that you are moving one foot forward and one foot backward.

9- Simile: The feminine ending attached to her name, linked her to girls’ lists like a link in a leather chain.

10- Analogy (tamthīl al-istībāra): She felt something strange happening to her body while moving up from the centre of the earth. It was getting less heavier. As if she were jettisoning in every step some invisible burdens which...

Metaphor, metonymy, and the reason and intellect are given № 7 because they all operate by characterization, i.e. the ES does not bother himself to explain to the audience that "cow", for example, in (7) does not refer to the four-legged animal, but rather to a human being. Instead, the audience has to make the inference by virtue of the absence or irrelevance of the animal mentioned. This is also the case with metonymy where "mouthful of bread" stands for sustenance in general, and with the reason and intellect FOS where the grammatical subject "body" is characterized as the initiator of creation.

Kināya and one type of analogy (i.e. analogy proper) also operate by characterization, but the figurative weight lies at the statement level, rather than the word level as is the case with the former group. For this reason, they are given № 8. In kināya "with her eyes raised" stands for dignity, and in analogy the whole statement characterizes the addressee as someone hesitant who moves one foot forward and another backward. In all the above cases, the ES does not bother himself to explain to the audience what exactly he is referring to. Instead, he leaves the whole burden of interpretation to them, ignoring the possibility that they might not arrive at the intended one.

In (9), however, the ES makes the personal effort of explaining: the feminine ending is not a chain, it is like a chain which links; the linguistic effort is there. In (10) the linguistic effort is even more conspicuous: the ES makes the effort of explaining to the
audience step by step how "she" moved up the mountain, and how she got relieved as she went further up. Such a (linguistic) effort cannot but be taken as a politeness marker. It must be pointed out, however, that in (10) conspicuousness is, under certain circumstances, too detailed and complicated for the audience to bear.

FsOS are not candidates for the non-redressive on record strategy because they are not direct requests. They are not primarily successful candidates for redressive positive politeness strategy, except in some situations where clarity does not conflict with politeness etiquette (consider the "cow" metaphor). They border negative politeness and share with it the capability of preserving the perennial wants of the audience not to be imposed upon. But they are satisfactorily and primarily candidates for off record strategy. They make viable and conventionalized hints, though with differing degrees of conventionalization.

"Conventionalization" with respect to FsOS has to do with the "staple meaning" of the FOS as clarified in the verbal opposition theory (see 2.1.2.3). All FsOS, except (istiāra) metaphor proper, either have their respective grounds explicit such as simile and analogy, or have one single interpretation such as metonymy. Metaphor proper is, as we have seen, is either novel or established. A novel metaphor is off-record in the sense that the connotations of the vehicle are equally viable, with each one being a candidate to be picked up by the audience as the intended meaning. An established metaphor, on the other hand, ranks higher on the continuum of conventionalization. It is, therefore, difficult to be evaded by the audience. We can conclude, therefore, that all FsOS rank high on the continuum of off-recordedness.

Advancing from the general to the specific, I shall now deal with how each individual FOS violates one or more of the maxims of Grice mentioned above. This will be done in descending order, i.e. in terms of the number of the violations of the maxims each FOS makes.
Metaphor violates the relevance maxim, the quality maxim, quantity maxim and the manner maxim. It violates the relevance maxim because it says something that is not explicitly relevant, and because if it were to be taken at face value, it would be trivially descriptive. In this, it is not different from, for example, "it is nice coffee" which, given the context, should be taken simultaneously both as a compliment and as a request. It accomplishes the desired act by means of a hint in the manner described above (i.e."she is in the grip of fate" is both a descriptive statement and a call for help). It violates the quality maxim because it is literally false. There is incongruence between the sentence meaning and the speaker meaning. It violates the quantity maxim because of its curtness. It violates the manner maxim because it can be ambiguous, as it is not always clear which and how many of its connotations are intended to be invoked.

Metonymy also invites implicatures by violating the same maxims which metaphor does, and in the same way. But it (slightly) differs with respect to its violation of the quality maxim: with metaphor vehicle and tenor come from two semantically disparate domains; with metonymy the two extremes involved are more related one to another. Hence the contradiction is less conspicuous (consider for example, "ship" and "sail").

Each of kināya and the figure of reason and intellect, violate two maxims: the relevance and the manner. Each violates the relevance maxim in the same manner described above; and they violate the manner maxim because they do not indicate the intentions of the ES in a direct way.

Each of simile and analogy violate two maxims: the maxim of relevance and the maxim of quantity. They violate the maxim of quantity though in the reverse manner from that of metaphor (and metonymy): while metaphor is too curt, simile is rather too elaborate; analogy is even more elaborate. Metaphor minimizes the hearer benefit, maximizes the speaker benefit. Simile does the opposite. Analogy, which is more elaborate,
combines the advantages and disadvantages of both FsOS. It must be pointed out, however, that other factors come into play when deciding the degree of politeness of these FsOS such as audience type and the degree of appeal each FOS contains.

In this connection, it is crucially important to make a comparison between simile and its foster-sister, metaphor. I have divided metaphor into two kinds: established metaphor and novel metaphor. The former allows one contextually relevant connotation, the latter allows in more. Simile, in turn, allows only one contextually relevant connotation, thanks to the ground. Novel metaphor, therefore, hedges on simile because it is ambiguous; established metaphor does not. It is as explicit and determinate as simile. However, because simile violates fewer maxims than metaphor does, it makes a simpler and more straightforward request. For this reason, the chance for the audience to ignore the request is made weaker.

By way of summary, we can conclude that all FsOS are intrinsically polite because they fall on the off record strategy which expresses requests via hints. This indicates that the motive lying behind using them is politeness: the ES wishes to dignify both himself and his audience, and to spare both parties any risk of humiliation. Politeness, however, is only a means to an end. This end is intimacy, i.e. persuasion.

The argument above allows us to conclude that the various types of FsOS are intrinsically polite and are used by casual friends who care for each other and who share a certain amount of background knowledge. They vary in their degree of politeness, i.e. in their degree of imposition; in their degree of giving options; and in the degree of appeal. It is this which enables them to account for many situation types.

It also allows us to conclude that having recourse to any particular FOS does not reflect a random tendency by the ES. Rather, it reflects that he sees that particular FOS as expressing a certain point of view and that he is adopting a certain strategy which helps him achieve a pre-conceived end.
3.4 Precis

By way of summary, two main issues have constituted the contention of this chapter. The first is that FsOS are capable of giving expression to human experience, that they are highly attitudinal as they are based on (naturalized) ideological assumptions, and that they are intrinsically evidential and persuasive. The second, is that they offer the most adequate strategy for the ES to draw his audience closer. The ES uses a particular politeness strategy to enable him, under proper conditions, to persuade his audience without losing, or causing the audience to lose, face. I have used "politeness" in its technical sense which accommodates but transcends "courtesy". Given the factors which determine the seriousness of any FTA, the ES, by the mere opting for FsOS as a strategy to effect persuasion, goes off-record. Off record strategy operates via hints, and is adequate only under certain conditions.

Once the ES has opted for off-recordedness as the most adequate strategy for the minimization of FTAs, the criterion determining the degree of politeness is the extent of linguistic effort the ES puts in his statement: the more linguistic effort the ES shows, the more polite his linguistic contribution.

FsOS differ between themselves in the degree of off-recordedness (i.e. politeness). I have demonstrated that FsOS fall into two groups: one in which the ES characterizes the tenor as vehicle and where he does not bother to explain to the audience, and one in which the ES does bother to explain.

FsOS also differ between themselves as to the number of maxim violations each of them makes. This has a bearing on the processing effort the audience has to make. In this respect, I have demonstrated that they fall into three groups. One group (e.g. metaphor and metonymy) violate all four maxims, another group (e.g. kinaya and the
figure of reason and intellect) violate two maxims: the relevance and the manner, and the third which consists of simile and analogy, violate two maxims: the relevance and quantity. I have also demonstrated that simile is simpler in that it is in possession of an un-branching ground.

The bearing of this is immense. It means in effect that each FOS is grounded in some sort of "practical logic", that it defines in advance the sort of relationship and attitude between the ES and his audience i.e. if the audience is made up of large masses, simile, for example, is more adequate. If the audience belongs to the elite, or if clarity overrides, metaphor is more adequate. It also means that each FOS is designed to achieve a particular purpose and express a particular point of view that cannot otherwise be expressed adequately. In the following chapter, I am going to further investigate how this attitude or "specialized" point of view is expressed. This will be carried out through discourse.
Notes to Chapter Three

(1) See Fairclough (1989), especially Chapter Three where he analyses Mrs Thatcher's TV. interviews and where he argues that she is creative in the sense that she sets an example for woman in Britain by working hard to gain a high position. The usage of "creative" is, I think, biased as the term is evaluatively loaded and as it is grounded in the premise that man-woman relationship is plagued by inequity.

(2) For "form" see also Abbás, F. H. (1987), though he seems to be interested more in the "economy" aspect of form, rather than in its appeal.

(3) For "evidence" see also W. Chafe (1987); see also Dubois, J. W. (1987).

(4) The term "delegated Efficacy" was coined by I. A. Richards (1965) to refer to the fact that words owe their meaning to the sentence and that they function, i.e. have their meanings determined, only when they enter into syntactic relation with other words. As the coinage is used in this dissertation, it means that the enunciating speaker owes the power he gains from having recourse to figurative language to the collective society.

(5) See also R. Brown and A. Gilman (1971); see also P. Brown and S. Levinson (1978).

(6) For "face" see "for example" Goffman (1981), (1971) where, especially in the first reference, he handles what he calls "the remedial act".
Chapter Four

DISCOURSE

4. Introduction.

According to Fairclough (1985), (1989), there are two approaches towards the study of "discourse": the "descriptive" and the "critical". The former was championed by, among others, a group of conversational-analysis-oriented ethnomethodologists such as Sacks (1972), (1978); Schegloff (1972); Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974); Cicourel (1973), (1974); and Goffman (1971), (1981).

Despite the fact that they viewed "discourse" as a mode of social action, and that they showed some interest in the relation between linguistic and non-linguistic activities, their main interest was focused on the formalisation of discourse. Furthermore, they primarily conceived of "discourse" as "mere talk", and except for Goffman (1981), whose model extended to incorporate the written mode, they confined "talk" to conversation. For lack of space, I shall not elaborate on their models.

As their main aim was the formalisation of talk, "power differential" was understandably irrelevant to their work. "Power differential" is the difference in power an individual enjoys thanks to some social values such as role and status. It gives structure to discourse and this helps in distinguishing one discourse type from another (e.g. question/answer in an interview or otherwise question/answer/follow-up in a lesson). It also positions interactants one vis-a-vis another. For example, in a job interview it is the business proprietor who has the right to ask questions, whereas the interviewee is required to comply by answering questions; in classrooms it is the teacher who asks questions (though not for the sake of gaining knowledge), students answer questions and then the teacher makes an assessment of the student's answer in
terms of good or bad. "Power differential" is, according to Kress (1985:14), the dynamo of discourse. For this reason, it is of great relevance to this work.

The "critical" approach, on the other hand, was developed at the hands of a number of prominent linguists, critical linguists and philosophers. Among them are: Kress (1985), Kress and Hodge (1979), (1988); Althusser (1971); Fowler (1974), Fowler et al (1979), Foucault (1971), (1972), (1977), (1982); Fairclough (1985), (1989); Pecheux (1982); and Thompson (1984). These were not contented with simply the description of data. On the contrary, each one of them tried to interpret the "social" in linguistic terms, i.e. to relate language to the social factor. This factor which both determines and accounts for the structuring of language contributions is, according to them, power differential.

Their approach enjoys many merits. Among them are: it widens to incorporate the written as well as the spoken mode, and as such it is more comprehensive; it accounts for power differential; it rejects, and attempts to bridge, the dichotomy between grammar and the social world; and it does not only describe, but also accounts for and explains, social phenomena. Their approach, therefore, is critical rather than descriptive; and their model is the most promising of all.

In this chapter, I shall examine three interrelated main issues: (i) discourse, (ii) institutions, and (iii) the rules of discourse. In the first I will be examining such issues as the unit and the emergence of discourse; in the second, institutions and power as respectively the loci and dynamo of discourse; and in the third, the rules regulating the functioning of discourse. "Discourse" is conceived of as a social phenomenon practised by (ideologically committed) groups the nucleus of each of which is the ideologically trained and specialised "subject". These ideological groups, in their diversity, make up the whole society. In the first part of this chapter, I shall be drawing rather heavily on Foucault.
4.1 Definition of Discourse

Following Foucault (1972), Kress (1985:7) defines discourse as a:

systematically organized set of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution. Beyond that, they define, describe, and delimit what it is possible to say and what it is not possible to say... with respect to the area of concern of that institution whether marginally or centrally. A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and organizes and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about, in that it provides descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions of social and individual action.

Elaborate and exhaustive, this lengthy definition spells out key discourse-related concepts. Among them are the unit of discourse (i.e. statement); the parties to discourse (i.e. institutions vs individuals); discoursal rules and constraints; and the importance of a given unity of discourse (i.e. topic) to the institution. By extension, and given Kress's indispensable criterion of difference in power relations, it can be safely argued that discourse organizes the relationship between different institutions on the one hand, and between institutions and their respective "individuals" on the other hand. It also gives a hierarchical structure to all relevant, albeit remote,
elements, events, and topics. I shall elaborate on these, and all relevant issues, one by one.

4.1.1 The Unit of Discourse: Statement

At one point Foucault (1972: 28) defines statement, the unit of discourse, as an "event" -not only because it is linked to the event of speech or writing, or because it is, like events, repeatable but unique, but also because it is always part of a series of events or "sign among signs". For example, the statement (Abuha ka al-qadar) "Her father is like fate" can only be appreciated and assigned significance only when situated among other relevant (parallel or opposing) statements on fathers. For example, what fate stands for, how negative or otherwise positive in Arabic culture fate is, how fathers who are like fate behave or alternatively how others who are different behave, and how serious their behaviour in that particular culture is. Even when a statement occurs on its own, others must be present, albeit in absentia.

At another point he takes "statement" as the "ultimate, undecomposable element that can be isolated and introduced into a set of relations with other elements" (ibid. p. 80). In fact the two definitions are not contradictory. Rather, they are complementary; with the second part putting "statement" readily in juxtaposition with other traditional linguistic or logical units (i.e. sentence and proposition respectively) which have been until very recently fulfilling the same function. Indeed, "statement" stands distinct from, though it might in some cases coincide with, either.

In the following I shall compare "statement" with the traditional discourse units: sentence, proposition. I shall also compare it with speech acts in order to see where and how they diverge, or alternatively, converge.

As far as the statement/proposition pair is concerned,"No one heard" and "It is true no one heard", for example, constitute the same proposition- but two different
statements on the level of discourse. For the first can function, in a novel, as an observation; while the second, as part of an interior monologue or a fragment of a dialogue. On the contrary, "The king of France is bald", to give another example, makes two distinct propositions but one single statement. (i.e. There is a king of France. The king of France is bald).

With the statement/sentence pair, on the other hand, an equivalence between both can obtain - but only in the case of grammatically isolatable sentences (e.g. smoking is dangerous) or those which have undergone a series of transformations (e.g. Wolf!) (ibid. p.81). In other cases, most cases, and given the equivocation of the standard of the correctness of sentences, (as some put grammaticality, others intelligibility as a requirement for the achievement of that) no equivalence obtains. "Statement" cannot be confined to any grammatically specific mood. Indeed, it can occur in negatives, declaratives, and interrogatives as the following examples demonstrate:

1- Can that body which dissolved in the universe create in that vanishing point another body attached to the earth?

2- The feminine ending attached to her name linked her to girls' lists like a link in a leather chain.

3- She dares not show her head in the outside, because in the outside there was a supernatural force capable of picking her out of crowds.

Where in (1) the ES is not using the rhetorical question to elicit information, but rather to state that "that body..." is capable of creating another body. In (2) the ES states through
narration that the girl referred to is oppressed. In (3) the ES is not primarily negating, but rather is stating through negation a state of affairs that is applicable to her.

Statement" is also recognizable from "local" speech acts which depend for their functioning on context or on shared background knowledge such as "the cat is on the mat". This is because without shared background knowledge the audience cannot determine whether the illocutionary force of the speech act is narrating or, say, warning. He might not even be in a position to know where the mat or cat is.

"Statement", however, does coincide with the serious or institutionalized speech act. As such, it acquires validity and credibility- though not by passing conditions that determine the validity of speech acts, but by passing some institutional tests or empirical confirmation 5. These speech acts are divorced from local situation, of assertion for example, and from everyday shared background knowledge. As Foucault (1972: 224) puts it:

It is always possible one could speak the truth in a void; one would be only in the true, however, if one obeyed the rules of some discursive "police" which would have to be activated everytime one spoke (cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1988: 48).

For example, "Her father is like fate" can make a banal everyday speech act so long as it is uttered by a man in the street, but it turns into a serious one (i.e. statement) once uttered by a specialist such as a feminist writer who is usually taken as an authority in this connection. Such statements cannot be false in so far as they are interpreted in terms of their institutionally empowered initiators- unlike scientific statements which cannot be detached from later developments 6.

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Thus we are left with the ultimate but safe conclusion that a statement transcends the individual, traditional units: sentences, propositions and speech acts. This fact, while accounting for the supremacy and uniqueness of the "statement", makes it difficult for us to define or to say at what level it should be situated, or by what method it should be approached. But we can conclude that it is not defined in terms of mood (i.e. declarative, interrogative, etc.), in terms of length or shortness, of being strongly or weakly structured, but one that is:

caught up, like others, in a logical or grammatical locutory nexus ... The statement is not, therefore, a structure (i.e. a group of relations between variable elements...); it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide... whether or not they make sense, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation (oral or written) (Foucault 1972: 86-7).

Having arrived at the uniqueness of "statement" when juxtaposed with the traditional units of discourse I shall now discuss its uniqueness in terms of its relation with its ES.

4.1.2 Characteristics of Statement

The relation between a statement and what it states is different from the relation between a sentence and its meaning and between a proposition and its referent. For example, the sentence "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" despite its grammaticality, is meaningless. But to say this, is to exclude a number of possibilities: that it is part of a poetic text, or that it is, for example, a dream. As a statement it holds well and does refer to something beyond itself.
The same also holds with "the king of France is bald" which fails as a proposition to satisfy the truth conditions (because there is presently no king of France), but which holds as a statement because the relation between it and what it states is not, as Foucault (1972: 90) puts it, "anterior to it". A statement is not confronted by the "absence" or "presence of a correlate". Rather, it is linked to a referential that is made up not of "things", "facts", "realities", or "beings", but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it. This referential includes the place, the authority which differentiates between states, individuals, objects, and defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition. This means that a statement possesses "something else"; this something else concerns itself, not its cause or its elements (ibid. p. 89).

Another feature of the statement is that, unlike the sentence, we have to distinguish between two kinds of subject: the grammatical subject and the ES, viz. he who emits the signs, or the author of the statement which can, but not necessarily, coincide with the grammatical subject (ibid. pp. 92-3). What concerns us in the following statement is not the "two legs" or "the feet of the girl", i.e. the grammatical subject(s):

4- The two legs never parted the way human legs normally do. Rather, it was a worm-like movement where the feet of the girl moved on the ground with her thighs clamped and knees bound, as if they were pressing something she feared might fall.
What concerns us is a specific identity of the ES, and his relationship with what he states and his different possible roles not only in terms of the occasion, but also in terms of his status, both of which are subject to variation.

In a novel, the enunciator of statements is not the character(s) but rather that man or woman whose world is being replayed or whose name usually appears on the cover. This author's name varies as his statements and his purpose behind enunciating them vary, i.e. does he project himself on the events or does he remain behind the curtain putting words secretly into his characters' mouths? This ES is a particular, vacant place that may in fact be filled by different individuals; one that is never defined once and for all (ibid. p. 20).

A third characteristic of the statement incurred by the ES, is that it does not and cannot occur in isolation; rather it has to be related to a whole adjacent field. A statement always has borders peopled by other statements. These bordering statements form an "associative field" which includes (i) all the formulations that make up the whole genre within which the statement appears, (ii) all the formulations that a particular statement reactualizes, albeit implicitly, either by opposition, by commenting, by modification, by adapting, or even by repetition, (iii) all the formulations whose subsequent possibility is determined by the statement and which may follow the statement as its consequence, (iv) all the formulations whose status the statement in questions shares, and among which it takes its place- without regard to linear order (ibid. pp. 96-100). For example, the associative field of the following statement:

5- the seven mouths [of girls] opened in a suppressed, broken feminine laughter like gasps...
can be detailed as follows: the statement is a comment on some college girl students is part of class-chat genre [i]. Ideally, in this genre the girls' right to freely chat among themselves should be guaranteed, especially in the absence of male students. This and other statements, which make a comment on the condition of college girls, actualize a state of conditions where the right of girls is lacking. At the same time, they run in opposition to a state of conditions (described by another statement or group of statements) where the right of girls is viewed as not lacking (i.e. this is how things should be), [ii] this statement can incur a statement or a number of statements which are in line with, or oppose, the statement above, [iii] even if the statement were ignored, the formula remains unaffected for we are dealing with possibilities. All statements which are critical of the oppressing of girls, (for example statements (2), (3) and (4) above) form the associative field of the statement.

The fourth characteristic of the statement is "materiality" which is not only attributed to "speech" or "writing", but also to its relation with its ES' and associative field. It must be pointed out, however, that the materiality of a statement is not confined to "substance" but extends to include the spatio-temporal dimension. The sum total of these factors gives the statement its uniqueness. This uniqueness nevertheless allows a number of constants: grammatical, semantic, and logical.

But at the end of the day, and despite the importance of these elements, what allows or prohibits the repetition of a statement are two factors: the institution and the associative field which surrounds it and of which it forms a part. As the statement's associative domain varies, its role, function and status vary. This associative field constitutes for statements "a field of stabilization" (ibid. pp. 50-2). This field makes it possible to repeat them in their identity and defines a threshold beyond which the appearance of a new statement becomes inevitable.
4.1.3 The Law and Source of Statements

According to Foucault (1972:103) the operation and functioning of statements in their diversity can be attributed to three factors. First, the status of the speaker which is accorded institutional knowledge and competence; his relations with other individuals or groups; and the role that he is functioning in. The sum total of all this, which differs from time to time, has impact on the force of the statement. Second, the position of the subject in terms of whether he is the listening, the questioning, the observing, or the seeing subject. Third, the institutional site from which the ES makes his discourse, and from which his discourse derives its legitimacy. These might be, for a feminist writer: the premises of a feminist magazine, the column she edits, and her house.

To sum up, I have argued so far that a statement is a unique unit of discourse which has got an imperceptible materiality, as it is simultaneously an event because it is linked to enunciation, and a non-event because the modalities of enunciation are invariably different. It is also repeatable, though never with the same meaning or the same force— even if it is made up of the same words, or if it preserves the same semantic or syntactic identity. As Foucault (ibid. p. 100) puts it, "Enunciation is an unrepeatable event".

4.2 The Unit and Unities of Discourse

Thus, the statement being a function of existence, an event, does not occupy a place that is definitive among other statements. Rather, it keeps shifting from a group of statements into another, preserving and violating the same identity at one and the same time. Like an 18 year old youth who is simultaneously identical with, and different from, the same baby he was a long time ago. This continuous identity is important in some cases (e.g. with the police), irrelevant in others (e.g. renting a car). It gives the statement a sense of stability and continuation and enables it to perform versatile functions.
The question that now arises is: what gives a certain group of statements their unity—given that statements usually emerge in groups? Surely it is not simply the fact that they describe a certain object—the position of woman, for example. For this object keeps shifting from time to time; it is not formed once and for all. Moreover, it cannot be traced back to an origin—because it has no origin. Nor could it be referred to style: a body of knowledge that presupposes the same way of looking at things—because of, inter alia, the ongoing modifications to the ways we conceive things. Nor could it be referred to "concepts", because new concepts which abolish or modify their predecessors progressively come into existence (consider the evolution of "grammar"). Nor could it be ascribed to "theme", because themes like objects are not always the same (consider "The Theory of Evolution").

What unites a group of statements, and eventually discourse on "the position of woman", for example, is the interplay of rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time; and the rules that define the transformations of these different objects, and "the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence" (ibid. pp. 32-3). In brief, but paradoxically, to define a group of statements is to formulate their law of division; their law of dispersion:

Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever,...between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions, and functionings, transformations) we will say, that we are dealing with...a discursive formation (ibid. p.38).
4.2.1 The Rules of Discursive Formations

The rules which make the formation of an object of discourse (e.g. feminist discourse) possible are relations established between three kinds of authorities (ibid. pp. 41-2). First, the surface authorities which help us map out the individual differences which will be accorded the status of, for example, social restraint or alienation and which differ from time to time and from society to society. Until fairly recently, feminism was defined by few people who showed interest in the liberation of woman, and by the work situation. Then other authorities such as art surfaced and began to structure this discourse. Second, the authorities of delimitation such as family and religion, which began to claim a bigger say. Third, the grids of specification or the systems according to which different "kinds of rights" are divided, contrasted, re-grouped, classified, derived from one another as objects of feminist discourse.

These relations incur four consequences (ibid. pp. 44-5): (i) They entail that not anyone can say anything about something any time. The speaker is constrained. (ii) They are established between institutions that are relevant but diverse and help the object of discourse to situate itself in relation to other objects. (iii) They are not internal to discourse (i.e. connect concepts together) nor exterior to it (i.e. limit it). They are at its limits, in that they offer it objects to speak about. (iv) Most importantly, it is these relations which form a system of rules and govern discourse and which are anterior to it (because they are derived from generalizations about previous discourses) that give discourse its unity. This system, it should be emphasized, is not, due to anteriority, fixed or immobile. Its mobility manifests itself in two ways (ibid. pp. 72-4): first, the elements that are being related to each other are always changing; second, new objects appear, new types of individuals, new modalities of enunciation.
Having accounted for, among other things, the definition, law and source of statements, I shall try to individualize or single out a particular discourse for a brief discussion. My example will be "the social discourse".

4.2.2 How to Individualize a Discourse

The discursive formations (i.e. a group of statements) which deal with discourse give rise, by virtue of the law governing them, to a certain organization of concepts or objects which form, according to their degree of coherence, themes or theories. These themes help us determine the possible points of diffraction of discourse: incompatible objects, though can belong to the same discourse, cannot enter the same series of statements.

Thus a statement cancels another statement out. But not ad infinitum. For in a different type of enunciation of the same discourse, they can, being alternatives, appear together under either/or; thus forming a system of equivalence. But not all alternatives are in fact actualized. Within the social discourse, for example, we can imagine an occasion involving a parent and his child. The parent gives the child a pound and asks him not to buy any kind of sweets (for they can cause tooth decay) and only permits him to buy a small toy car. In this case the statements "buy X" and "Don't buy Z" delimit each other. The same occasion involving the same individuals can, however, obtain but under different circumstances. The parent now with a different motive, wishing to reward the child for some school achievement, gives him a pound with permission to buy either a toy car or some chocolate. Here the two statements are equivalent. In a third situation, however, the second statement or choice can disappear; and so on. This is how statements delimit each other within the same discourse.

So we must study the authorities that guided one's choice or intention; this involves contemporary discourses and their relation to one another. This relation can be one of
analogy, opposition, complementarity or of mutual delimitation. This has the grave consequence that a discursive formation does not occupy "all the possible volume that is opened to it of right by the system of formation of its objects, its enunciations, and its concepts; it is essentially incomplete..."(ibid. p. 67). Hence the fact that the same discursive formation, taken up again, and placed in a new constellation, may reveal new possibilities.

There is another type of authority which helps determine a discursive formation; this authority involves the function of discourse in a non-discursive practice, the rules of appropriation or who has the right to speak, and the possible positions of desire in relation to discourse.

4.2.3 Modes of Subjectification

Before moving to a relatively different issue, I would like to tackle a relevant question: "What are the modes whereby the institution transforms individuals into subjects?". Modes of subjectification can be divided into two: extrinsic and intrinsic.

The first tends to be institutionalized and takes the mode of know-how in which institutions "steep" their subjects to guarantee their loyalty; and the mode of the dividing practices they established in the society as a collectivity, such as the opposite pairs good/bad; clarity/vagueness; and order/disorder. These take the form of qualitative experience and are derived from the past and permeate the future through the present (Foucault 1982: 208-16).

The second, the intrinsic or congenital, relates to sexuality (i.e. male/female pair) (ibid. pp. 211-12), though this is not a man-made division. Institutions, especially in the West, tend through some slogans (such as equality between the two sexes or the emancipation of woman), to fight against this division. By so doing, they create
conflict around what and how the subject is, or around forms of domination and exploitation.

The institution, to ensure subjectification, need not necessarily be present at every verbal exchange. This is because it can remote-control the behaviour as well as the contributions of its subjects. Fairclough (1989) distinguishes between two kinds of discourse power: power behind discourse and power in discourse.

In discourse types where power is present behind discourse (e.g. conversation), power does not lie in the hands of the institution, but rather in the hands of power-holders in the institution (e.g. parents) (Fairclough 1989: 43-49). An example would be the way a parent talks to his child, and the way the child answers his parent (a parent can normally command his child, an outsider cannot; he requests him).

In discourse types where power lies in discourse (e.g. literary discourse), power is "hidden" and not explicit as in the former case (ibid. pp 49-62). It prevails in occasions where interactants are not present (e.g. a written text) and where no feedback to regulate their contributions is available. In this case, discourse pre-positions both the writer in order to give form to his contribution in a specific way, and prepositions the reader in order to make him respond (negatively or positively) to what he reads. As Fairclough (1989: 38) puts it: "occupying a subject position is essentially a matter of doing (or not doing) certain things".

4.3 Institutions

Having finished the statement and relevant issues, I shall proceed to discuss the second main issue of this chapter: institution.
4.3.1 Definition and Types of Institutions

The main if not the only authority that delimits, gives structure to, and channels discourse, is the "institution". In general terms, an institution is an apparatus responsible for designing, executing and policing a certain policy or type of behaviour.

According to Althusser (1971: 131-6), institutions fall into two categories: state apparatuses and ideological state apparatuses. The first works predominantly by force and repression, secondarily by ideology, and includes, among others, the police, the army and prison apparatuses. The second works predominantly by ideology and secondarily by force and repression, and includes, among others, religion, education and family apparatuses. The interest of both kinds of apparatus does not only lie in enforcing their respective ideologies, but also in securing their repeatability by trying to maintain the same sort of intra- and inter-institutional links, i.e. between the institution itself and its "members" and between the members themselves on the one hand, and between the institution and other institutions on the other hand.

Two interesting points ensue from this division. First, that the distinction between the two kinds of institution is blurred- the difference being one of dominance. Second, and more important, is his attribution of both kinds to the state, to the oblivion of the social dimension of the institution. In my handling of "institution" I primarily focus on the second kind- the social institution, a term I borrow from Fairclough (1985) and prefer to Althusser's political term. According to Fairclough (1985: 746), an institution is an "ideological speech community" for verbal interaction (which is a mode of social action), or an order of discourse which has its repertoire of its speech events.

An extreme example of an ideological speech community can be what Halliday (1978: 164-84) called "antilanguages". By this Halliday is referring specifically to a sub-group of underground criminals who, to ensure a maximally intimate and cooperative
relationship between themselves (i.e. to secure personal safety against police raids, to maintain self respect against the ostracizing society, and to boost morale) used a sub-language characterized by overlexicalization that was intelligible only to them.

Thompson (1984: 129) in turn, distinguishes between two modes of institution: **specific** which can be viewed as a constellation of social relations and reservoirs of material resources, and is concerned with authority relations and capital resources, and **sedimented** institutions which are configurations which persist in various specific forms and are concerned with the social structure. The two kinds are, I believe, only separable in theory.

Let us take "Mu'ta", a name given to a university in the south of Jordan, as our example. For its name, the university capitalizes on the fame of a very renowned battle in the history of Islam. Hence, its main field of specialization lies within the military domain, a reminder of the famous battle. This is the gist of the sedimented mode of the university: it serves more a mainly bedouin community reminiscent of the glorious forefathers who fought that famous battle. But at the same time, the social dimension is part and parcel of the specific mode which is manifested by the fact that all students are state-sponsored (unlike other Jordanian universities). State-sponsorship is also a characteristic of the sedimented mode. Here lies the circularity and indivisibility of the two modes.

### 4.3.2 The Place of the Institution

According to Fairclough (1985: 745-6), the best way to conceive of the social institution is as a pivot between the highest level of social formation and the most concrete level of social action. Social action produces social structures and tends to cluster in terms of institutions so much so that we find no difficulty in ascribing a social
event (specifically a verbal interaction) to a given institution, say, family or school institution.

The relationship between the three social phenomena can be seen as one determined from top to bottom. But it can also be determined conversely; though this is less likely—probably due to power differential. For example, in a school the ways in which the teacher/student relationship is defined are determined at the higher social formation level, i.e. that which involves school/economic system and school/state pairs relationship. The actions that take place in the school are in turn determined by institutional factors. However, circumstances might occur at the base level which might re-shape the institution itself; and changes may occur in the institution which may contribute to the transfer of the social formation. This demonstrates that the relationship between the three is dialectic rather than mechanistic.

4.4 Institutional Relations.

These divide into two kinds: intra-institutional relations and inter-institutional relations. I shall deal with these kinds in the above-mentioned manner.

4.4.1 Intra-institutional Relations

The same sort of relationship mentioned above obtains also between the institution and its cast of participants. These are the "individuals" who have shared and will continue to share (unless the institution disintegrates) the same discourse which projects the interest(s) of the institution of which they are members and to which they belong and which they themselves have created. They provide the institution simultaneously with rules and with compliance. The institution, in turn, provides them with the knowledge of not only how to talk about things, but also how to see things. It provides them with a "frame of action" without which they could not act, but it
thereby constrains them to act within that frame, as Fairclough (1985: 749) puts it: "particular ways of talking are based upon particular ways of seeing". The teacher, for example, is taught to talk like a teacher, and is made, more than any one else, to see what is beneficial to his students.

It must be pointed out, however, that he applies the institution's rules which I shall call ideological discursive formations (IDFs) with a flexibility ranging from persuasion to coercion, and that these IDFs acquire orderliness and become naturalized i.e. he uses the same structures unconsciously. The opportunity remains, however, for charismatic subjects to exert their influence on the institution and force new laws into its legislature.

This sort of (dialectic) relationship forms a basis for the refutation of a famous statement by Althusser (1971: 162), "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects" where he sees the relationship as one-sided, and power concentrated solely in the hands of the institution. He takes "subjects" in the sense of the "royal subject". But this can be refuted on more than one count: that subjects who take part in the institution's policy-making are not invariably human beings. They can be joint ventures or body corporates. Besides, and as Thompson (1984: 252) puts it:

If the subject were simply an individual interpellated by a pre-existing ideological formation, then no room would be left for the emergence of resistance or revolt, for the revolutionary creativity which is an irrepressible feature of the historical process.
In this dissertation "subject" is taken in both senses: the royal subject and the grammatical subject or the affected entity and the one who is capable of taking the initiative.

In fact, Fairclough (1985: 749) in his tripartite division of parties to verbal interaction, i.e. subject, client and public, established a subtle yet important distinction between these three categories and appointed rights and obligations between them proportionate with their loyalty. The subject shows the most loyalty and enjoys the highest stake in power. The public enjoys relatively more freedom but less power. The client enjoys even more freedom but less power than both.

As a working definition for "subject" I propose: a permanent member of the institution; for "client" : an occasional member; for public: any member of the community whose interest might be prejudiced. (If we take our example of Fairclough's division from the feminist discourse, we can say that the subject can be a feminist writer or columnist or even those who work in a feminist institution; client: all female members of the society, especially those who believe in feminism; public: all members of the society who can potentially be involved, such as parents and brothers).

In addition to this hierarchical organization, the distinction also implies that each one of us can be, or virtually is, a subject- if not by virtue of belonging to a certain institution, by virtue of subject formation or the fact that we must have been socialized through and by, for example, family, school, club and university institutions.

The hierarchical division of subjects yields yet another result: the more a subject succumbs to the institution the more power he can gain and vice versa. In other words, the subject-institution relationship is based on a give-and- take policy. The more one gives, the more one takes. In rare cases, the situation can exist where the subject is asked to give up all his powers to the institution, and in return, s/he occupies a
position just at the top of the hierarchy— but which is only ritual. Monarchy in the UK is an appropriate example of this.

By emphasizing the double sense of "subject" I am emphasizing that the subject affects discourse and is affected by discourse (i.e. institution). As Fairclough (1985: 750) puts it "discourse makes people as well as people make discourse". It is interesting to point out that subjects fall into two categories: the constraining subjects such as parents and teachers whose interests lie in implementing the institution's instructions; and the constrained subjects who function as site for the application of these instructions.

It is also interesting to point out that the struggle takes place at a higher level of abstraction, the level of conflicting desires, and that it does not materialize at the concrete level of subjects. In fact, children do not resist, challenge, or hate their parents or teachers as such. Rather, they resist, challenge and hate their suppressing wills, desires, and instructions. But since these institutionally empowered desires are abstract and difficult to defeat, constrained subjects turn towards fighting the institutional "tools" which are immediate and more perceptible.

I would also like to point out, at least as far as this point is concerned, that the relation of conflict and tension between the two types of subject exists side by side with "solidarity" as the two parties need each other for their respective and relative well-being. Given this, the institution's discourse cannot but reflect this conflicting situation i.e. power struggle. Naturally enough, the institution's discourse reflects the dominant ideological discursive formation (IDF) in situations where other rival IDFs are hardly effective. This is because in many cases there can be two IDFs which are, more or less, equally prominent (i.e. in pluralistic institutions); and in extreme cases a schism can occur between the two rival IDFs and the institution simply splits.
4.4.2 Inter-institutional Relations

An institution, however, does not exist on its own, but constitutes only one of a network of institutions that make up and contain the ideological system of the whole society. As such, it is defined in relation to others. This relation is also one of power and conflict on the one hand, and of solidarity on the other.

Every institution after "ironing out" internal differences, projects the world in forms that reflect its own interest, the interest of power. This interest is by necessity in conflict with the interest of other institutions which aspire to assume the same power position. In this sense institutions delimit and exclude each other. At the same time, each institution needs to sustain bonds of solidarity that are the condition of its dominance. For this reason, the institution's discourse has to capture all these inter- institutional conflicts and contradictions. I propose to use "ideological complexes" to refer to this sort of complex situation which combines domestic as well as foreign affairs, and confine Fairclough's "IDFs" to the first kind; this term regulates the inter-institutional relations.

But at the same time I would like to emphasize that these policies overlap. The reason behind this is to account for the pluralistic approach or nature of many institutions when it comes to their relations with their cast of participants, and to the monolithic approach when it comes to their relations with other institutions. An ideological complex is, according to Kress and Hodge (1988:3) a:

functionally related set of contradictory versions of the world, coercively imposed by one social group on another on behalf of its own distinctive interests or subversively offered by another social group in attempts at resistance in its interests"
It represents the social order as simultaneously serving the interests of the dominant and dominated. I shall now demonstrate this multi-faceted, multi-level conflict within and between institutions through the family institution.

At the base level, tension always exists between parent and child; at the institution level, between the main IDF and other less dominant IDFs (i.e. between old and new techniques); at the higher, social formation level, between family and state. On the inter-institutional level, tension always exists between the "family" institution and other institutions that have a bearing on, and can delimit, the (verbal) contribution of its subjects, (e.g. the religious institution which dictates what is taboo and what is not); the economic institution which can dictate a relationship of dependency between parent and child, and automatically authorizes the former to use "commands" and the second to acquiesce to them; the moralistic institution which delimits or polishes the parent's authority on his child. This is apparent in, for example, the parent's frequent use of surface politeness markers such as "please", or still deeper, the changing of a command to a question.

Three issues should be remembered in this connection. First, that the position of the institution is never definitive; rather it is mobile and indefinite. "Family" can come at the bottom of the list of institutions which delimit "economy"; or it can never occur. Second, the major device for expressing tensions and power relations is modality. Third, discourses emerge and are based on conflicts that are in some way or another related to class struggle.

To sum up we can say that institutions are the source which accord validity and truth to statements; and that they are the authority and the loci which give birth to discourse(s). By virtue of their intermediary position as a pivot between the base or social structure and the higher social formation they are the loci of power. Internally, the conflict between the institution and its subjects is one of subjectification and
one of naturalization. Externally, the conflict is one of de-subjectification, de-
familiarisation and de-naturalization: each one does its best to alienate other subjects
from their naturalized discourse as they are bent on widening their hegemony over
others. This needs demonstration.

A feminist writer, el-Sadāwī for example, writes to a cast of participants the members
of which are usually sympathetic. To these, the institution's discourse is naturally
correct, and not controversial; they are already subjectified. Such is the case with a cast
of the female members of the society. The same discourse is also targeted at other
members who are already subjects to other institutions, such as parents or men of
religion, in order to de-subjectify them with the purpose of weakening their institution.
These are among the most difficult to convince, as they hold almost completely
different views. The discourse also targets the youthful members of the society
whose fluctuant experiences allow for more negotiation.

Having accounted for inter- and intra-institutional relations which account for the
abstract side of discourse, I shall in the following account for two issues: (i) the relation
between discourse, genre and text, and (ii) field, mode and tenor of discourse. The
latter issue relates to discourse as language in use. I shall follow this by a
demonstration with a view to showing how discourse emerges.

4.5 Discourse, Genre and Text

Discourses tend towards exhaustiveness. That is to say, they attempt to account not
only for an area of immediate concern for an institution, but also for increasingly
wide areas of concern. Religious discourse, for example, tackles areas of morality,
human relations, aspects of the economic system, and so on. It tackles them in their
diversity, and sometimes contradiction, and attempts to present them as one piece, a
tightly interwoven fabric the strands of which cannot be distinguished.
This fabric is called text. Text is a stretch of language where a problem, a difference is resolved and presented from the point view of one authority as a fact. It attains factuality because all traces of other discourses (i.e. institutions) have been eliminated. Text, therefore, must bear the hallmarks of a particular institution. As Kress (1985: 12) puts it "texts are...manifestations of discourses and the meanings of discourses".

Nevertheless a text is also part of a particular social situation in which it is constructed, i.e. genre. A genre is a conventionalized social occasion which is accessible to certain social groups and which has a bearing on the structure and meaning of a given text. A novel genre, for example, is usually preferred by wide masses and where narrative structure predominates. (Therefore, the choice of a particular genre is motivated, and hence adherence to its requirements is more or less mandatory). It follows therefore that the meanings of a text are derived from the meanings (or conventions) of genre and of discourse. Discourse determines what is to be said; genre determines how it will be said. I shall not develop "genre" and "text" further. Though I would like to point out that the "text" I shall present for analysis is figurative statement.

4.6 Discourse: Field, Mode and Tenor

Field of Discourse. This refers roughly to the language activity "that is going on". It is an approximate to Crystal and David's (1969) "province", or Gregory and Carroll's (1978) "the purposive role", i.e. the social function of the text.

Mode of Discourse. Traditionally, discourse divides into two modes: spoken discourse and written discourse (e.g. Gregory and Carroll 1978). Each one of these two modes divides into more than one subdivision. The spoken mode of discourse divides into spontaneous (e.g. conversation) and non-spontaneous (e.g. political
speeches). These subdivisions in turn subdivide. The written mode of discourse divides according to whether it is written to be spoken (e.g. play texts), written to be spoken as if not written (e.g. political speeches), or written but not necessarily to be spoken (e.g. novels). The latter in turn subdivides. The overlapping of this bicategorization is clear.

This division is superficial and based on a difference in production and reception (we use our mouths and ears for one, and our hands and eyes for the other). It is based on the premise that the spoken is not as planned as the written mode of discourse. But the fact that a lecture [spoken], for example, can have many features common with, say, a novel or a political speech [written] flaws the premise.

Cook (1989: 60) proposes a different categorization based on reciprocity. In reciprocal discourse, there is a potential for interaction. A particular sender monitors reception and adjust to it; receivers can influence the development of what is being said. In non-reciprocal mode, sender and receiver may have no opportunity for interaction. However, there is no sharp division between the two categories; we are operating on a continuum. As Cook puts it: "even writers working in solitude try to form some idea of the receiver of their work and adjust to it".

Tenor of discourse. This reflects how the addresser interacts with the addressee. It relates to how social relationships are realised in language. Gregory and Carroll (1978) divide social relationship into two major categories which are presented on a continuum of formal and informal. These heavily interrelate with, and hinge on, some factors such as familiarity, role and social status. The division has to do the social concept of politeness (i.e. courtesy). This is personal tenor.

Gregory and Carroll also distinguish another kind of tenor: functional tenor. This is a "category used to describe what language is being used for in the situation. Is the speaker trying to persuade? to exhort? to discipline?".
So far I have argued for discourse as traditionally seen: discourse as represented by a group or groups of interrelated statements the totality of which make up a specific discourse. However, we do not always encounter, say, a religious discourse which addresses the faithful; very often we encounter a representative statement which can be easily allocated to a particular discourse and which expresses its sentiment.

The following examples from the two novels will hopefully demonstrate particularly this issue and other issues mentioned above as well as the impact of various institutions on the linguistic exchanges (i.e. statements) and how these delimit and exclude one another.

6-
6-(a) إنها في قبضة القدر
والإصاب التي تقبض عليها حديدية كالقضبان لإشرته
(b) القدر هو أبوها
6- Indeed, she is in the grip of fate, and
6-(a) the fingers which grabbed her were iron fingers like bars which will not bend
(b) fate is her father.

In this example, the three consecutive figurative statements deal with some aspects of the household genre (i.e. occasion). They express the sort of relationship existing between the heroine and her father [field]. The point of view expressed by the ES is one of utter dissatisfaction: father is characterized as fate, and his fingers [which grab her] are like [iron] bars which do not bend. This is tantamount to indictment [tenor].

Such point of view is characteristic particularly of feminism; the institution which is actively at work is the feminist discourse which is trying to suppress other rival discourses by presenting its own point of view in a determinist way. This can be substantiated by the emphatic particle (inna) "indeed", by the implicit verb (takūn)
"is" (as opposed to, for example, the modal "may") which presents the process as a fact, by the two metaphors proper (i.e. the personification of (al-qadar: 6) "fate" and the adjectival metaphor (al-Ḥādīṭiya: 6-a) "iron" and by bluntly equating fate with father (6-b). Such commitment to this point of view dictated her language and presented the feminist discourse as the most dominant discourse. (Such discourse or point of view with respect to parents is relatively new to the conservative Middle East).

But besides the religious and the family discourses which transpire through "fate" and "father", there are the social and the moral discourses which are intertwined with the former discourses, though further suppressed. The feminist discourse dictates the new sort of parent/child relationship which calls for "looser" ties and which can replace, should it gain currency, a relationship of cohesiveness. Let us now examine another example made up of a longer chain of figurative statements:

7- A great barrier stood between her and life, and pulled her away
(a) like the big arms of her mother which used to pull her,
(b) [and like] the voice of her father which used to intimidate her,
(c) [and like] the iron gate of the college,
(d) [and like] the dissecting room… with the corpses lined up in it,
(e) [and like] the crooked legs of male students,
(f) [and like] the beaten eyes of female students,
(g) [and like] the eyes of Dr. Elwi with their hidden greed.
In this example the feminist discourse is challenging even more rival discourses: (a) and (b) challenge the family discourse as well as the social; (c) and (d) the college institution; (e), (f), and (g) the college as well as the social institution; (7) stands as a summary FOS encompassing all other FsOS. The moral and the state (i.e. the police) institutions are suppressed further to the background (for the challenge of the former institutions can bring about clashes). The biggest discourse that is actualized in absentia, however, is the discourse of personal freedom.

Linguistically, the presenting of the feminist point of view is realised by, among other things, the explicit presence of the emphatic particle (inna) "indeed" in (6) which is also present elliptically in 6-(a). This relegates all other points of view to the background. It also hinges for its effect on the bad connotations of (al-qadar) "fate", (quDбан) "bars", and in the classification or characterization of "fate" as her father, rather than the opposite. This is more expressive.

In the second example (i.e. 7-) this is realised in the simile which likens all those restraining agents (e.g. the intimidating voice of her father) to the barrier which is of inherently bad connotations; and in the bad connotations of other events that are taking place such as "pulled"; and in the bad epithets such as "crooked", "beaten" and "greed".

The Following examples from "The Old Man and the Sea" present more palatable points of view as they are not as poignant:

8- I wish I could feed the fish, he is my brother.
9- He always thought of the sea as La mar which is what people call her in Spanish when they love her.
Solidarity between the two rivals (i.e. the old man and the fish in (8) and between him and the sea in (9) is more obvious. Rivalry is non-existent or quite muted. In fact, personification in both examples where the fish is seen as brother and the sea as a loveable female reflects a relationship of interdependence between the two parties involved. This is quite natural. The institutional matrix present is quite thin, for there are only two (immediate) institutions: the institution of entertainment, and of economy. Both are relatively violence-free (especially when compared with a feminist discourse where man/woman relationship predominates).

Other less immediate institutions are tourism, and personal freedom, both of which also contain relaxation as a main theme. The themes of non-rivalry, relaxation, and entertainment are realised by "wish", by the theme of brotherhood in (8) and by the theme of love and personification in (9). The examples above reveal that discourse determines the language to be used, and that it exerts power on the ES as regards the discourse type\(^{10}\).

4.7 Characteristics of Discourse

From the examples above it can be concluded that discourse is structured by rival internal as well as external authorities and powers. It reflects a representation of the world as is typically seen by the principal institution, and deals with and preserves its interests. I take discourse as being able to structure other alien institutions and list them in a descending order of importance- each according to the role it is playing on a particular occasion. I also take other institutions as candidate names on a waiting list; some might have the chance to "turn up", others might not. Discourse, therefore, is distortive, exhaustive and authoritarian.

Discourse also deals by necessity with all but relevant objects, concepts, themes; and, therefore, can be characterized by heterogeneity and exhaustiveness. But since
these unities of discourse do not and cannot maintain a linear organization (events, for example, appear on differing levels of depth) it acquires discontinuity. However, since this discontinuous and heterogeneous discourse is dealt with by one principal authority, it acquires homogeneity. All these characteristics accord discourse with freshness and originality. Hence Foucault's (1972: 25) valuable observation:

We must be ready to receive any moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs.

But then, and as Whitehead (1936:107) puts it, discourse acquires certain specificity and exclusion:

All forms of realizations express some aspect of finitude. Such a form expresses its nature as being this and not that. In other words, it expresses exclusion; exclusion implies accuracy (i.e. relevance); accuracy gives rise to uniqueness, but of course, it maintains essential relationship to occasions other than itself.

Finally, discourse is power, because it involves and entails Knowledge; a specialized kind of knowledge. Regrettably, it is this sort of knowledge which implicates discourse and its subject(s) with weakness, parochialism and bigotry, not only because he masters only one branch of human knowledge, but also because it
exposes and makes him visible to his opponent(s) and hence more vulnerable. What is relieving, however, is the fact that to master a principal domain of life all other neighbouring domains should be accounted for. Hence the exhaustiveness of discourse. After all, this knowledge, power, or "discourse" is purposeful because it enables us to account for reasons for phenomena (via power relations) instead of merely describing phenomena.

Besides, discourse, as a device for prompting or pre-empting action, is most effective (just remember the faithful and how they rally around the prayer leader). This usefulness accounts for the practicability of discourse, and, but only on the surface, gives it a touch of materiality, though discourse is far from being material. This is because of the fact that while dealing with discourse we do not take it as a group of statements or representative words, etc., but rather as that power, visible or invisible, which manipulates, re-arranges, re-groups, or selects from among language resources.

4.8 Towards a Redefinition of Discourse

If we look back to Kress's definition of discourse (see p. 98) we notice that it is of a relatively descriptive nature, apart from being unnecessarily lengthy. Furthermore, it dismisses as rather peripheral the role of the ES, and it also tends to be rather dismissive as to the practicability of discourse. For these reasons, and for the purposes of this work, I propose the following working definition: "Discourse is a point of view or an attitude expressed by a selection from, or manipulation of, language resources to prompt or pre-empt action".

This definition serves our purposes because, apart from its succinctness, it allows us to see the ES with a greater degree of clarity; it allows us to see the relation between language and action, for the use of language is always motivated; it allows more
room for the abstractness of discourse. There are those who, to say the least, ignore the difference between discourse which is abstract and topic which is concrete and which is only one of the unities of discourse (see section 4.2). The difference between topic and discourse, I believe, is a difference between what a statement or a set of statements communicate (i.e. what they are about) and what attitude is taken by the ES towards what is communicated. Both, needless to say, require one another, for you cannot express your attitude towards something without pinning it down, and the way you project your self on that something is in itself an attitude.

So far, I have argued, among many other things, for the uniqueness of "statement", the unit of discourse; for the institution as the authority which accords the statement with power and truth; and for the institution as the loci of power and the axis of both higher social formation and social action at the base. In the final part of this chapter, I shall examine the rules which regulate the functioning of discourse.

4.9 Rules Of Discourse

Discourse is controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a set number of procedures which exist prior to it and regulate its natural emergence and remain concomitant with it until it disappears into the archive of history. These can be divided into two major groups which overlap. These rules are:

First, the rules which belong to this group relate more to control and limitation. They divide into three sub-groups: (i) rules functioning on the exterior of discourse; (ii) rules functioning on the interior of discourse; (iii) rules of rarefaction. Second, this group concerns the functioning and reception of discourse. I shall deal with these groups and sub-groups in tandem.
(i) Rules which act on the exterior of discourse. These are principles of exclusion which control and delimit discourse. They deal with power and desire. These are, according to Foucault (1971: 8-12), rules of prohibition, of division and rejection, and are related to the will to knowledge and truth.

Rules of prohibitions delimit who, what and how to say anything. For not everyone is privileged to say or do anything, and the speaker has to observe the rituals. For example, in Islam there exists a "specialist" division between men and women as far as work is concerned. Men serve the household by mainly carrying outdoor jobs which usually require physical strength. Women serve the household by carrying out mainly indoor jobs such as child-care as it requires more patience and is physically less demanding. This rule of division, however, becomes more flexible under exceptional circumstances (e.g. when the family loses their breadwinner). Men are also prohibited from uttering religiously taboo or sexually offensive words; and this also applies to women. Both men and women, however, can allude to sex each within their own group with a greater degree of flexibility. Children are also taught not to interrupt adults and are disciplined should they try to break the rules. Girls and boys are dressed recognizably different.

All these rules have recently been undergoing a considerable change under the influence of especially western culture where these rules are almost intangible. This change of attitude has resulted in the emergence of what can be called dissenting movements such as feminism which sees these dividing, but protective, rules as restraining as a chain (in the example above "The feminine ending attached to her name linked her to girls' lists like a link in a leather chain"). These three types of prohibitions interrelate, reinforce and complement each other forming a web.

Rules of division have to do with how institutions categorise some concepts. For example, medical institutions categorise mad men's talk as nonsense although it can be credited with some proportion of truth. With rules of rejection, on the other hand,
the will to truth is linked to the will to knowledge which sketches out a schema of possible, observable, measurable and classifiable objects. It also imposes upon the "knowing subject" a certain position, a certain viewpoint and a certain function (look rather than read, reify rather than comment) and which prescribes the technological level at which knowledge can be employed in order to be verifiable and useful.

(ii) The second, internal group concerns a set of rules where discourse exercises its own control (Foucault 1971: 15). These rules concern the principles of classification, ordering and distribution, and the principle of events and chances. Discourse operates on three types of classification: classification of discourse itself (e.g. commentary vs original), classification of author and classification of disciplines (e.g. outdated vs updated). For example, discourse can take the form of "commentary" which reiterates, expounds and comments on another yet more original and richer type of discourse. The gap between them is neither stable nor absolute; for commentaries can sometimes occupy the place of primary texts (e.g. some commentaries on Abū Hilāl Al-Askārī's ASānīyatayn). The difference between them permits us to create new discourses highlighting the richness of the original and enabling us to say what has silently been articulated deep down even though through masked repetition.

Discourse also operates on the principle of the author, not in the sense of the individual who speaks or writes a text but as the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or statements and the one who accords them with coherence and unity. For example, in Modern Arabic Literature and the West, an anthology by Badawi (1985), the author is that name which works out the attitude of modern Arabic Literature with respect to the West, and accords unity and coherence to the whole work (i.e. discourse), rather than the writers whose works are cited in the anthology.

Discourse also operates on the principle of "disciplines". This is opposed to both the "author" and "commentary" principles. It is opposed to "author" because
disciplines are freely available to anyone. It is opposed to "commentary" because for a system to exist there must be a possibility of formulating fresh propositions. Disciplines constrain discourse because they define what is acceptable in a certain age. What is acceptable (vs what is true) must belong or enter a certain type of theoretical field. It is not enough for a proposition to be true, it also must not be bizarre-looking. For example, one cannot nowadays write a book without attaching to it a bibliography at the end, or with annotations at the margins. This is not a wrong discipline, but outmoded and unfamiliar.

(iii) The rarefaction group of rules (ibid. p. 17). These concern the qualifications of speaking subjects who employ discourse; for none may enter discourse on a specific topic unless he has satisfied certain conditions, or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so. More exactly, not all areas of discourse are equally open and penetrable. Some are forbidden territory while others are virtually open and stand, without any prior conditions, open to all.

Second, this second major set of rules concern the functioning and reception of discourse (Kress and Hodge 1988: 4). The need for and the importance of this group of rules becomes more conspicuous if we recall the fact that ideological complexes are made up of two contradictory halves which would cancel each other out. We call this group the "logonomic system" which is "a set of rules prescribing the conditions, for production and reception of meanings, which specify who can initiate or know meanings about what topics, under what circumstances and with what modalities". These logonomic systems are taught, and policed by concrete social agents, higher subjects (e.g. parents, teachers) and coercing concrete subjects, lower subjects (e.g. children, students) into specific situations by processes that are open to them. An example which would illustrate how these rules regulate the production and reception of texts is a joke; a statement which might by itself prove offensive to the recipient and where the message-maker relies on the fact or on the hope that it would not be taken seriously.
4.10 Precis

In this chapter, I have argued that the unit of discourse is the statement, and that it is accorded with force and truth by the institutionally empowered subject. This statement is a function of existence, and is not confined to a specific grammatical mood or logical nexus; this status enables it to transcend the sentence, proposition and "local" speech act.

I have also argued that the "institution" is an ideological speech community the nucleus of which is the individual/subject, and that it transforms individuals into subjects and steeps them in its ideology. It provides them with a frame of action which should enable them to see things from a specific point of view, and teaches them how to act and how to talk.

I have also argued that institutions have their ideological formations which regulate their relations with their respective subjects as well as with other institutions, with these acting as rival institutions. Rivalry is of differing degrees. "Discourse" takes care of, and expresses, the interest of its respective institution and is therefore, biased and prejudiced.

Finally, I have projected the rules of discourse. These rules either define discourse or regulate its functioning.

I have examined, among other things, the anatomy and logic of the various types of figurative language in Chapter Two; their advantages over literal language and how they could be employed to bring about intimacy in Chapter Three; and the institutional power which accords them with force and truth in Chapter Four. In the following chapter, I shall highlight the linguistic basic underpinnings of this dissertation and provide a framework, a guideline of analysis for my data.
Notes to Chapter Four

(1) See E. Goffmann (1981) where he extends discourse to include the spoken as well as the written modes; For works which fail to recognize power differential see A. Cicourel, et al. (1974); see also H. Sacks, et al. (1974) where conversation is analysed for the sake of formalisation and where interlocutors are accorded equal powers of turn-taking; for a useful critique of H. Sacks, et al. see J. B. Thompson (1984) pp. 108-18; see also Levinson (1983), especially pp. 284-5.

(2) For power relations see G. Kress (1985); see also N. L. Fairclough (1989).

(3) For different approaches to the study of discourse see J. B. Thompson (1984), especially pp. 98-9; see also N. L. Fairclough (1989).

(4) Kress, however, is not the only sociologist who draws heavily on Foucault; see also J. B. Thompson (1984), especially pp. 98-9; N. L. Fairclough (1989); for the easy comprehension of Foucault see H.L. Dryfus and P. Rabinow (1982).

(5) It is interesting to point out that Foucault (1972: 83-4) has argued against the equivalence between "speech act" and "statement" as he was too enthusiastic to account for the uniqueness of the latter. But in a reply to Searle he admitted that an equivalence can obtain between both, though he was not interested in the banal speech acts which depended for their interpretation on a local context or on shared knowledge; see H. Dryfus. and P. Rabinow. (1986: 46-7).

(6) It is interesting to point out a fine division made by Austin (1962) between what he calls brute facts which are the facts of science (e.g. Water consists of hydrogen and oxygen) and institutional facts which derive their force from their respective institutions; in this connection see also T. S. Khun (1962).

(7) For a relevant and useful definition of genre see G. Kress (1985); see also D. Hymes (1972).

(8) The pressure, however, though spearheaded by a charismatic character, is normally exerted through a collective channel, unless the institution is authoritarian.
(9) This picture of tension and conflict dominating our life is championed by big names such as L. Althusser (1971), L. Fairclough (1989); see Fairclough (1989), especially p. 34 where he equates struggle and conflict with power. This is misleading. The ground for this claim is that conflict is not a synonym of power, rather it is an illegitimate offspring which sees light only when power is misapplied by the discourse subject or misjudged by the discourse client. Power is a constructive factor which generates discipline, conflict is a destructive factor which brings about chaos and dissent.

(10) For an exhaustive analysis of statement and the linguistic bearing the institution has on it, see R. Hodge and G. Kress (1988: 8-12).

(11) See for example R. Jakobson (1956: 76) where he says: "The development of discourse may take along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another through their similarity or their contiguity".
Chapter Five

THE SOCIAL, CRITICAL LANGUAGE

5. Introduction

This chapter examines the basic linguistic underpinnings of this dissertation and sets up the framework within which the data will be analysed. It probes the interplay between man, language and thought; and, viewing language as a social phenomenon, I shall examine its various functions. I shall also set up an exhaustive model for the analysis of critical discourse through three stages. First, a projection of the code of language where an exhaustive analysis of syntax is carried out with a view to providing a descriptive account of discourse. Second, a discussion of the formal characteristics of statement with a view to providing an interpretation of the relationship between statement (as a mini-discourse) and interaction. Third, a provision and examination of the three levels of social order: social action, social institution and higher social formation (or structure) with a view to providing an explanation for why things happen the way they do.

5.1 Man, Language and Thought

The influence of language on, and the ways whereby it structures, the human mind has already been extensively discussed. Whorf (1956:134-7), for example, claimed that language exercises power on man and on his thought, so much so that certain non-verbal events (e.g. fires) can be attributed to reasons that have to do with the verbal understanding of the people involved in those events. Whorf observes that people tend to be careless when they see "empty" because it connotes "free from danger". Whereas
in some places "empty" can prove hazardous especially if cigarette butts are thrown on empty gasoline drums which contain explosive vapour.

According to Whorf (ibid. 246-72), languages constrain the thought of their respective people so much so that people cannot see except in terms compatible with the languages' "patterned structures". In this way, people fall prey to the influence of their respective languages. These patterns of language structure delimit and shape peoples' thought: they tend to think of "I gave you that idea" and "I gave you that book" as exactly the same, though "idea" is abstract, "book" concrete. This is because the two concepts are expressed via the same pattern (see p. 28).

It has also been pointed out that each people have their own experiences that differ from other peoples', and that this is reflected in the language system (i.e. lexical items and structures) of these people (ibid. p. 57). Arabic, for example, abounds with names for gazelle because Arabs had rich experience with this animal. English abounds with names for spirits because the English people brew and drink different brands of liqueur. In either case names carry nuances of meaning that are significant to their respective language-users. This means that each language segments the experiences and mirrors the life of its own people. In terms of this principle, each language reflects the experiences of its own people in a way that might, but not necessarily, coincide with other languages.

This theme has been diligently and succinctly captured in a famous statement by Jakobson (1959: 236) that "languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not in what they can convey". Urban (1939) observes that there seems to be a general agreement among linguists that all developed languages have as part of their codes all basic parts of speech. These parts should enable them to give expression to the experiences of their respective own people; but there is no general agreement as to what particular parts are imperative. Jesperson (1924: 91) names five such basic parts: noun, verb, adjective, pronoun and particle. Sapir (1921: 126), limiting them to two, claims
that no language is wholly without the distinction between the subject of discourse (i.e. in general, person or thing) and the predicate (i.e. in general, what is said about it), even if the distinction is sometimes elusive.

Sapir observes that what is essential in one particular language can be dispensed with in another. This applies to grammatical concepts (e.g. dual), grammatical structures (e.g. word-order), as well as grammatical categories or speech parts. For example, "dual" is mandatory in Arabic, optional in English; Arabic enjoys a free adjective order and a verb/noun or alternatively a noun/verb structure, English on the other hand applies a stricter system. There is no universal grammar that applies to all languages. However, Hatim and Mason (1990: 29-31) observe that despite this fact, translation across languages remains undisputedly possible. Combined with this mitigating factor, and with the inevitability of the presence of these basic parts, despite disagreement on their number, there is an agreement, at least informally, on the definition of these terms. "Noun" refers usually to an entity or a concrete object, "verb" to an action, "adjective" is some sort of an epithet which qualifies a noun, "pronoun" stands for a noun and "particle" can be a determiner such as the definite article "the", a preposition, or, for example, a verb qualifier, i.e. an adverb.

I would like to point out, however, that these categories are not clear-cut ones, in the sense that a noun is not always distinguishable from a verb, or even from an adjective. Instead, this classification is only an approximation to an inventory of experience which is worked out for convenience. Indeed, they functionally grade one into another, and very often they can do the job of one another. For example, the adjective "red" does the same job of predication as the verb "reddens": "stop when red shows" or "when it reddens". Similarly, while "height" in the "the height of the building" functions formally as a quality, it actually can be taken as a concrete thing that is not different from "roof" in the "the roof of the building". Sometimes, nouns are but mere fossilized actions that have undergone a long process of transformation: a "farmer" is someone who farms, though he sometimes, engages in
some other non-farming activities; "father", though a noun, is also a profession of someone who carries out his fatherly duties more or less as, say, a lawyer.

The effort to relate the verbal to the non-verbal is invaluable. However, it seems the case that it admits only of the influence language exercises on man, and is oblivious to the fact that it is man who, in the first instance, structured language to meet the demands of his daily life. By doing so, Whorf has failed to view language as a social phenomenon which affects and is affected by man.

On the contrary, Saussure (1976: 30), keen to demonstrate the social dimension of language, admitted only of the influence of man on language. He conceived of it as comprising two distinct phenomena: langue and parole. By "langue" was meant the system or code of language, by "parole" speech or "output". "Langue" was taken as a social phenomenon inherited from the collective society, and "parole" as an individualistic achievement. By so doing, Saussure not only separates "what is social from what is individual and what is essential from what is ancillary or accidental", but he also unwittingly puts the burden of effecting language change on the shoulders of the individual.

My conception of the relation between man and language is that it is dialectic: both structure one another. Language uses man because he cannot use it except in ways that are determined by the structures of language, and because he has to abide by its rules. In this sense language constrains man. On the other hand, man employs language not only in the sense that he employs it to meet his demands (given that the raison d'être of language is the performing of its various functions), but also in the sense that he has room to choose from, and tamper with, these rules whenever it is permissible. It is only in this conceptualization of language that it becomes a social phenomenon which simultaneously affects and bears the marks of social change.
The reciprocal effect between language and man, however, is not atomistic. It does not take place at the individual level as such. Rather, it takes place in the individual's capacity as part of a bigger speech community, viz institution. As part of an institution he is more susceptible to change and can effect more change.

As Fairclough (1989: 21-22) has rightly observed, language variation in the society occurs at the level of sections, groups, or institutions within a given society (e.g. teachers, fathers, women) where each one of them performs a distinct type of practice and consequently uses a relatively distinct sub-language (see pp. 112-3). Indeed, classes of talented and institutionally empowered individuals can free themselves from the synoptic power of language and bring about, albeit slowly, some gradual change to its system (consider, for example, the effect of writers).

In the following, I shall examine the functions of language and further focus on the interplay between man and language. I shall specifically focus on what Halliday (1971: 331) calls "a functional theory of language". "Function", as used by Halliday refers to two related senses: it refers to the general functions of language, and to the functional roles of linguistic structures (i.e. speech parts and grammatical structures). I shall deal with these in tandem.

5.2 The Functions of Language

Needless to say that language derives its legitimacy from the functions it fulfills to meet man's daily needs. These functions might differ as emphasis and interest of the critic differ. Buhler (1965) claims that there are three language functions: (i) the expressive function: this is a speaker-centered function where he expresses his feelings (e.g. a political speech), (ii) informative function: this centers around communicating facts about a situation or topic (e.g. a technical report), and (iii) the vocative function where
an audience is called upon to react in a way intended by the text (e.g. an advertisement) (cited in Newmark 1988: 39-42).

Jakobson (1960) believes that the functions of language impinge on the constituents of any speech event. These are six: the addressee (sender of the message), the addressee (to whom the message is sent), the message itself (what the addressee wishes to communicate), a context (verbal or non-verbal), code (i.e. language) and contact (i.e. channel oral or written).

Each of these factors determines a different function of language (though other functions which can feature in hierarchical order can be distinguished). If orientation is toward the sender of the message, the function fulfilled is emotive (i.e. expressive), if toward the addressee the function is conative (i.e. vocative), if toward the message the function is primarily poetic (i.e. language itself), if toward the context the function fulfilled is referential (or informative), if toward code the function is metalingual (i.e. aesthetic), and if toward contact the function fulfilled is phatic. Thus Buhler and Jakobson have three language functions common to them: the expressive, the informative and the vocative.

Halliday (1971: 331-8), primarily interested in the social component of the language, concisely sums up language basic functions into three. These are:

(i) the ideational function,
(ii) the interpersonal function,
(iii) the textual function.

In terms of the first, language serves, among other things, for the expression of content. Here language lends structure to man's experience and constrains him as to how he can express it, and determines his way of looking at things in a manner reminiscent of Whorf's explanation. In terms of the second, language is used by man to
express his attitudes, evaluations, and also of power relations he sets up between himself and the audience: whether he is a narrator, a questioner, and the like. In this way language serves in the establishment and maintenance of all human relationships. It becomes the means with which social groups are integrated and the individual is identified. The third function is internal to language, and concerns how language makes links with itself and with the situation. This function makes it possible for the ES to produce his work and the listener to recognize it.

These functions overlap in the sense that neither of them can completely eliminate the other two. Indeed, they can figure each in the same statement, though not necessarily with the same degree of prominence. For example, the figurative statement:

1- إنها في قبضة القدر

Indeed, she is in the grip of fate

encompasses the three functions in the following manner: (inna) "indeed" sizes up the degree of commitment of the ES and expresses a judgement [interpersonal] by him that what is going to follow [ideational] is true; the suffix (hā) "she" anaphorically refers to a particular referent in the outside world [textual]; the implicit in Arabic (takīnu) "is" has no referent outside the statement, but it structures the statement in such a way that its absence would render the statement ungrammatical [textual], it also has an interpersonal component because it gauges the degree of commitment of the ES towards his statement especially when juxtaposed by, say, "might be"; (fī) "in" encompasses an ideational component; so does (qabDa) "grip"; (al) "of" links "grip" to "fate" [textual]. The statement as a whole expresses an interplay of the three language functions. In particular, it expresses a particular experience in a biased way; this bias is signalled by the emphatic particle (inna) "indeed" and "is" which presents the experience as a fact.

Of course, the ES does not look into the components of every single constituent of his statement before he structures it; for all functions are simultaneously embodied
in his planning procedures. For the expression of a particular message, the ES has many options open to him. For example, he could have used an interrogative (e.g. "Is she in the grip of fate?") rather than a narrative texture to characterize the same moment of hardship for, and impart an attitude of sympathy towards, "she" (for why the selection of that particular difficult moment). As Halliday (ibid.) puts it: "the syntax of the language is organized in such a way that it expresses as a whole the range of linguistic functions". While these functions determine one another relatively, the attitudes of the ES are relatively undetermined by the content. The speaker is, by and large, free to associate any interpersonal meanings with any content. The above statement could be used by the same ES, under different conditions, to vent out relief at the hardship of "she".

The functional theory of language proposed by Halliday requires, in addition to the examination of the functions of language, the differentiation between form and content. For example, not all entities which occupy the initial position of statements are, functionally, agents; even if they formally are. For instance, X in "X knew history" is not, functionally, an agent; rather, X is made patient by his new knowledge of history. Patients, in turn, are not necessarily always constrained: Z in "X gave Z a present" is a beneficiary.

The differentiation applies also to the grammatical processes and concepts where sometimes, the boundaries are blurred: "seems" in "He seems happy" does not refer to a process or action that is going on; rather, it refers to a state of conditions that relates to "he". The same notion also applies to negatives which are functionally affirmative because they require the recovery of the underlying structure. According to Burke (1945: 295), negative is a state of affairs which points to "what is" through "what is not", when something is not dry, it is (positively) damp.

The language system is not made up of unrelated speech parts. These speech parts are linked one to another in a way which reflects different relationships. For this reason
various language categories define the name as well the relation of these subjects; with
the result that we have the pair agent/patient for respectively the one who carries out an
action (i.e. constrainer) onto another (i.e. the constrained), "process" for the action
carried out by the former on the latter, and so forth. For example, in
2- Eyes besieged her from every corner.

( Uyun) "eyes" is the agent, the suffix (ha) "her" attached to (HaSarat) "besieged" is
the patient, and (HaSarat) "besieged" is the process. Agents, patients, and processes
can, though not necessarily, be sub-categorized; these categories and sub-categories
need not correlate across languages. Rather, they can differ; though not in a drastic
manner such that a particular event cannot be communicated in other languages. In
this dissertation, I am assuming that both Arabic and English can express what the
other language encodes; though not necessarily in identically corresponding
grammatical structures or even, in some extreme cases, identical lexical items.

5.3 Approaches to Discourse Analysis

As has been demonstrated in Chapter Four, one of the attempts to analyse discourse
was made by, among others, a conversational-analysis oriented group of linguists and
sociolinguists (e.g. Sacks et al: 1974). Their main aim was the formalisation of
discourse, and they therefore, laid emphasis on examining the structure of discourse.
Successful in this activity though they were, they failed, among other things, to account
for many social and contextual factors (see introduction to Chapter Four). It is
probably this failure which prompted a group of linguists to adopt a different
approach to discourse analysis with a view to accounting for contextual and social
factors which have a bearing on discourse.
This new approach was developed by a team at the University of East Anglia composed of R. Fowler, R. Hodge, G. Kress and A. Trew. These scholars made a concerted effort to account for contextual factors. They realised, and attempted to bridge, the dichotomy between the grammatical structure and the social world. Their approach was almost purely grammatical. Fowler, et al (1979), for example, attempted to demonstrate through purely linguistic analysis that particular discourse types are more accessible to particular social groups. For example, the discourse of managers is different from that of workers, news reporting is different from club conversation.

They also attempted to demonstrate that language is not a mere reflection of social process, but is also part of social process: clubs control the behaviour of their subjects through predominantly instructional language where commands prevail. An interview, to give another example, is also an adequate mechanism whereby the interviewer practises his power over and controls the contribution as well as the behaviour of the interviewee: he asks while the interviewee answers. This control is made possible to be effected by the creation of an apparently natural world in which inequitable relations of power are presented as natural and inevitable.

Also in one of the most revealing linguistic analyses, Kress and Trew (1978) demonstrate the fit of particular patterns of language to particular discourse types. They analyse two letters which deal with the same issue: how to get a management message across to workers so that there would be fewer strikes and a badly needed project could be financed.

One of the two letters was written by the director of a British company, the other was proposed by the Sunday Times. The director's letter, the scholars observe, was made up of long sentences which abounded with passive structures where agents are lacking and with nominalizations which refer to abstract concepts. The Sunday Times letter meanwhile, was made up of shorter sentences which contained
fewer words with more than two syllables. It also avoided nominalizations as well as passives. With the recovery of agents, this letter reflected plentiful activity by the various agents of the management.

The following are two examples: one from the management letter (first), another from the Sunday Times (second); passives will be underlined, nominalizations in bold; square brackets relate corresponding items in both extracts:

At meetings there earlier this week it was emphasized that commitment was required by 4 pm Thursday 7 October as the NEB and the company were meeting on Friday 8 October; without that commitment no submission could be made.

At meetings there earlier this week at Longbridge people were told they must promise [vs commitment] to give their support by 4 pm Thursday, October 7. The NEB and the company met next day (Friday, October 8). Without this promise [vs commitment] no request [noun vs the nominalization "submission"] for money will be made.

In the first quotation, there is only one long sentence, three nominalizations and three passives; whereas in the second, there are three short sentences, no nominalizations and only two passives. Thanks to rigorous linguistic analysis of the two letters, Kress and Trew conclude that the management letter reflects an industrial discourse which is unitary, i.e. it reflects the interests of the whole management as one body or team. Whereas the Sunday Times letter reveals an industrial discourse which is pluralistic, i.e. it gives the impression that the management is made up of many and diverse agents who are all accorded power. At the same time, it preserves the unity of these agents (by virtue of belonging to the management). The grammarians, therefore, are able to conclude that the Sunday Times letter says more than the other letter and that it contains two discourses [unitary and pluralistic] one superimposed upon the other.
It was Kress and Hodge (1979) who, drawing on Halliday and on Whorf, developed a fully fledged linguistic model for the analysis of discourse. Their model highlights basic assumptions underlying the use of language and attempts to relate language to people's beliefs and actions. This model should, to quote the authors themselves:

encompass the study of syntax and the basic rule systems of the language along with the social uses of language, that is, the relations between language and society, and between language and mind, in a single integrated enterprise. (Kress and Hodge 1979:2-3)

The authors capture, quite often successfully, some aspects of power relations involved between interlocutors. For example, "Can you get the meal ready" asked by a husband to his wife is a speech act which involves power relations. It can very well function not as an interrogative, but rather as a request. They also illuminate the overlapping between linguistics and social life. For example, "Picketing ...curtailed coal deliveries" contains two nominalizations (underlined). These, when dismantled, can respectively read:

strikers [who] picket a factory --> picketing curtailed drivers['] deliver[ing] coal --> deliveries

The nominalizations delete agents and the sense of time, attenuate actions, and accentuate instead abstract notions. It becomes therefore, more difficult to apportion responsibility. At the same time, they facilitate comprehension and reduce complexity: the less you see, the less you think.
With regard to tense, they also adopt an approach which is different from that of traditional grammar (e.g. Quirk and Greenbaum 1973). Traditional grammar views tense as a simply time-marking device relating utterances as prior to, following, or even simultaneous with speech events. It also divides tense into two basic "times": past and present. Other "times" can be attained by resorting to auxiliaries (e.g. verb to be). For example, "bought" in "I bought some tea" is perfective (i.e. finished) in the sense that the buying took place before the speech event (i.e. the narrating); "buy" in "I buy my tea from X" is imperfective and has no end in view in the sense that it is habitual; whereas "am buying" in "I am buying..." obtains by adding "am" and relates the utterance as simultaneous with the speech event.

But the authors adopt a functional approach with respect to tense. For example, Kress (1977) claims that tense, in addition to functioning as a time-marking device, can function as a case of modality gauging the power as well as the commitment of the speaker towards his utterance. Kress argues that "thought" in the utterance "I thought you would like it" is not merely the past of "think". Rather, it is a device, a modal expressing the certainty of the speaker and/or a device for distancing himself from his statement. When and if challenged by his interlocutor he could argue that he just thought, thus distancing himself from what did not happen but which he thought it might.

Not only did the authors examine modality (i.e. power relation and the degree of the speaker's degree of conviction) in terms of utterances, but also atomistically in terms of processes (i.e. verbs): "believe" is more evidential than and more committal than "think", "realise" signals more conviction than, say, "know", and so forth.

However, according to Thompson (1984: 124-5), Kress and Trew fall back on pure linguistics (i.e. syntax) to account for the social dimension of language (i.e. discourse). This is because they presuppose a specific account of social relations between social groups and fail to provide a systematic account of these relations. Such an account forms the social grounds on which grammar rests. The failure to provide
it would render grammatical structures on their own fragile and untenable. By almost solely relying on syntax, they seem to suggest that syntax is autonomous and that meaning can invariably be read off from it.

But I have already demonstrated that in many cases (e.g. speech acts) pragmatic information is as important as syntax in accounting for the speaker meaning (as opposed to sentence meaning) and that is not necessarily derivable from syntax. Moreover, what a statement means is not a fixed given, but is a fluctuating phenomenon which is determined as much by the contextual conditions of its production and reception as by the syntactic features of its construction. Despite these reservations, however, the grammatical approach remains indispensable. This is because it has the ability to provide a rigorous and systematic analysis of the descriptive aspect of discourse that cannot otherwise be provided.

However, as Fairclough (1989: 109) rightly suggests, there are three stages for critical discourse analysis: the descriptive, the interpretative and the explanatory. Syntax provides the first in terms of solely projecting what language is saying. The second should provide an account of the interaction between language and the ES on the one hand (for example, in terms of why he goes for that particular language pattern selection), and between the ES and audience on the other (for example, in terms of what he wishes them to do for him and their response to that request). This is of a speculative nature. The third should provide an explanation as to why a certain action has been carried out by a certain subject or class of subjects.

5.4 An Integrated Model of Discourse for Data Analysis

Given this, I shall first deal with discourse description by projecting the grammatical model of Kress and Hodge (1979). I shall do this through examining the syntax of a "mini-discourse", i.e. a discourse representative statement. Secondly, I shall examine
this mini-discourse in terms of what it can do for the ES and in terms of the response of the audience to that request. To do this task, I shall provide a framework, a guideline which attends to the formal characteristics of statement. The framework is proposed by Fairclough (1989: 110-12). Thirdly, I shall provide an interpretation for why things happen the way they do. I shall account for the three levels of social phenomena: social action, social institution and higher social formation or structure. The link is proposed by Thompson (1984: 124). I shall deal with these three stages in tandem.

5.4.1 Stage One. The Descriptive: Syntax

In terms of the grammatical approach, language is viewed as the assemblage of "a set of models which describe the interrelation of objects and events" (Kress and Hodge 1979: 7). Two basic types of activity (i.e. models) form the backbone of this approach: the actionals and the relationals; a third type which the authors call "transformations" is a hybrid of both (for Kress and Hodge's model see figure (iii)). These models which describe the interrelation of objects and events can be summed up as follows (English official translation of processes does not necessarily coincide with the source text in terms of tense; this does not have a bearing on the analysis):

1. Actionals. These deal with actions (i.e. events) and relate them to entities such as objects, viz. they establish the relationship in the outside world between "agents" and "actions" in terms of causality. Actionals fall into two types:

(i) transactives: these gain their reputation by virtue of the fact that an event must be carried out by an entity (i.e. agent) onto another (i.e. patient). Transactives subdivide into physical and mental processes:

a- physical transactive processes refer to actions initiated by agents and acted upon patients:
Figure (from) Kosse and Hodge's Model: 1979: 120, (slightly adapted).

- Qualitative e.g. X is a wall
- Location e.g. She is in the grip of fate
- Qualitative e.g. It was a worm-like movement
- Possessive e.g. X's eyes has spread
- Mental process e.g. She looked around
- Physical process e.g. She marched onwards...
- Mental process e.g. She realized something
- Physical process e.g. Eyes beseeched her

Actions
- Non-transactive

Transformations, e.g.
- Picketing stopped coal deliveries
3- Eyes besieged her from all sides.

where (HaSarat) "besieged" is the physical action carried out by the agent (suyūn) "eyes" and inflicted upon the goal (hā) "her" suffixed to the verb.

b- mental transactive processes, on the other hand, refer to some non-physical event initiated by the agent and passed on to a patient. Let us consider these two examples:

4- She then realises that her mother was deceiving her, and that nothing in her is breakable.

5- [On the college grounds]...she felt as if she were sinking in the sea alone.

where (tudriku) "realises" is carried out by the agent "she" and passed on to the patient (i.e. post-verb clause). This, however, only happens on the surface level, in the underlying level it is the agent himself who undergoes some sort of change by virtue of a "new realisation". In (5) on the other hand, the mental process (aHassa) "felt" is similar to (4) in terms of its relation with the agent and patient but different in terms of modality. (Tudriku) "Realises" in (4) is of a higher degree of conviction than (aHassa) "felt" in (5), this accords the former with more force.

(ii) non-transactives: in this case, the event is restricted to the entity filling the agent's slot, while "patient" is either non-existent or non-affected. As is the case with transactives, events are also either physical or mental:
a- physical non-transactive:

6- She marched towards the wedding chair which was surrounded by flower bunches like the grave of the unknown soldier.

Where (tasiru) "marched" is a physical process carried out by the implicit (but retrievable pronoun-agent) (hiya) "she". and where we understand that she is undergoing (not enjoying) the agony of marching.

b- mental non-transactive:

7- She stood in the dissecting room...she looked around astonished as if she had lost her way.

where (tatalaffatu) "looked around" is a mental process the agent of which has passed no action onto any patient; in fact, she could well be the patient of her action.

Thus "causality" and the sense of "action-hood" are the key concepts in "actionals". "Causality" establishes the functional roles of the entities involved; though with differing degrees of clarity. We have seen that the entity filling the slot of the agent (i.e. eyes) in (3) is really the initiator of the action. Whereas the entities filling the slot of the agent in (4) and (7) (i.e. she realised and she looked around) are patients and not actually agents; in (6) the agent "she" in "she marched" can be either agent or patient, this differs according to whether the agent is "marching" out of, or against, his own will. On the other hand, the sense of "action-hood" is accentuated in (3) and (6) (i.e. in "besieged" and "marched") as the processes involved are physical transactive. Whereas in (4) and (6) (i.e. "realised" and "felt") action-hood is attenuated as the processes involved are mental non-transactive.
By way of summary, "actionals" in effect divide into two categories. These are (ignoring for the moment the above division while maintaining the same theme): physical and mental. The former deal with the processes of doing. They can be presented in one or two ways: agent/process/patient in cases where the agent involved passes his action onto another entity (e.g. His big palm $A$ shoved$Pr$ her$P$...), or agent/process in cases where the agent involved self-limits his action (e.g. She$A$ marched$Pr$ towards...)

where $A$ = agent, $Pr$ = process, $P$ = patient.

The latter, the mental processes, deal with processes of seeing, feeling and recognizing. They are also presented in one or two ways: agent/process/patient in cases where the process or action is passed onto another entity (e.g. She$A$ realised$Pr$ that...nothing in her is breakable$P$), or agent/process in cases where the agent involved self-limits action (e.g. She$A$ looked around$Pr$). In either case, it is the agent who, in the underlying level, is the affected entity (for a "practical" example and discussion of "actionals" see pp. 176-7).

Before moving to the second major category, I would like to point out that in dealing with actionals we are operating on a continuum at one extreme of which there are "brute" or material actionals such as "follow" and "shove" which demand much physical activity for their obtainment, while at the other extreme there are low-rating actionals such as "call" or "name" which involve very little physical activity $^5$. I would also like to point out that in many cases actionals can be mitigated or muted by some sort of device such as prepositions; an example would be "to nibble at" as opposed to "nibble". In this case actionals are called "intermediate actionals".

2. Relationals. These are processes of being$^6$. They provide us with the classification system of the language and specify the relation not between entities and events, but rather between entities themselves, or between entities and their attributes.
There are two relational grammatical forms (Kress and Hodge 1979: 103). These are:

First, attributives. The formula of this category is noun + adjective (nouns are underlined, adjectives in bold) such as *Ahmad is intelligent* where the adjective is an epithet describing the noun. Second, equatives. The formula of this category is noun + noun, such as *Ahmad is a teacher*, where the two nouns are set in appositional order.

The logic behind each case is different. In the first, the judgement is subjective and differs from one speaker to another. The second is a description of and a judgement on a de facto situation existing between the two nouns involved, and the relationship therefore, is durable, and the judgement passed objective. For more insightful nuances I shall examine the following two examples (relevant items will be underlined):

8- Like a prison-keeper, her father was crouching in wait to watch her movements.

9- She saw a face showing from a long, black car like the police car

where "prison-keeper" and "father" in (8) stand in appositional order, though in a slightly down-toned way. This is because the simile particle "like" hedges or demotes the apposition. Whereas in, for example, *Ahmad is a doctor* "Ahmad" and "doctor" stand strictly in appositional order. In (9) the two adjectives which qualify "car" come, as far as English is concerned, in terms of the most intrinsic comes closer to the noun it qualifies. According to this reading, black is more inherent than "long" for contiguity-related considerations. (In Arabic which enjoys a free adjective system, this is not necessarily the case). As such, "relationals" present an ideal and clear body of devices which enable us to pass our judgements on the world. In
the examples above, it is quite clear that the judgement passed on "father" and "car" is not favourable: in the first "father" is characterized as an approximate of "fate", in the second, "car" is compared to a police car which is black, an omen of misfortune.

The first category, attributives, divide into three subcategories: (i) possessives, (ii) qualitatives, and (iii) locatives. I shall deal with these in tandem:

(i) attributive possessive where adjectives are ascribed to entities (or nouns) in their capacity as possessors [vs bearers] of that epithet:

\[
\text{وعينا الدكتور علي الوهمهما الخفي}...
\]

10- A barrier pulled her away...[like] Dr Elwi's eyes with their [hidden] greed.

Where (binahamihimā) "with their [hidden] greed" assign "greed" as an epithet intrinsic to the hero's eyes.

(ii) attributive qualitative where adjectives are ascribed to entities in their capacity as bearers [vs possessors] of that quality:

\[
\text{لم تكن الساقان تنفصلان أبدا في حركة الخطوات المألوفة للردميين} \\
\text{وهمهما هي حركة دودية غريبة}
\]

11- Legs [the girls' legs] never parted the way human legs normally do. Rather, it was a strange \textit{worm-like} movement.

Where (dūdiya) "worm-like" sets the quality of the girls' movement as extrinsic to them, and where "girls' legs" are bearers [vs possessors] of the quality. The difference between (i) and (ii) being is that in the first, the quality ascribed to the entity is, or is made to look, inalienable; whereas in the second, the quality ascribed and the entity are alienable one from the other.
(iii) attributive locatives where particular lexical items (e.g., prepositions) establish a spatial relationship between entities and locations such as:

12- Indeed, she is in the grip of fate.

Where (fī) "in" makes of (al-qadar) "fate" a prison, and of the grammatical subject (ḥā) "she" suffixed to (inna) "indeed" a prisoner.

Before moving to the third major category of syntax, I would like to point out that the borders between actionals and relationals can sometimes be blurred; for if we examine the relational locative "She is in the grip of fate" we can see that it is transactive: "she" which is filling the initial slot of agent is, functionally, patient; while "the grip of fate" taken as an agent, is capable of imprisoning that particular she. Similarly, the relational "worm-like movement" in (12) can also be dismantled into a transactive, so that it can be presented as two distinct processes: (i) worms move [in a sinuous way] and (ii) girls move like worms do.

The difference between actionals and relationals which behave like actionals is that actionals display action-hood quite conspicuously, relationals covertly. Indeed, relationals are more of an efficient device of control whereby the ES narrows down the information he gives to the audience and controls them as to where they should direct their attention. In a statement such as "she saw a face showing from a long, black car like a police car" for example, cars are narrowed down only to "long" cars, then to "long" and "black" cars. All other cars are excluded. In a final step of limitation and control, all "long" and "black" that are not "like police cars" are also not included.
3. Transformations. Language users, however, do not always resort to categories that are discretely actionals or relationals. Rather, they very often conflate two (or more) categories. This conflation produces what Kress and Hodge refer to as "transformations". According to them, these transformations are permissible manipulations of language which distort the basic form in such a way as to serve the ideological purposes of language users (1979: 9-10).

A particularly interesting type of transformation is nominalizations. Manipulation renders nominalizations as made up of two structures: the surface structure and the underlying structure. The latter, I believe, is always recoverable; though one cannot ensure that the interpretation he arrives at is the only or the correct interpretation (because we are not close to the moment of the utterance's moment of production). This ascribes to interpretation a speculative nature.

Nominalizations are characterized by the deletion of agent and patient; this, while attenuating our sense of time, accentuates the sense of abstract notions and objects. One of the most interesting examples of nominalization that Kress and Hodge provide is the following sentence (cited above) which contains two instances of nominalizations (underlined):

Picketing stopped coal deliveries.

They draw our attention that "picketing" is a conflation of two components: the agent "they" + a transactive process "picket"; and that "deliveries" is a conflation of the agent "drivers" + a transactive process "deliver". The outcome of this manipulation is that the sense of agency and of action-hood is deleted; so is the sense of time. The result is that no responsibility can be apportioned. Let us examine the following example from "Two Women in One":

\[157\]
13- Seven mouths [of the girls] open in a feminine laughter, **suppressed** and **broken** like gasps that would never be quenched.

The underlying structure of the above nominalizations (underlined) can be presented as follows:

\[ \text{suppressed laughter} = X \text{ suppressed } Z. \text{ and,} \]
\[ \text{broken laughter} = X \text{ broke } Z. \]

Where "X" = agent, Z = patient.

The ideological gain from this tampering is to background the agent(s) involved in suppressing and breaking girls' laughter. They also help in attenuating the feeling of the activity that has taken place. The outcome of all this hidden activity by the ES is a mini-narrative. Consider (maklumah) "suppressed" which is, as far as Arabic is concerned, (ism mafūl) "passive participle" and how it hides the real agent and presents the activity as a de facto situation. The following example highlights another nuance:

14- ...and [like] the **beaten** eyes of female students.

where (munkasira) "beaten" presents another interesting instance of nominalization: it adds the infix "n" which means "self" to the noun. This gives the nominalised passivization another dimension; for it now suggests that girls self-beat their eyes. This raises the question: "What is it that makes girls do this?"; there must be another agent; since woman is defined in terms of man, it must be him. The implication is that these girls have been continuously conditioned and subjected to repression so much so
that this characteristic has become inherent to them. The initial stage of this process can be presented as follows:

\[
\text{beaten eyes} = \text{X beat Z,} \\
\text{X beat Z,} \\
\text{ad infinitum;}
\]

The whole process can be presented as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Stage One: beaten eyes} &= \text{X beat Z,} \\
&= \text{X beat Z,} \\
&= \text{ad infinitum} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Stage Two: self-beaten eyes} &= \text{Z beat Z's eyes} \\
&= \text{Z beat Z's eyes} \\
&= \text{ad infinitum}
\end{align*}
\]

where "X" = agent, "Z" = patient, \(\rightarrow\) = leads to

So far, I have projected the code of language or syntax which highlights the descriptive aspect of discourse. The code of language comprises three categories which very often overlap. These are: transactives, relationals and transformations. Transactives deal with the interrelationship of agents and processes. They primarily have causality as the key concept for the differentiation between its various sub-categories. Relationals provide an easier-to-spot system for passing our judgement. They also control the speaker's influx of experience and the society's conception of reality. Transformations, a hybrid of both, help reduce complexity.

Having accounted for syntax, a valid question should now be raised. This relates to how the figurative statement fits in with the grammar of congruent sentences, given that some FsOS are semantically impertinent.
As we have seen, there is no problem in this respect with regard to all but metaphor, metonymy and the figure of reason and intellect. Other FsOS are grammatically congruent, though they probably are not as simple as literal language. I shall deal with this issue briefly.

Simile, for example, is a conflation of two independent statements (or sentences) on the paradigmatic axis of language, i.e. the possible choices which could have been used but in fact were not (but see p. 236). So are analogy and kināya. The only difference being is that in simile both sentences are present; whereas in analogy and kināya, one of the two sentences is present in absentia. For example, "The feminine ending... links her name like a link in a leather chain" can be dismantled into:

"Leather chain links", and
"feminine ending links".

Similarly, the analogy "I see that you put one foot forward and one foot backward" can be dismantled into "you put one foot forward and one foot backward" and someone hesitant, "puts one foot forward and one foot backward". Paradigmatic relations in these instances are happy ones.

Metaphor, metonymy and the figure of reason and intellect are a little bit more problematic, as is the case with FsOS mentioned above. Each FOS of this category is also a conflation of two independent sentences on the paradigmatic axis. For example, "X is a wolf" can be dismantled into:

"The wolf is ruthless", and
"X is *a wolf", and therefore,  
"X is ruthless".
where * means ungrammatical.
The same applies to metonymy and the figure of reason and intellect. The conflation, however, is not a happy one. But we can "digest" the contradiction as it alerts us to the presence of the FOS. I would like to point out that in all instances of FsOS the lexical units which are selected (as vehicles) are symbols, i.e. known for renowned property. For example, a wolf is ruthless and chain "links".

I shall now proceed to elaborate on the second stage which accounts for the interaction between syntax and the ES on the one hand, and between him and his audience on the other; with a view to accounting for how this interaction is realised in the mini-discourse (i.e. figurative statement).

5.4.2 Stage Two: the Interpretative

This stage aims at establishing the link between the verbal and the social. I shall address the following issues which make a guide, a framework of analysis complementary to the grammatical approach. The purpose of this exercise is to address the relationship between the ES and language in terms of what language can do for him, and between him and his audience in terms of politeness. Given that my unit of analysis is the statement (which is not of a rigidly defined grammatical character as it can be declarative, interrogative, negative, positive). I shall, following Fairclough (1989: 112), highlight the formal features of "statement". These are experiential, relational, and expressive.

A formal feature with an experiential value is "a trace of and a cue to the way in which the text producer's experience of the natural or social world is represented"; relational value is "a trace of or a cue to the social relationships which are enacted via the text [i.e. the statement] in the discourse"; expressive value is "a trace of and a cue to the evaluation of the ES's bit of reality it relates to".

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The framework of analysis comprises two main components: vocabulary and grammar (ibid. 110-11). The points covering these components take the form of questions; both components and questions are selectively chosen.

1. Vocabulary

Analysis will be focused particularly on (i) tenor and vehicle, (ii) attributes attached to either, and (iii) type of process. The questions relating to this component are:

1- What experiential values do words have?
   What classification schemes are drawn upon?
   Are there words which are ideologically contested?
2- What relational values do words have?
   Are there euphemistic expressions?
   Are there markedly formal or informal words?
3- What expressive values do words have?

2. Grammar

4- What experiential values do grammatical features have?
   What type of process and participant predominate?
   Are statements predominantly active or passive? positive or negative?
   Are there (ideological) transformations?
5- What relational values do grammatical features have?
   How are relations of power expressed?
   Are there important features of relational modality, i.e. modality expressing power relations of one participant in relation to others?
6- What expressive values do grammatical features have?
Such a guideline is intended to provide answers to questions such as why the ES has drawn on particular words/statements which express particular experiences, what kind of relations are existing (or he assumes to be existing) between him and the audience and what words/statements which best realise those relations, and finally how sincere he is in his expression of his experiences and which words/statements express best his sincerity.

The guideline is also intended to function as a preliminary clue as to the discoursal attitude of the ES towards these experiences by the mere display of the nature of these experiences: if they are bad his attitude would be disfavourable; otherwise it would be the opposite. To give a concrete example, I shall examine the following statement in terms of the interpretative procedure:

15- like a prison-keeper her father was crouching in the lounge to watch her movements.

(Sajjān) "prison-keeper" has the experiential value of severe confinement. The ES characterizes the father's profession by way of approximation because of the simile particle. The characterization is ideologically contested, for not everybody accepts this claim as true. (RābiD) "crouching in wait" is a formal term and comes from the military discourse. It expresses maximum readiness for assault. (Yarqubu) "To watch" expresses the nature of the activity the agent engages himself in; and it is of an aggressive, parasitic nature. Meanwhile, (Harakātihā) "her movements" stands for a spontaneous event (vs action) that cannot or can rarely be aggressive.

On the statement level, father is indicted through a functionally transactive process (i.e. (RābiD) "[was] crouching") as engaged in a surreptitious activity with the intent to contravene with the freedom of his daughter.
In terms of relational values which the statement realises, it is clear that there is a great deal of hostility existing between the agent and patient. This is expressed through the near characterization of the agent as (like) a prison-keeper and through the type of activity the ES claims the agent aggressively engages in. The simile particle predetermines readership: the ES is addressing an audience whose members prefer clarity to conviction. It follows therefore, that he exerts pressure on them in a straightforward manner. His request is bluntly made; though he does it in a way which maximizes their benefit. This is clear from the linguistic effort he makes. There is also (rabiD) "crouching" which is a markedly formal word and which might be interpreted that the ES is distancing himself from the audience.

In terms of expressive values, the ES has recourse to the simile particle which can be taken to mean that he is not apparently fully committed to his claim, i.e. he wishes to give his audience more room for manoeuvre. He uses two relationals which are collapsed in the same statement: "her father is like a prison-keeper" and "[he is/was] crouching" (abūhā ka al-sajjān, and rabiD). The first can be interpreted to mean that his fatherly duties are carried out like the duties of a prison-keeper. The second is a case of nominalization. It describes his state in that particular time. If dismantled the second relational can provide a transactive reading: (huwa yarbuDu) "he [always] crouches". The transactive process (yarqubu) "watches" has no end in view because it is in the present imperfective. It can be interpreted to mean that the ES wishes to present the watching activity as habitual. This reveals that he invests a great deal of commitment in his claim.

So far I have accounted for the descriptive and the interpretative aspects of discourse. In the following, I shall account for the explanatory aspect of discourse and attempt to explain why things happen the way they do and what are the motives for doing what has been done. This will be carried out by assigning the institutional identity of agents and the institutions they are subjects to. I shall also identify the
actions carried out by these subjects and define the nature of these works. I shall also refer actions and institutions to the society from which they emanate.

5.4.3 Stage Three: the Explanatory

Thompson (1984: 128-30) proposes that the relation between syntax and the social factor be conceived of by distinguishing three levels of abstraction: social action, social institution and higher social formation or structure. The following is an account of the three levels in a descending order of abstraction:

1. Social Action. This is the most concrete of all three parameters. It is a flow of activity monitored by free-willed agents who are capable of accounting for what they do. They are also capable of intervening in the sequence of events and can alter their course in pursuit of their aims and interests. Action differs from "event" which is only a mechanical sort of movement and which just "happens".

2. Social Institution. This gives power and authority to social agents in order to impose the institution's policy with the intent to constrain and control. It is the loci of power, and the authority which empowers its subjects to make decisions, and pursue ends in such a way that without such institutionally endowed capacity, they would not be capable of carrying the relevant course.

3. Higher Social Formation or Structure. This is the most abstract of the three levels. Among the three, it is the most resistant to change, and it provides the code for the explanation of social actions and for the way social institutions behave. The higher social formation is a series of elements and their interrelations which conjointly define the conditions for the persistence of a social formation. It regulates and guides the functioning of the other two levels from afar. It accounts for the persistence of institutionally authorized actions, and for the distinguishing between one
society and another: capitalist vs communist, secular vs religious, Christian vs Muslim, and so forth.

Ideally, a Muslim society should first and foremost have its life comprehensively regulated by Islam which protectively organizes and measures the relation between the pairs parent/child, husband/wife, and male/female. There are other forces which help in shaping these relations such as the social and moral institutions. These prescribe what is and what is not taboo, but they are usually subservient to religion. It is, therefore, almost impossible to untangle the relationship between these "forces". Any rejection of one of them should be, ideally, a rejection of the others. Police, economics and academic institutions are also given structure by religious and social institutions, and they as well define relationship between man and woman.

In the West, this relationship is differently defined: religion is not as comprehensively organizing on the one hand, and on the other, the role it plays in the life of people is not as vigorous. Social as well as moral institutions provide for the non-differentiation between man and woman. So do all other institutions: academic, police, or economic. (Of course, there is an anti-woman movement in the West which calls for the "dominance" of man, and the presence and strength of feminism attest to this). Given this, a call in a Middle Eastern Muslim society for "equality" would be frowned upon and might be taken, by some, as tantamount to destabilizing its beliefs, whereas such calls would fall on heedful ears and are welcome in the West.

Given this, I shall now re-visit and examine the above statement in terms of the explanatory procedure:

The figurative statement collates two types of activity and two types of subjects. There are notorious actions carried out by a father representative of all fathers, and there are innocent events which just happen to a daughter representative of all daughters.
Fathers have interest in and a motive for implementing the rules of the family institution. They have been trained to do so. These interests do not coincide with the interest of the lower subjects. Both types of activity and types of subject belong to the family institution.

The immediate institution involved is the family institution as it is the father who is immediately under fire. But since this institution derives much of its power from religion, the religious institution is also under fire. These institutions empower fathers with authority that allows them to act in such a way which makes their actions look natural. They teach them how to behave and what to say. Their motive is to preserve their hegemony and "persuade" their subjects, albeit with some coercion, to remain loyal to them. There are other institutions involved; these would be the social institution and the police institution. There is also an institution which is present in absentia: the institution of (personal) freedom.

By way of summary, I have developed in the above section a three-stage procedure for the analysis of critical discourse. The first is descriptive and made up of syntax, the second a guideline of questions and the third three social parameters. In the following, I shall provide a description for the two novels which make the data for this dissertation, and relate them to their respective discourse types. I shall also define the characteristics of their discourse type: literary discourse to which the two novels belong. Finally, I shall describe methodology which I shall use for examining the data.

5.5 Two Types of Discourse

Instead of simulated and isolated instances of FsOS, this dissertation examines FsOS naturally occurring in natural discourse. The scrutiny will be carried out with a view to (i) abandoning a tradition of resorting to simulated, and/or purely poetic instances such as "Sally is a block of ice" or "My love is like a red red rose" (e.g. Levinson: 1983, Kellet:
1988, Al-Sawwaf and Kharbutli: 1989), (ii) upholding a currently fledgling tradition of bridging the gap between theory and practice (e.g. Krug: 1987), and (iii) giving up individuation. By "individuation" I mean two things. First, the tendency to shed more light on one particular FOS at the expense of others. Second, the tendency to treat FOS in their individual capacity instead of threading together those which function identically, i.e. they simultaneously express the same point of view and give expression to the same experience, regardless of their type.

The aim of this approach is to examine the hypothesis which makes the thesis for this dissertation: FOS in their various types are functional (vs ornamental) in that they specifically give rise to discourse, i.e. they can flesh out the attitude of the ES towards the experiences which they give expression to. Attitude and experience are inseparable, being two sides of the same coin. By being functional in this way, FOS help distinguish one type of discourse from another. This approach will provide us with a better understanding of how they operate in real discourse, given that they collectively provide a unique off-record politeness strategy and that each one of them is more appropriate to address a particular audience.

Two novels: one Arabic, another English, together with their respective published translations form the data of this dissertation. The two novels, while still belonging to literature, represent two different discourse types: feminist discourse and literary discourse. The novels are:

1- Two Women in One
2- The Old Man and the Sea

The two novels tackle problems that are more or less of the same urgency to their respective societies. The feminist novel tackles the problems of woman particularly in
Egypt (which are not very different from other countries in the Middle East). The second novel tackles the problems of the "masculine" American individual.

The choice is motivated by a desire to explore if and how FsOS vary in terms of quantity and quality, given that the first is more contentious as it contains controversial ideas about man-woman relationship in a conservative society. The second is a novel written for a leisured audience with the aim of attracting them to the sort of intriguing hardship an old man can face and overcome on his own. Its aim is to enhance the spirit of challenge in his cast of (American) audience.

"Two Women in One" is a short novel by the feminist writer Nawāl el-Sādāwī from Egypt. It is narrated by third person singular, i.e. el-Sādāwī herself assumes the role of the omnipresent ES who controls and dictates all the events of the short novel.

The novel belongs to the literature of ideas which began to take shape at the end of the forties with the return of the earliest products of state-sponsored university graduates from the West. These, influenced by the West and the development there, nurtured and advocated hostile ideas to their culture. They also smoothed the way for more "liberal" literature to develop. "Two Women in One" is an appropriate example.

The novel is written to be read. It revolves about the position of woman in that part of the world. Feminist writers have the assumption that woman is culturally inferiorised, and they work towards achieving her freedom from the grip of forces holding her. These forces, by virtue of the position of woman in the society as a mother, wife, a working force, etc., broaden so much so that they encompass almost all institutions of which the whole society is made up. Since man is the main "force" which figures in and controls these institutions, and since he is the (dialectic) counterpart in whose terms woman is defined, feminists take him as the main rival and indeed the oppressor of woman.
In this relationship where rivalry between both is stretched to its limits, solidarity is not, however, non-existent; for each party accounts, albeit in part, for the well-being of the other. It is natural that some themes would figure as more pressing than others, and that man would be depicted as, among other things, repressive and ineffectual; whereas woman would be depicted as violence-free and deep down strong but harmless. Other themes, such as penetration which alludes to sex or to pain, or the craving for freedom and which relate to the longlasting relationship between both parties, would also feature in the works of feminist writers.

"The Old Man and the Sea" was written to boost individualism and enhance the spirit of adventurism in the American. By that time, the American had successfully fought all his battles with the Red Indian and in the Independence War. There was worry that he would relax and "lose" masculinity.

5.6 Data Description

"Two Women in One" is addressed to wide masses: (likulli fata[n] wa fatāh) "every young man and woman" [the novel does not tell where] and is intended to raise their consciousness as to the ruthlessness of the present "forces" and to encourage them to oppose and change the naturalized sort of relationship existing in the society so that they can live among the stinging and "food-hungry bees". Ill-founded her claim might be (for it is only by food-hungry bees that flowers get pollinated), it clearly indicates her hostile intentions towards the existing, local world.

Indeed, in a highly polemic reply addressed to a literary critic, the feminist writer confesses that her main aim is to effect a change in the matrix of the society which she accuses of injustice and of bias to man. In his critique, Ṭarābīshi (1988), the critic, accuses her of being against her sex. El-Sađāwī vehemently denies this charge. She also complains that a former analysis of the same novel by the same critic was much
more satisfactory than a later analysis which he based on a Freudian psychological approach. This exchange has been one of the strong motives for me to try to build a reliable method for the analysis of her novel.

"Two Women in One" is about an Egyptian girl, Bahiah Shaheen, who is brought up in a Middle Eastern "conservative" society where man is very often depicted as woman-restrainer, and woman oppressed. The dominant values are those of the male, whether he be father, brother, husband, lecturer, student, policeman, or even lover; though he is not, so the ES claims, of a better quality.

Indeed, he is ruthlessly and incessantly associated with, through chains of figurative language, characters and objects associated with violence such as prison-keepers, fate, and the like. Bahiah Shaheen, who grows weak and indecisive in such an oppressing environment, starts to reflect on the values of the whole society. She first becomes suspicious of the disproportionately powerful position of her father and the weak position of her mother. She develops a critical eye for all the conventions as well as the sections of the society: students, lecturers and ordinary people in the street. She becomes also reproachful, but out of love and sheer solidarity, of her fellow poor sisters. Bahiah Shaheen, however, remains not fully confident of her wise judgement.

Torn between two conflicts: to abide by the social conventions which dictate how to behave or to adopt her own way and vision of life, Bahiah Shaheen opts, though not without much agony, for the second solution. She decides to break free from the social conventions. She falls in love with Saleem who, despite being a man like all men, seems to be different. He is neither ineffectual like other men, nor tied to the chains of the society conventions. Instead, he is depicted as a man of action who acts against the institutions of the society (he distributes some anti-government leaflets and encourages her to flee to his flat where she gets pregnant by him) and ends up in prison. Bahiah is forced to marry a man chosen by the family, but she decides to revolt against the family decision and flees to Saleem's flat. There she leads an active
life distributing leaflets calling for change against the government and against the society. And though the novel concludes with Bahiah ending up in prison, too, she is hailed as victress and praised for her strength and determination, a signal of encouragement for the new generation to apply her programme of action.

"The Old Man and the Sea", written by the American writer Hemingway, is also written to be read. It is representative of literary discourse. The novel constitutes a formidable "metaphor" of struggle against the forces of nature. It is also one of the most concise novels. The novel, therefore, rates high on the continuum of literary discourse. It is narrated by third person singular, i.e. the author himself who absents himself from the novel so much so that the reader is wholly left with his hero "the old man". At no point throughout the novel is the reading process interrupted by the ES.

The novel tells the story of an old fisherman forsaken by luck. It is a concise novel just over 100 pages long which tells us what goes on in the mind of this experienced man throughout this journey which he goes alone. For more than eighty days, the old man remains, due to bad luck it is believed, unable to catch any fish. The old man sets off to the open sea on his own after having lost the company of his apprentice who was obliged by his parents to abandon his master. After some time, the old man, skilled and experienced, is able to catch a very big fish.

Delighted at the idea that he will no longer be target of his colleagues' jokes and at the money he will get from selling the fish, he now begins to reflect on his future and loneliness. The old man braces himself for a hard struggle with the fish; and he is up to it, he contemplates. Everytime the old man is in trouble he remembers the boy, "If only he were there to help". For three nights, he remains on the boat drifting unable to kill and load the fish who leads the boat and remains the old man's sole companion. He is his "brother". At last, tired from towing the boat, the fish's strength weakens; and the old man is able to kill "his brother".
Unable to load him on board the skiff, the old man ties him to the side of the boat. Unfortunately, sharks sniff the smell of blood and come forward to have their share. The old man braces himself to defend his fortune. He uses the harpoon and kills the first shark, though not before mutilating the big beautiful fish. Other sharks, undeterred, attack and nibble out parts of the fish. The old man kills them one after another, but there were too many of them. He loses his harpoon, his club, and everything that could be used for defending. After a long battle he loses the last bit of fish, and almost his hope.

Extremely exhausted, the old man reaches the beach, safely. But almost without anything, apart from his beleaguered skiff and the head of the big fish. He is hardly able to trudge to his shack and lies down there as if dead. In the morning the whole community discover what a large fish the old man had caught. With this the novel concludes. So does a hard struggle between the old but experienced old man and the more powerful forces of nature: the sea and fish.

As is expected, each novel deals with experiences that might, though not necessarily, coincide with those expressed by the other. Each novel, needless to say, should represent the point of view of its author, and portray a picture of a world (as contrasted to "the" world) as viewed by him. Naturally, the feminist novel should present woman as victim of man, and present this view in a way which safeguards the interests of woman. The other novel, in turn, should present man, old but experienced as he is, as capable of standing up to the challenge of nature. Both novels are expected to show some degree of solidarity with both woman's rival (i.e. man) and the old man's rival (i.e. sea and fish). Solidarity will enable us to gauge the degree of power contested between the two parties involved. The analysis of FsOS would hopefully reveal if and how politeness differs across the two languages involved.
5.7 Characteristics of Literary Discourse

These novels have not been chosen on the assumption that FsOS abound particularly in literature. Indeed, as Hasan (1971: 303) observes, these can also be found even in advertisements. Instead, they have been chosen on the basis that in literary texts, especially short texts, unity of topic or theme is more observable; and that this unity regulates the development of discourse without being literally present in it (ibid. pp. 308-9). This regulative principle directs the ES as to what, and how to say what, he wants to say. It also pre-positions the audience as to what to expect and how to interpret what they receive.

This theme or regulative principle of a literary work may be seen as an abstraction or a generalization which accounts for the truth of the work; for in every generalization there is a grain of truth. A certain set of situations, events, or a configuration of events is seen not only as a particular happening, but also as a manifestation of some deep underlying principle. As such, literature is idealised and universal; it achieves its universality by referring to the particular as universal.

Also of the characteristics which distinguish literature from non-literature is that in literature, according to Hasan (ibid. p. 309), there are two layers of symbolisation. The first obtains when language is used to symbolise a set of situations, events, processes and entities as they are used in language in general. The second obtains when these situations and/or events, in their turn, are used to symbolise a theme or a theme constellation.

In "The feminine ending linked her to girls' lists like a link in a leather chain", for example, it is language as conventionally used which establishes the first layer: "her" is made patient to the physical process "linked" which is perpetrated by the instrument/agent "the feminine ending" (which refers to social conventions). The second layer of symbolisation, on the other hand, occurs when an identical "her" (or
other similar "hers") is recurrently and systematically made patient by, or for, the same agent (or other agents who harbour, more or less, the same intentions towards "her") to establish the theme that woman in general is oppressed.

Every utterance, according to Hasan (1967: 109-110), has a thesis and a function in the internal organization of the text. The thesis is what the utterance talks about (i.e. "linking" in the above example), the function is that it should, in combination with other utterances, realise and enhance a particular theme (i.e. she is oppressed). The presence of two levels of symbolisation has the implication that the audience do not merely decode the literary message; rather, they interpret the message. This, in turn, can have the consequence that there is more than one viable interpretation, and that the audience might get out of it more information than the ES was originally conscious of putting into it. In literature, the second level of symbolisation enhances the theme, rather than destroying its power.

Literature, as Lodge (1977:4) claims, invites and requires interpretation for its successful completion; non-literature is destroyed by it. For example, in "...her father's eyes...pulled,...followed her " the work of the eyes in actual life is more immaterial, less violent, and does not really oppress as such. But to present or to see eyes as they really function, is to deprive the message of its force. This invites the ES and the audience to respectively depict and see eyes as capable of "following" and of "pulling".

Literature also differs from non-literature with regard to verifiability. Literature is, in the words of Lodge (1977: 6), "self-evidently fictional or may be read as such". It deals with events, and processes that might happen, and presents them as if they "have happened", though they are not necessarily in the archive. In other words, literature is not verifiable; non-literature is, or should be. It follows therefore that literature, for its decoding, should contain its own context of situation. This context does not necessarily correlate with a physical context in the outside world.
Moreover, literature differs from non-literature by foregrounding. "Foregrounding" is the systematic use of a particular linguistic pattern to highlight a particular theme by virtue of its own value in the language, through the linguistic function from which its meaning is derived. Halliday (1971: 339) defines foregrounding as "prominence that is motivated". Such is the case when, for example, the one-participant non-transactive processes are systematically used in order to signal non-action or ineffectuality. Foregrounding requires motivation which is necessary for the explanation of how and why those patterns are foregrounded.

5.8 Summary and Demonstration

To demonstrate many of the key linguistic themes that I have examined, especially causality and foregrounding, I find it quite useful to refer to a particularly distinguished analysis by Halliday (1971). In his analysis of the language of "The Inheritors", Halliday highlights, among other things, how causality is one of the ways of looking at experience. He also highlights how causality can bring about foregrounding thus enhancing the main theme of the novel, which is ineffectuality.

"The Inheritors" in essence is the story of the Neanderthal man, Lok, whose tribe were invaded by a more developed people and who, being confined to a limited area and unable to understand or cope with the newcomers' civilization, faced elimination. Halliday brings to our attention the fact that syntax is used to provide a picture of the tribe moving, rather than acting. They are depicted as ineffectual. In order to hammer this idea out, the processes used by the ES are predominantly one-participant non-transactive processes (e.g. Lok steadied, turned), intermediate transactive, i.e. a transactive mitigated by a preposition such as "he grabbed at the branches" vs "he grabbed...", or even mental processes (e.g. "Lok gazed").
Moreover, a high proportion of the agents used are either parts of the body, or inanimate (e.g. "His nose examined", "The stick began to grow", respectively). It is this lack of transactive processes and of human agents which has created an atmosphere of ineffectual activity. This (underlying) ideational component is further enhanced by the fact that the experiences of this tribe do not go beyond the forest environment. There is abundant mentioning of "bushes", "trees", "stick", and other forest-related entities, as well as of a limited number of events (i.e. experiences) which account only for a narrow environment such as "twitched", "faced", "grow", and the like. This could be taken to mean that the tribe's knowledge and experiences do not go beyond these confines.

In this novel, transitivity patterns are successfully exploited to weld together the subject matter (i.e. what Lok and his people were doing on the appearance of the other people) and the underlying theme of the tribe's ineffectuality and inability to survive when confronted with "more developed" human beings. When these people take over, syntax adequately responds: transactive processes predominate and a bigger horizon, not limited to the tribe's forest, emerges.

Syntax in the language of "The Inheritors" highlights, as far as we are concerned, the ideational and the interpersonal functions of language. It projects two worlds that are completely at odds: the world of the primitive tribe with their limited and immature experiences (as seen by an outsider) and their narrow environment on the one hand, and the world of the invading people who are depicted as capable of effecting change on the other. In either case, transitivity has been the main device for the exposing of those two worlds, and for the justification of, not innocuously perhaps, the swallowing by the "superior" of the "inferior".

In dealing with these discourse-representative novels, I am working on the assumption that each novel represents a specific point of view, or rather, a set of interrelated points of view which altogether fuse and give rise each to its respective discourse, i.e.

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feminist discourse and literary discourse. (They are not mutually exclusive). To these points of view or themes, I shall give the name "discoursal threads". Each theme is realised by one figurative statement or a chain of related, consecutive or non-consecutive figurative statements (i.e. event or a series of events of the same type, taking "event" to mean action for convenience) carried out by particular classes of agents and, in some cases, passed onto some other particular classes of patients. Each discoursal thread stands for a pattern of experience. I am also working on the assumption that these discoursal threads can be expressed each by a minimum of one FOS; this guarantees, at least in theory, that no single FOS will escape inclusion.

5.9 Methodology

To achieve this objective, I have adopted a novel approach. Instead of dealing with them on individual basis, I have grouped the various types of FsOS which express the same point of view towards the same pattern of experience under the same heading. This will be done irrespective of their types and irrespective of the fact that they do not feature linearly in their respective novel. Thus and by way of summary, in each theme which can be realised by a single or many instances of FOS there is present:

(i) a discoursal theme, e.g. oppression
(ii) an action or alternatively an event, e.g. somebody perpetrating oppression on somebody else in a specific place, and in a specific time, e.g. the feminine ending linked her...like a link in a leather chain; or otherwise something that just happens, e.g. seven mouths open...
(iii) medium, i.e. a FOS of any type.
For demonstration, the following FsOS express the discoursal theme “oppression”; each instance is followed by the type of the FOS used (between brackets) and the underlining to signal or alternatively locate the FOS:

16- their legs never parted the way human legs normally do. Rather, it was a strange worm-like movement whereby the girl’s legs moved while the thighs remained clamped and knees bound as if she were pressing her thighs to protect something she feared might fall (metaphor, analogy).

17- the feminine ending attached to her name...linked her to girls' lists like a link in a leather chain (simile).

18- The moment her head showed, a force would pull her with a magnetic power stronger than gravity.

19- Seven mouths [would] open in a feminine laughter, suppressed and broken, like gasps...(simile).
This is despite the fact that each instance is a different types of FOS, and that all agents engaged in suppressing her are different; though all are institutionally empowered and have an interest in enforcing social restraint (or oppression, from the viewpoint of females). "Oppression" is expressed in (16) via the metaphor (al-dūdiya) "worm-like" and via an analogy signalled by "as if"; in (17), (19) and (20) via similes; in (18) via a kināya. Agents range from the grammatically blurred (but retrievable) such as in (16), (17), and (19); and the explicit whether it be an instrument such as in (17) or human agent such as in (20). The agent undergoing such oppression is invariably the female.

As for the discoursal theme, it is manifest in (16) particularly in the contrast between the way human beings walk and the worm-like movement of girls, and in the clause "as if she feared..."; in (17) in "linked"; in (18) in "she dares not"; in (19) in "suppressed", and "broken"; and in (20) in the causal relationship.

On the contrary, the following sample of FsOS express the discoursal theme "strength" (the theme will be underlined):

21- As she got up...she lost her balance and would have fallen...But, with the strength of her long legs she stood on the ground like the experienced sea captain on the deck of a sturdy ship. [lit].
For the first time, she heard chanting as wide as the sky, and as strong as a gale,
(b) their features were as sharp as swords,
(c) their eyes raised high, and
(d) their backs straight and unbending.

She felt it [power] with her fingers, strong and flexible as rubber,
(b) her heart would continue to pound like bursts of laughter,
(c) everything took on a splendid radiant colour. The red spots on the floor shone like the sun.
(d) The stars shone as brightly as the moon.
(e) And each green leaf took on prominent texture like incised teeth.

Where the discoursal theme "strength" is manifest in (21) in (qudra) "strength", and in the connotations of (rubbān māhir) "experienced captain"; in (22) respectively in the connotation of (al-rīH al-ʿātiya) "gale", in the connotations of (al-saif) "sword", and in the corollary of the whole statements of (d) and (e); and in (25) it is manifest respectively in (qawiyya) "strong", in the connotations of (ka-al-qahqahāt) "like
bursts of laughter", in the likening of the moon's light with that of the sun, and in the connotations of (al-asnān al-mutharthara) "incised teeth".

I am assuming that in feminist discourse, "woman" is defined in terms of her relation with "man". This relation is one of rivalry and of solidarity at one and the same time. I have, therefore, grouped FsOS into two groups: man-related FsOS and woman-related FsOS. In the first, the ES expresses an attitude of contempt towards man, or better, towards man's dominating values. In the second, the ES expresses an attitude of sympathy towards woman. In either case, I would like to point out, the ES's preoccupation is to present the interest of woman and suppress the interest of man.

The novel abounds with FsOS each of which ridicules man whether he be subject to the social institution (e.g. father), the marriage institution (e.g. husband) academic institution (e.g. lecturer or student), the police institution, or even the social institution in a wider sense (e.g. when she remains sceptical with respect to all men even the hero, Saleem, who is presented as relatively different from other men). Here are some examples which are intended to substantiate my claim. The first example is intended to demonstrate the heroine's feelings towards men in general; the type of FOS, the name of the male/subject ridiculed plus the institution which he represents will be presented between brackets:

24- She hated them [men], she hated their trousers, their eyes, their smell which..., ...

and their thick moustaches which looked like black, dead insects flapping over their lips (simile, men: social institution).

25- كُلُّ ما خُلِقَ طَوِيلَ الضُّحُمَ كَانَ أُوَّلَا وَهُوَ يَقِفُ بِهِنَا وَبَيْنَ نَفْسَهَا

الحقيقة وكسف الكبرياء وعيه الكبريتين السابعتين في مدخل البيت
25- Like a high massive barrier, her father stood between her and her real self (simile, father: family, social and religious institutions).

26- His fingers [the bridegroom's] were strange. They coiled around hers like the fingers of fate (simile, husband: marriage, social and family institutions).

27- From behind] She would see the brown skin [of male medical students]... and tiny imperfections like pores (simile, students: college).

28- He [the doctor/lecturer] took off his jacket and the banknotes in the inside pocket smelt like hospital: a mixture of blood...(simile, lecturer: college).

29- But the faces on the tram were not those of fathers and mothers; instead they were those stunningly similar faces stamped out by the government like coins, sitting shoulder to shoulder in silence, their lower bodies immobile and fixed to their seats, their upper parts shaking slowly and rhythmically like the tram's. Their huge skulls swung back and forth like pendulums... Their ties wound round their necks like hangmen's ropes (simile(s), government employees: social and state institutions).
30- [In a car] Her father [sat] on one side, her uncle on the other...They did not give her any attention, exactly like two policemen who were strange to her (simile, father, uncle, and policemen: family, social, and police institutions).

31- She hated his smile and his happiness [her cousin and prospective fiancé]...But he never got angry,...and he would say to her in his dull, flat voice... (metaphor, cousin/proposed fiancé: family, marriage and social institutions)

32- His eyes [Saleem's] were now in her eyes, they were angry, their black colour was tinged with a frightening dark blue colour like the colour of a bottomless sea (simile, Saleem: social institution).

There are FsOS which are critical of women, but these should not be confused with the above FsOS: they are not out of contempt. Rather, they are out of "overzealous" love. This is because the ES, to convince them, identifies herself with them and with their statuses as inferior (such as when Bahiah, for example, describes herself as cow in "You should have examined the cow before you bought it"). The following chain of figurative language contains resentment of females' acceptance of the status quo which is in favour of man, as well as an implicit call for them to redress the balance of power.
33- She pursed her lips in anger, for the greedy desire to consume is mere compensation for eternal deprivation. Under the lustful, burning eyes lies frigidity cold like frost. Under the hair wavy like silk lies a brain soft like a rabbit's, knowing nothing of life except eating and reproduction.

The same division also applies to "The Old Man and the Sea", where FsOS, I am assuming, flesh out two worlds: the world of the old man, and the world of the sea and fish. Naturally, animosity between the two parties in either case, is not and cannot be absolute; otherwise each party would be living on his own. The well-being of one party is dependent on the relative well-being of the other. There must be some kind of solidarity, though this solidarity differs from one case to another.

FsOS will be divided in Chapter Six in terms of the grammatical categories proposed above. They will be examined and afterwards related, in their threads, to the social. Source texts will be provided first, and these will be followed by translations not necessarily from the official translation; except in Chapter Seven where I shall be following an empirical approach. In either case, I would like to point out, it has been the intention to make a point: in the first, to focus on the figurative nature of the statement, and in the second, to make a translation assessment from a discourse point of view. Two discoursal themes from "Two Women in One" and one from "The Old Man and the Sea" will be analysed.
Notes to Chapter Five

1- For the issue of how seemingly synonymous words carry nuances which might have a bearing on the life of people see Burke (1941).

2- This view is not different from the view expressed by Burke in Chapter Three; only that Whorf expresses the view of someone interested in science, while Burke represents the view of a literary critic.

3- For example, when the British troops "Desert Rats" were dispatched to Saudi Arabia, "rat" was interpreted to local people as Jerboe, another less undignified desert rodent. The linguistic "manoeuvring" was opt for because in Arabic culture rats do not have anything gallant about them, jerboe are at least edible.


5- For a relevant division of processes see R. Quirk and S. Greenbaum (1973), Chapter III, especially p. 18; see also Halliday, M.A.K (1985: 102-12); see also G.D. Morley (1985).

6- For "relationals" see R. Quirk and S. Greenbaum (1973), Chapter IV; see also Halliday, M.A.K (1985: 112- 28).

7- The third category, the locatives, is borrowed from Morely (1985).


10- For the influence of the West on modern Arabic literature see for example Badawi, M. (1985), especially Chapter (iii) and (iv).
11- See el-Saādāwī's dedication; for other novels by el-Saādāwī see also The Death of an Ex-Minister (1982); see also Tarābishī, G. (1988).

Chapter Six

DATA ANALYSIS

6. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall analyse one discoursal theme from each of the two novels (Imra’atān fī Imra’ā) "Two Women in One" and "The Old Man and the Sea". The discoursal themes are respectively "Oppression" and "Admiration". The analysis will be exhaustive and it will be carried out in terms of the three stages proposed above: the grammatical, the interpretative and the explanatory. I shall also provide a brief analysis of a second discoursal theme from the first novel as a back-up (for "Oppression") with a view to recording whether or not there is a shift of attitude by the ES. All three discoursal themes will be attached in this chapter in their respective places.

6.1 Two Women in One: an Overview of the Discoursal Themes

All FsOS in "Two Women in One" have been grouped under twentyone discoursal threads or themes. As has been mentioned in Chapter Five, these divide into two inextricably intertwined main sets: a set of man-related discoursal themes and a set of woman-related discoursal themes. Here is a list of these themes (themes will be in square brackets).

Through the first category, the ES expresses the themes that man is woman-abuser [abuse], oppressor [oppression], that he is boring [boredom], servile [contempt], bullying [intimidation] and inefficient [malfunction]. All are degrading qualities that should disqualify man from his claim for dominance over woman.

On the other hand, in some themes of the other set woman has been described as ostracized [alienation], stray [disorientation], deceived [disillusionment], of a split
personality and craving for both escape and freedom [split personality, loss of identity, escape and freedom respectively]. She is also described as traumatized [pain]. Nevertheless, in some of the other discoursal themes woman has been described as more "durable", more viable and discontented [strength, viability, and rebellion respectively]. She is able to discover herself and "assimilate" with the society [discovery and assimilation]. She is also worthy of sympathy [pity].

There is also the theme of penetration which alludes to an admixture of pain and of pleasure caused by objects which are ideally or practically capable of permeating through other objects [penetration]. (Consider, for example, "Before her she saw the eyes [the hero's] penetrating hers, unmasking her [reality] and tearing at the guise" and "She felt them [the teeth of the keys] and a shudder permeated through her flesh like soft, warm sands. It went down her arms to her legs and then it went up to her head"). The allusion to pain in the first, and to sex in the second is quite clear. For this reason, I take this theme as presenting a symbolic and summary theme of the unavoidable bitter-sweet relationship between man and woman.

Not all these themes, naturally, start on page one of the novel and end the moment it concludes. Instead, they alternate, coming into prominence and dying out, and very often we find the majority of them functioning simultaneously (see figure iv). Remarkably enough, the novel which is inaugurated with "oppression", i.e. woman being restrained and oppressed by the world of man, ends with requesting pity for, and demonstrating the strength of, woman (pp. 141, 142 respectively). Discoursally, this is quite significant as it signals a triumphant conclusion to the life of the heroine and a rather happy, albeit implicitly put, end to the novel.

Of the above discoursal themes I have chosen "oppression" (by the world of man) and "strength" (of woman) for analysis. The choice is motivated by the fact that they make two of the most important feminist claims: women are oppressed by the world of man and they are as strong as man. The themes also realise the five pillars of
dramatism (i.e. act, scene, agent, agency and purpose), though in differing ratios of transparency. In terms of "oppression" man carries out his (male) dominance over woman [act] to enforce discipline [motive] \(^1\); it can also refer to the place where he oppresses her [scene], or he can use it as a means by which he achieves some objective [agent] or a casuistry to account for his act [agency]. Thus oppression, from a symbolic point of view, turns into "agent", "agency", "act", "motive" and/or "scene" without much difficulty. It turns into a parameter in their mutual relationship that should reveal the nature of the values, actions and characteristics of both man and woman.

"Strength", on the other hand, should primarily display the features of a state of conditions which qualify it more for a scene: it presents an end result to things rather than a process. But of course, other pillars of symbolic dramatism are recoverable, though with more difficulty. By definition, strength of woman negates, or at least neutralizes, that of man; "oppression", on the other hand underlines the power of man and the weakness of woman.

I shall analyse figurative statements which express these two themes through three stages: (i) grammar in terms of actional and relational processes as well as transformations, (ii) formal characteristics in terms of the experiential value, the relational value and the expressive value, and (iii) the social factor through social action, social institution and higher social formation. Before that, I would like to re-emphasize three points. First, that a statement is not a rigorously defined grammatical unit. This does not mean that it is not grammatical; rather, it means that it cannot be defined in terms of shortness or length and that it can occur in all grammatical moods: declarative, interrogative, affirmative, or negative. Second, because there are statements that each contain more than one FOS, I shall, for the facilitation of analysis, break them down into their respective FsOS. Third, I would like to point out that this is not a statistical study. I shall, therefore, use figures only to highlight a point and arrive at an interpretation. (The following is Appendix A Oppression).
Oppression
Boredom
Contempt
Abuse
Intimidation
Malfunction
Alienation
Disorientation
Disillusionment
Split
Loss of identity
Escape
Pain
Freedom
Strength
Viability
Rebellion
Discovery
Assimilation
Assimilation
Pity
Penetration

Code: * figures refer to page number

Figure (iv) showing the condns and distribution of both F & O's and discursive
APPENDIX : A OPPRESSION

1. لم تكن السفاحين تنزلان أبداً في حركة الخوات المألوفة

للإدمان ونها في حركة دورية غريبة تستقل بها قدمًا الفتحة

فوق الأرض وتحت سلاسة ملتفتين وركبتهما ملتحمين كلما.

2. تضغط بين فخذيهما على شيء تمشي سقوط.

3. النواء عريوف مضافة إلى اسمها ترتبطها بقوائم البنات

4. كالجام الجليدي

5. وتشتقات الأفواه السفيرة في ضيقة أثقلها مكتومة ومتقطعة

6. كأنفس تنهت بحرمان عاجز عن الارتواء

 حين سارت في الهواء الطارق ... أدى أنها لم تكن غاضبة

وإمما كانت هي تريد أن تمسك في الآن أحد بذلك الإحساس

في الغريب الذي يتكون في جوفها كالجنيين طوال السنة يشراك

يوما بعد يوم

لأنه على أن نظن برأسها في الخارج فهناك في الخارج قصة

7. قادرة رهيبة ماناً تظل برأسها حتى تشداها إليها

8. كالحاج الطويل الجهم كان أباها يقع بينها وبين نفسها

الحقيقة وكفة الكبيرة وعسيّ الكبيرتين القائمتين في مدخل

البيت

9. ... وبذراعيه الكبيرتين (بهدي الصغيرة) وساقيه كان يضرب

الساقين الكبيرتين لكنهما كانتا قويتين مختلتين كلكي

10. القدر

11. كانت تريد أن تقول حتى يحتفق النبيس لكن رغيتها الخفية في

12. الموت يلد في المزرعة كرفة مصممة

13. تستفيق عينيها في السباح على موت المحب وعيناً أبيها

الكبريتان من فوق السرب تندميان خاز السرب وخارج حجرتها.

14. وتستفيق فتكت في الكلية

15. وفخمه الكبيرة تدفعتها داخل المشرفة

16. حاصرتها العيون من كل جانب

17. هفوات ... أنفاس متداولة برغبة دقيقة مدفونة في الجسد
14 أضوع الشارع طويلًا، باردًا... من بطن الجبل كذراع طويلة ممدودة...

ومن فوقها صيرفة السماء المحصورة بين الجبل والمباني

15 حينما رأى بيتها من بعيد خاص قلها

16 كسب من روابط رشاق إلى السجن

مسار بقوة قوة الحديد

لكن البيت الآن أصبح النص

17 وفدوها ك السجاسة رابض في الصالة... يرقب مرتكباتها

18 وعيون وأفواه من حولها في كل مكان تكساك بالأسئلة

30 تبدو من الخلفية المستحيلة تماماً: ضراع

31 يمستعمرة بالذينان والفناء الكامل في الكون

32 صد الدم إلى قلها... وتزوجت أنتفاسها كذري يغرق في بحر

33 وكأنما تحولت الحياة كلها من حولها إلى سيولة دائمة

34 وساروا أمامهم إلى عرفة كبيرة: الصندوق كالزنادة...

35 جاء مكفدها إلى جوار شق صغير في جدار العرفة شق المفتاح...

في الباب

36 حان كبير مصمم... يقف بينها وبين حياتها... يشدها بعيداً

37 كذراعها أومها الكبيرتين حين كانتا تصداناً

38 وممت أومها حين كان يبتهرها...

39 وباب الكلية الحديدية

31 والمضارة... ومن فوقها أشرار الحـ..

32 وسقان الطائفة المعاوية

33 وعيون الطالبات المكسرة...

34 وعينا الدكتور علي بنهمها الخفي

35 إنها في قمة القدر

Ma
S = simile
Ma = metaphor
Ex.S = expressive simile
E/S = elliptical simile
A2 = analogy (?) simile al-tashbih
L/C = local chain
E/Ma = elliptical (recoverable) metaphor

Underlining locates or signals figure of speech
6.1.1 Oppression

This discoursal theme with which the novel is inaugurated runs well to the middle of its final quarter (p.127). It comprises [43] statements; these include [52] metaphorical instances, out of which there are [35] similes, [7] metaphors, [6] kināyas and [2] analogy (tashbih tamthils).

6.1.1.1 Stage One:
The Descriptive (Syntax): Actionals, Relationals and Transformations:

Actionals: The heroine, Bahiah Shaheen, is systematically made patient in a large number of transactive processes [22]. These processes are carried out by particular classes of agent with the intent to oppress woman (from the point of view of the feminist writer). They divide into two categories: animates and non-animates. Animate agents, in turn, divide into intact human agents and parts or organs of human agents (agents will be in bold type, processes underlined and figures will refer to the number of the statement in the appendix). The sole example of an intact human agent is "her father" "watches" her movements (abūha urqubu Ḥarakāthā: 18). Otherwise, woman is made patient through transactive processes which have parts of human organs as agents. For example, "the eyes of her father" "pull" and "follow" her (ṣaynā abiha tashuddānihā wa tataqqābānihā: 9-10), "his palm" "shove" her (kaṣfuha tadfaṣuhā: 11); "eyes" and the eyes of her brothers" respectively "besieged" and "besiege" her (ṣaynūn akhawāthīhā Ḥásarāthā, tuḥāṣārāthā: 12 and 19); (dhiraṣay ummihā, Šawtu abihā, ṣiṣān al-Talaba, ṣaynūn al-Talibāt and ṣaynā al-duktor  ḤElwī); "the arms of her mother" "the voice of her father", "the crooked legs of male students", "the beaten eyes of female students" and "the greedy eyes of Dr. ḤElwī" were "pulling" and "chiding" her (yashudduhā wa yanharuhā: 25-32); "fingers" "grab" her (al-asābi taqbiDu ṣalayhā: 34).
There are two other instances where woman is oppressed by personified entities: "the silk gown" "smothers" her breast (al-fustân al-Ḥārīrī yakhnuqu Ṣadraha: 36) and "she is in the grip of fate" (innahā fī qabDār al-qadar: 33). The former personifies and presents the silk gown as capable of smothering her. The second presents an even more interesting case: formally the process is locatively non-transactive for there is apparently no activity that is going on. Functionally, however, it is transactive for there is a surreptitious activity that is carried out. This does not differ from another two parallel and related instances. The first: "[the gown]" coils (...wa yaltaff: 37) is formally non-transactive. Functionally, however, it is transactive. The second, the transactive process "grab" in "the fingers which grab her" is played down by a preposition (i.e. (alayhā) "on her").

Furthermore, there are [3] transactive processes that are carried out by non-animate agents: each of "the gate of the college", and "the dissecting room" rebukes her, and "the feminine ending" "links" her (bāb al-kulliya: 28, al-mashraHa: 29 and al-fā' al-marbiTa: 2).

In the above cases, man is ruthlessly and violently active and woman is consistently oppressed. This theme of man oppressing woman is further enhanced by the absence of mental processes which are void of action as they are primarily processes of cognition.

Contrary to this actively aggressive world, the world of woman is differently depicted: woman is active, but not on anything external to herself. The transactive processes which handle woman are but formally agentive. Functionally, they are patientive and woman is invariably the affected entity: "she marches towards the wedding chair surrounded with flowers like the tomb of the unknown soldier", "her legs move slowly...as if she were heading for an unexpected catastrophe" (hiya tasīru: 38, ṣaṣaḥā tataHarraκan: 41); "she gasped" for breath (tāḥaḤaqat anfāṣuḥa: 22); "her heart sank" (ghaṢa qalbuhā: 15); "seven mouths opened" (tanfatiHu al-afwāhu al-sabja: 3);
and the intermediate transactive "she wished to confide" vs she confided (kānat turīdu an tahmisa: 4). There are two transactive mental processes (which are significantly absent from man's aggressive world described above) where she is, functionally, patient: "she saw" a face, "she felt" that...(ra'at wajh[an], aHassat: 42, 44).

Still there are two statements which are worth considering:

5- She dares not show her head in the outside world, for there is in the outside a powerful, supernatural force which is capable of picking her up and...

6- With her puny arms and legs she [the child, Bahiah] was striking at the big legs [of a policeman], but they were strong and open like the jaws of fate.

The first statement is interesting because it is negative. Negative becomes more conspicuously effective after recovery of the affirmative underlying it. Once this takes place the statement can be interpreted as reading: "she is indeed weak [and that some other girl somewhere else is strong]. Dramatistically, negative should involve some sort of action for it is a function of expectation: when someone wants an apple and he is given an orange instead, he disappointedly says "That is not an apple, it's an orange".

In (7) there is a transactive process which confirms that Bahiah Shaheen, when still a child, was engaged in a physical activity: "she" "struck" the big legs of the policeman. However, situated in its context of situation, the statement, (i.e. the process, ignoring the difference) never in reality materialized. Rather, it is fancied and
realised only in a drawing in which Bahiah Shaheen imagined herself as capable of hitting a policeman.

Moreover, there are factors which nullify the activity of the child. For example, the contrast between the qualifier (al-Ṣaghīratayn) "puny" (attached to the "arms of the child") and (kabīratayn) "big" (attached to the legs of the policeman) renders the child's attempt abortive. There is also the simile particle which likens man's powerful legs to the jaws of fate thus underlining the helplessness of the child vis-a-vis the invincible power of the policeman.

Relationals: In addition to the actionals which the ES uses with the intent to express the experience of oppression that her female sisters have been subjected to by the world of man, the ES also has recourse to relationals in order to pass an easier-to-spot judgement. Relationals involved are used to pass judgement on three categories. These are: (i) the world of man, (ii) the world of woman and, (iii) the world which links man to woman (e.g. her/his house).

All relationals which pass judgement on the world of man are inherently derogatory. Judgement is predominantly passed via similes (simile particles will be underlined). Representatives of the world of man include intact human agents, parts or organs of human agents and inanimate agents. Intact human agents are solely confined to her father who is labelled as "like a high massive barrier", and "like a prison-keeper" (ka al-Ḥajīz al-Tawīl al-Dakhm: 6, ka al-sajjan: 16). In one instance he is characterized in a reversed expressive simile as fate (al-qadar huwa abūhā: 35).

Parts or organs of human agents include the arms of the mother, the voice of her father, the [crooked] legs of the students, the [beaten] eyes of the female students, the eyes of Dr ḤElwī [a lecturer] and the fingers of the bridegroom (ka dhīrāxī ummihā: 26, wa [ka] Sawti abīhā: 27, wa [ka] sīqān al-Ṭalaba al-muwajjah: 30, wa [ka] ṣuyūn al-Ṭālibat al-munkasira: 31, wa [ka] ṣaynai Dr ḤElwī: 32, wa aSaḥīb al-ṣarīs: 40). All,
except the last, are like the barrier which oppresses her and stands between her and real
life. The last coils around her fingers like fate's do.

Instruments include the iron gate of the college, the dissecting room, the police car,
the feminine ending and the arms of the street (wa [ka] bāb al-kulliyah al-Ḥadīdī: 28, wa
[ka] al-mushrāHa: 29, al-ṭā' al-murūTa: 2, wa sayyārāt al-būlīs: 42). All these agents
are oppressive.

Meanwhile the judgement on woman is different. She is described as like a "lifer"
who is driven [to prison] by a force like steel, she is like someone "submissive" and like
someone who finds ecstasy in self-destruction (ka sajin mu'abbad: 16, ka al-
mustaslimah 20, ka al-mustamtiḥah: 21).

Woman is also referred to through organs: her smouldering breath is like a germ
which rips through the body, her laughter is like unquenchable breaths (anfās... ka
al-jurthūma alladhi: 3, DuHka...ka-anfās: 13). In addition to these similes, there is an
instance where woman's movements are characterized as identical to those of worms
(hiya Ḥaraka ḏūdiyya: 1)

The third category on which relationals pass judgement relates the world of man to
that of woman. It is the making of man, but which woman nevertheless is forced to
experience. Because of man's oppression, the house, in which she was to live, became like a prison (...al-bait...ka al-sijn: 17). The police car to which she was
driven looked like a box, like a mobile cell (jaraba ka al-Sundūk, ka al-zinzāna al-
mutaḤarrika: 23); the window of the police car in which she was sat oppressingly
looked like a key-hole (ka shiq al-miftāḥ: 24). Even the wedding chair to which she
was marching on her wedding day seemed like the tomb of the unknown soldier, the
drum beatings like the beatings of a funeral tune (...ka qabr al-jundiy al-majhūl: 38, ka
daqqāt al-lāHn al-janā'zī: 39).
Thus it can be concluded that the ES imparts two discoursally distinct feelings: a favourable one towards woman and one which is unfavourable towards man. This has been done covertly and overtly. Covertly by syntax which puts into relief the second layer of symbolization where woman is depicted doubly as oppressed and inactive: when woman acts, she does not act on something external to herself (contrary to man); instead, she is patient to her actions. Overtly, this is done primarily through relationals where the ES’s judgement is explicitly expressed.

Transformations. In addition to transactive processes there is a considerable number of transformations. These consist of nominalizations and passivizations functioning as vehicles or particularizations of vehicles (e.g. “life-imprisoned” in “Life-imprisoned prisoner” (sajin mu’abbad, lit.) and which have actional processes underlying them. As is the case with transactive processes, transformations also fulfil surreptitious ideological purposes. They make things seem less complicated: the less you see, the less you think. The following is a list of them, all relevant items are underlined.

2- the feminine ending attached= x attaches y with the intent to oppress (or restrain) z

لكن رغبتها الخفية بدت في...

المزينة كرغبة محرمة

محكة أُنتوية مكتومة ومتقطعة

3- like a tabooed desire= x made y taboo with the intent to restrain z

كمسين مؤيد مساق إلى السجن

6-

life-imprisoned prisoner= x imprisoned z driven by a force= x drives z by force

where x= agent, z= patient, y= an intermediary patient, *= ungrammatical

All these transformations have actional processes with two participants (i.e. agent, patient) underlying them and all have the female (or something related to her) as their
patient. The agent, which is recoverable, though with differing degrees of difficulty, is invariably an institutionally empowered one which belongs, in one way or another, to the world of man. This agent is respectively: social conventions (2, 3), a combination of social and religious conventions (8) and the police institutions (16, 17).

This idea of woman being oppressed and restrained by socially man-dominated institutions is further enhanced by a number of nominalizations. These not only depict man acting on woman, but also condemn him as evil and aggressive by nature. These nominalizations also have transactive processes underlying them, but which are more difficult to detect. A list of them is given as follows:

\[
\text{منفرجتان} \quad \text{ناماها} \quad \text{كفكي} \quad \text{القدر} \quad 7
\]
\[
\text{لله} \quad \text{وجهين} \quad \text{كفكي} \quad \text{القدر} \quad 32
\]

where \( x = \text{agent}, \ y = \text{a property of} \ x, \ z = \text{patient}, \ * = \text{ungrammatical} \)

There are also two other nominalizations which contain fossilized actions such as (\( \text{rabid}: \ 6, \ \text{qabiaatain}: \ 18 \)) "lying in wait" and "crouching in wait" which describe aggressive intentions of man. This is put into relief especially when juxtaposed with a fossilized but self-inflicted action by the girls. Such is the case with (\( \text{raghba madfuna}: \ 13 \)) "buried desire" where a "smouldering buried desire" in girls wants to tear at and rip through the girls' own bodies.
There are another four instances which present us with a cue as to the present status quo of both woman and man. Three of them describe woman as inflicting harm on herself probably because of the persistent oppression she has been subjected to:

31. \text{female students' beaten eyes} = x \text{beat } x's \text{ eyes}

20. \text{self-submitting for the unknown} = x \text{ wilfully submits to the unknown}

21. \text{self-enjoying destruction} = x \text{ enjoys } x's \text{ own destruction}

The fourth transformation describes man as victim to his own values (i.e. probably because he has so blindly succumbed to rotten social values, he has developed crooked legs):

30. \text{male students' crooked legs} = x \text{ crooked } z

where \( x = \text{agent} \), \( z = \text{patient} \)

Through the motivated and systematic use of syntax, all the above processes foreground the discoursal theme of oppression on the one hand, and demonstrate that subject matter (i.e. oppression as action) is inextricable from the abstract aspect of discourse (i.e. point of view) on the other; the second enhances and gives substance to the first.

Having examined the syntax of the (figurative) statements involved, I shall proceed to examine their formal characteristics in terms of vocabulary and grammar so as to further assess the ES's discoursal claims. After that, I shall turn to analyse the link between syntax and the social factor through the three parameters suggested above: social action, social institution and social structure.
6.1.1.2 Stage Two.
The Interpretative: the Experiential, Relational and Expressive Values of Vocabulary and Grammar.

Vocabulary:
The Experiential Values: These are primarily experiences of imprisonment, life-endangering and confinement. The ES classifies the father's free-willed actions as oppressing, and likens him to, among other things, a prison-keeper and fate. These claims are relatively new to a Muslim Middle Eastern society, and they clash head on particularly with the prestigious socio-religious image of fathers as "guardians" and "protectors" of their children as opposed to prison-keepers. This claim can be contested on the grounds that fathers do what they do to protect their children from deviation and to enforce discipline on them for future investment.

It is interesting to note that this claim is maliciously staged against her father who is targetted by six Fs0S: [1] as an intact entity and [5] where he is dissected into organs: eyes which pull and/or follow, palm which shoves, etc. This serves to focus attention particularly on the father and demonstrates that everything about him is oppressing. Meanwhile, woman in most cases is kept intact in order to, I think, portray the whole of woman as oppressed.

The Relational Values: The above ideological claims display a high degree of hostility to the above forces in power. There is an oscillation between highly formal words such as (ghāSa, rābiD) "sank" and "crouching in wait" (the latter could have been replaced by the more informal "habaTa") and informal words such as (zințAa, shiqq al-miftāH) "cell" and "key-hole" which address a more illiterate audience. Having recourse to informal words is characteristic of casual conversations. Having recourse to highly formal words can be taken as a sign of linguistic incompetence, given that the Es in her dedication to the novel addresses wide audiences, and that there is an instance of grammatical incorrectness (i.e. N° 9).
There is also one instance of a non-euphemistic use where (fakhḍhāyī) "her thighs" is both socially and religiously uninhibited. It could be taken to mean, in terms of "politeness", that the ES is exasperated and that clarity overrides every other consideration. It is interesting to note that "politeness" as a strategy and as a social phenomenon (i.e. courtsey) diverge. As a strategy, the non-euphemistic use is effective; as a social phenomenon it is impolite, given the sex of the ES.

The Expressive Values: It is highly likely that the ES assesses the experiences vented as true and factual. The reason for this assumption is that the ES dwells on one domain of life experience, i.e. imprisonment which leads to oppression. This oppression is carried out by agents who are represented as both intact and dissected; this should emphasize their oppressing role. Woman is also portrayed as spatially and temporally oppressed. Spatially, among other things, "her home is like a prison", she is confined between "two gigantic arms", which are like "the arms of fate", and of a "mythical god". These arms are "horizontally parallel that do not meet" so that she perpetually lives in fear as she does not know when they "might clasp" (e.g. 24, 14).

Temporally, she is almost always oppressed: thirteen out of fourteen man-related transactives where man acts on woman are in the present imperfective which have no end in view (to avoid repetition only the English translation will be provided): "her father's eyes pull, follow": 9, only one process is in the past perfective: "The eyes besieged her": 12. Three of woman-related non-transactives where woman is functionally patient are in the present imperfective (i.e. present simple); four are past perfectives, two processes point to an attempted past action (e.g. "she wished to confide": 4 vs "she confided") and one process is in the negative summarizing woman's inability to act. This is enhanced by a host of nominalizations which have transactives underlying them and which do not refer to a specific here-and-now.
Furthermore, the sizeable number of transformations the bulk of which, if not all, have transactive processes underlying them do not refer to any specific time; this can be interpreted to suggest that the ES believes that woman has been, and is still, oppressed.

**Grammar:**

**The Experiential Values.** All processes used with the world of man are, apart from one, two-participant transactives. They depict man as a constrainer and woman constrained. Even the remaining non-transactive process is, functionally, transactive. The fewer woman-related processes are, with the exception of one, also two-participant transactives. Formally, they describe woman as engaged in some sort of activity. Functionally, however, they are all patientive because woman does not act on anything external to herself.

Statements are predominantly active/positive; thus the audience does not have to work out any underlying themes. There is, however, one statement in the negative which summarises woman's inability to act (i.e. No 5). There are also a considerable number of ideological transformations. These, I believe, help in the minimizing of processing effort (the less you see the less you think) 4.

A great number of statements are in effect ideological claims which are bound to arouse controversy. They look down on the religious and social values of the society and downgrade them as oppressive. The demeaning claims widen to include almost all institutions. For example, the separation between boys and girls, with a view to protecting both sexes from social evils is likened to chaining girls (boys are not mentioned); fathers are laughed at and reduced to prison-keepers, the lecturer possesses greed inherent to his eyes, and so on. Such claims which ridicule the values prized by a great number of the society are likely to meet opposition. The attack is primarily targeted at the higher social formation of the society which distinguishes one particular society from another.
The Relational Values. The predominance of two-participant processes help in making explicit the intentions of the ES in terms of who is doing what to whom: the world of man is the oppressor and oppression is the type of action carried out on woman. This can also mean that man-woman relations are traumatized, and that they, therefore, need to be mended (and if this claim is true, action should be taken to right the wrong). However, and given the great number of similes (and the few tamthils) which do not characterize man as, say, prison-keeper or fate, modality with which the ES expresses his point of view is not absolute: claims are toned down. It remains the case, however, that the invitation by the ES to his audience to see what he sees is made in the most explicit possible manner and is made to a large audience. Metaphors and kināyas (which characterize tenors as vehicles), on the other hand, help in the strengthening of the ES's stance.

There is also one instance where the ES uses a figurative statement non-euphemistically: "...she moved...as if she were pressing between her thighs something she feared might fall" (i.e. نَمَة ١); the use is uninhibited and sex-allusive. Furthermore, there is one instance of grammatical incorrectness (where نائحة: ٩ "her eyes" should be in the nominative as opposed to accusative). This can be taken to mean that the relationship between the ES and his audience is very informal. But given the high prestige of sticking to the rules of grammar in Arabic, this can very well be taken to point to linguistic incompetence by the ES. However, any interpretation is equally valid.

The Expressive Values. Given the above analysis, and in view of the fact that the oppressor is multi-dimensional (as many entities join forces to "oppress" woman) while the oppressed is unidimensional, it can be taken that the ES assesses the situation as grave and serious. Thus the whole network of relations between man and woman should be re-worked.
6.1.1.3 Stage Three.
The Explanatory: Social Action, Social Institution and Higher Social Formation

I shall now examine the language as a social phenomenon and attempt to arrive at a social explanation as to why things happen the way they do and the motive for their doing. This will be carried out through three social levels: social action, social institution and social structure. These are presented in a descending order of abstraction.

Social Action. This is the most concrete of all three parameters. The type of actions carried out by the world of man is that characteristic of men of violence, those of woman are free from harm except to the self. Man, to be brief, besieges, shove and, to say the least, follows woman with the intent of constraining her freedom. Woman, on the contrary, is not capable of doing any harm to anybody except herself. This could prompt us to label man's activity as "action", and that of woman as mere "event". Moreover, it could very well be argued that these "events" are the consequence of man's persistent oppression.

Violence and the contravention of the freedom of others are universally condemned; inflicting harm on the self is not as serious, especially if the cause is beyond control. This is bound to draw condemnation to man, and sympathy to woman.

Social Institution. This gives power and authority to social agents in order to impose the institution's policy with the intent to constrain and control. The agents involved in "oppression" are subject to the following institutions which are presented in descending order of importance. The presentation is based on the number of figurative occurrences allocated to each institution; the allocation is intended to provide a rule of thumb as to the attitude of the ES towards the institutions "indicted": the social institution [12]; the family institution [10] where father receives (6), house (2),
naturalized mother (1) and brothers (1); socio-religious institution [7] 6; police institution [6] college institution [5]; marriage institution [5] and the religious institution [1].

The figures are self-explanatory; though two points need to be fleshed out: first, it is almost impossible to untangle the relationship especially, between the social, religious, family and wedding institutions: any collision with one of them necessarily entails a collision with the others; second, the fact that the religious institution, for example, has received only one "condemnation" does not mean that it is the least affected, for one of the most condemnable acts in a Muslim society is for one to set himself on a collision course with religion.

**Higher Social Formation (or Structure).** This factor regulates and guides the functioning of the other two levels from afar. It also accounts for the persistence of institutionally authorized actions and for distinguishing between one society and another: capitalist vs communist, secular vs religious, Christian vs Muslim, and so forth.

Ideally, a Muslim society should first and foremost have its life comprehensively regulated by Islam. Islam protectively organizes and determines the relation between the pairs parent/child, husband/wife, and male/female. There are other forces which help in shaping these relations such as the social and moral institutions which prescribe what is and what is not taboo, but these are usually subservient to religion. It is, therefore, almost impossible to untangle the relationship between these "forces". Any rejection of one of them should be, ideally, a rejection of the others. Police, economic and academic institutions are also given structure by religious and social institutions, and they define the man-woman relationship as well.

In the West, the man-woman relationship is differently defined: religion is not as comprehensively organizing a force as Islam on the one hand, and on the other, the role Christianity plays in the life of people is not as vigorous. Social as well as moral
APPENDIX : B  STRENGTH

1. فتحته وكانت تسقط لولا قدرة ساقها الطويلتين ... تشفعان
جسدها منصبة إلى فوق تلك السيطرة المحبة على الوان
والسر فور الأرض باتك الخطوط القوية ثابتة تسق الكون
كربان ماهر يمسك بدفة سفيئة مضيئة ....
3. وتدخو بحسين خبي لكنه يغنيي أن أما تدخعها ، وان شهبا
للانكس ..
4. لفته في مذينة الصغير وبخطواتها الواسعة السريعة كوكبات
الفهد اجتاذت الفناء المزدحم
5. كلاحلان الجامع وجدت نفسها واقفة بجسدها الطويل التحييل ...

6. وعينها السودتان مرفعتان إلى أعلى
7. وجأاه الاهتز الزناد عنيفة كحمات زنال ارتجت له ...
8. كملاين المراعات التي تتبع صوتا واحدا
9. لأول مرة ... تسع ظهافا ... بطول السماء وعرضها قوفي

10. كربيع المائية
11. فالمزمن أصبت ببرة حادة كالسيف
12. والعين مرفعها إلى أعلى
13. والظهور ممتعة بغير انحناء
14. من بنظر الي وجه هي في تلك اللحظة هي شديد سواد عينيها
15. القرآن الرحيم أن لا عودة إلى الخلف
16. وفعت جامدة كالتمثال
17. وعينها مرفعتان إلى أعلى
18. ظلت واقفة كالتمثال في مكانها شامحة بقامتها الطويلة
19. وعينها السودتان المرفعتان إلى أعلى
20. في السجن) ... وهي تشبع بقوة خارقة ... تحصها بصاحبها
21. الصنينة مرنة كالمطاط
ويصبح لأشياء الوان داهية والبقع الحمراء فوق الأرض تصبح
 incontrovertible, and the moon casts its shadow...

٣٢ وأن يكون السماء لامعة، والجبال ملونة بالشمس،
 و كل ورقة لها لبوع وتصبح بارك كالناس المتشرة...

٣٣ لو اكتسبت موضعها فسهمها، لكن عنيها السواداوين
 ظلتا مرئيتين إلى أعلى...

٣٤ قدم الأحذى كما عدها قدم صغيرة لينة، أما هذه القدم (قدم)
 بهية فتقلب قويا كأقدام...

٣٥ وتحط أصابعها حول الفشاعة، عضلات جسدها مشدودة

٣٦ ... وساقها وقدماها ثابتة كتمثال من الفضائيت

٣٧ عن بُعد كانت تُعرف أن نحن نسقط في القاع ،...

٣٨ لا تكون جبهة شاهين،

٣٩ لا يكون إلى الوجه العادي،

٤٠ ونُفخ في صدر الأجسام المشابهة،...

٤١ أو نسج في قبر الأيام العادية

٤٢ رفعت عينيها السواداوين إلى أعلى،

٤٣ وضع عضلات ظهرها وساقها وتقدمت نحوهم بخطواتها الواسعة

CODE:

S = simile
K = kinaya
Lc = local chain

Underlining locates or signals figure of speech
institutions provide for the non-differentiation between man and woman. So do all other institutions: academic, police, or economic. Given this, a call in a Middle Eastern Muslim society for "equality" would be tantamount to destabilizing its beliefs, whereas such calls would fall on heedful ears and are welcome in the West.

6.1.2 Strength

From the analysis of this discoursal theme I intend to bring primarily into relief whether or not there is a shift in the discoursal attitude by the ES towards both man and woman and, if there is any, how it is realised. I shall, therefore, be selective in my analysis to avoid prolixity (for "Strength" see appendix B).

6.1.2.1 Stage One:
The Descriptive (Syntax): Actionals, Relationals and Transformations:

"Strength" is made up of thirty three statements which comprise eighteen similes and fifteen kiññayas. Noticeably, there are no instances of metaphors, metonymies, or tamthils. There are five two-participant physical transactives, only one one-participant physical transactive and seven mental two-participant transactives.

It is interesting to point out that none of the patients of these processes is man. Patients of physical transactives are either natural entities (patients are underlined): "the universe" in "she ploughs through the universe... like a skilled sea-captain" (tashuqqu al-kawn... ka rubbān[in] māhir: 1), or an entity belonging to the agent himself such as "her eyes" in "she raised her eyes" (rafwat ʔaynayha: 32).

Meanwhile, mental processes in "strength" are confined to processes of strong cognition (processes are underlined): "she realises", "she feels", and "she knows for sure"; (tudriku: 2, tashur: 18, ṣan yāqīn: 27); patients of these processes are not even
animate entities but relative clauses which stand for a new state of cognition such as "She realizes... that nothing in her is breakable." (anna shai'an la yankasir: 2). The processes do not, therefore, show any signs of aggression.

Relationals, more than half of which are similes, have their vehicles coming from strong natural phenomena and entities which are associated with strength: "her long strides are like those of a panther's" (ka KhuTuwāt al-Fahd: 3), "her pace is as firm as that of skilled sea captain" (ka QupTan?[in] māhir: 1) and "her legs and feet are firm like a statue" (ka al-timthāl: 16). Some of them are human artifacts renowned for their fatal consequences: "her feet [Bahiah, the bride] is like a rocket" (ka al-qadhīfa: 24). All kīnāya instances are near kīnāyas: "she knew for sure that she would not fall into the bottom" [of the abyss] and that "she would not sink in the sea of identical bodies" (...Ian tasquTa fī al-qār ...: 27-30). Thus while syntax displays a favourable attitude towards woman by implicitly describing her as non-aggressive, relationals, on the other hand, ascribe to her epithets of strength and determination.

This notion of woman as non-aggressive is further enhanced by a host of nominalizations which have physical transactives underlying them. Some of these processes are one-participant process such as "strides" in "she crossed over with the strides of a panther" which has the underlying structure "she A strodePr with long strides like those of panther" (wa bikhuTuwātāl-wāsiba...ka wathabāt al-fahd: 3), or two-participant transactives such as "the raised eyes" (al-uyun marfuwa: 11) which has the underlying structure "sheA raisedPr her eyesP", none of the agents of these processes act on a patient external to themselves. Thus these nominalizations serve to underline the non-aggressive nature of the strength of woman, and to show that "strength" is more of a "scene" than an "act", in symbolic terms.

But there is more than this in "strength": we can detect a shift of attitude by the ES towards the world of man. Indeed, there is a dim but traceable thread that leads us to this conclusion. When man (accused of malfunction in another discoursal theme)
starts to rise up against the status quo, the ES starts to show signs of appeasement: "their voice rocked the universe, like the sound of an earthquake, like the roar of thunder, and like millions of voices melting into one enormous voice". (ihzaz al-ka\wnu... ka Sawt Zi'l\al,...ka Sawti al-sam\'a H\'\'\'na turced,...wa ka Sawt al-mal\'ayeen: 6-8). Furthermore, the ES describes the features of people chanting as sharp as a sword, "their eyes raised in dignity" and "their backs straight and unbending" (al-mal\"\miHu...b\'azat\tan\ ka H\'addi al-saif, wa al-\'uy\u011fu marf\u011fu, wa al-zuh\u011furu mashd\u011du\tan\ bighair[i] inHin\': 9-12).

All these figures express strength and, at the same time, signal an important shift in the attitude of the ES towards the world of man. However, this approval by the ES is not without reservations. For apart from the last two kin\'aya instances where tenors are characterized as vehicles (i.e. "raised eyes" as "dignity") and which show a strong approval of what is going on, there are (three) similes which help play down this strong attitude as they do not characterize tenor as vehicle.

Combined with this, there is also the fact that the vehicles of the first two similes are not respectively "earthquake" and "thunder"; rather they are just "the sound" of "earthquake" and "the roar of thunder" (consider if the similes were "their voices were like an earthquake...like thunder"). The third example is even clearer: the vehicle is "millions of voices which melted into one voice", and not "millions of people whose voices melted into one voice". This can be interpreted as a sign that the ES is not strong in his approval of the world of man.

Having made a brief analysis of the syntax of "strength", I shall now proceed to further examine the formal features of the statement and then work out the link between syntax and the social factor through the three levels of abstraction mentioned above: action, institution and social structure.
6.1.2.2 Stage Two.
The Interpretative: the Experiential, Relational and Expressive Values of Vocabulary and Grammar.

Vocabulary:

The Experiential Values. These are experiences of displays of strength and of shows of sabre-rattling which are the outcome of woman's self-confidence and which are aimed at triggering tremors of fear in the heart of the adversary. For example, woman ploughs through the universe, her strides are like those of a panther's, and she is like a wild pony (tashuqqu al-kawna: 1,...Khuwuwtah...ka khtuwati al-fahd: 3,...ka al-HiSani al-jamiH: 4). The connotations of these are clear.

These are relatively new ideological claims reflecting the aspirations of a maverick woman; the naturalized social and religious teachings prescribe that woman should walk in a manner that is compatible with her soft, delicate nature. She' (as well as man) is recommended to lower her gaze- for decency-related reasons (a statement present in absentia). This clashes with the call for woman by the ES to walk "with her eyes raised", a call which might not be equated with dignity, but rather with a call for insolence.

It is interesting to note that the ES, in order to confirm the strength of the female, has gone for male animals which are renowned for their strength (e.g. [male] panther and [male] pony). This is a sign of weakness. The ES, a female, could have selected strong females for her vehicles. This shows how deep woman is steeped in the dominant culture of the male.

The Relational values. The above ideological claims reflect an undercurrent conflict (with man) which primarily involves the social institution, with the religious institution quite visible. However, man is indeed applauded, though not in his individual capacity. Instead, he is recommended, albeit vaguely, as an indivisible part of a collective which has a voice like, among other things, that of thunder.
The Expressive Values. The dwelling by the ES on one type of experience is a
censorial principle which should eclipse all other experiences, and therefore, highlight
woman's claims.

Grammar:
The Experiential Values. Unlike "oppression", the discoursal thread
"strength" abounds with the negative [7], for example, "she realises that...nothing in
her is breakable". This experience which is yet to be tasted is new to woman. Other
examples of negative present interesting nuances: "one who looks into her face can see
in the blackness of her eyes that there is no coming back, Bahiah Shaheen will not fall in
the abyss,...she will not sink in the sea of similar bodies,..." Such determined
experiences reveal a current and bitter de facto situation which will cease to be.

There are also a number of affirmative statements which reveal that woman has already
exercised "strength": "He [a policeman] slapped her face. But her eyes remained
raised high" which means that they had been already raised high well before she was
slapped. There is also a considerable number of kināyas [17] which are, though
near kināyas, culturally deep-rooted. Their abundance can be taken to mean that the ES
is "digging in" for protection, i.e. she is invoking the voice of the collective society
which bore these Fs0S.

The Relational Values. The above negative statements suggest that fierce
clashes are looming between woman and other rival institutions. Affirmative statements,
on the other hand, suggest that clashes have already started and that woman has
achieved some results in her favour. The abundance of the cultural kināyas can be
interpreted to indicate that the ES does not feel quite safe and that he, therefore, invokes
the collective culture for protection.
There are three instances of grammatical incorrectness (i.e. 15, 17, 22). These can be taken to signal one of two things: either the relationship between the ES and the audience is highly informal, or that they are sign of the ES's linguistic incompetence, given the high prestige of sticking to correct Arabic.

**The Expressive Values.** The ES has recourse to strong mental cognition processes which reveal a strong commitment to his claims: "she realises (tudriku), she believed for sure (an yaqīn)" 7, she believed that she would not fall...". Besides, there are also a number of fossilized actions the function of which is to suggest that they have become an integral part of woman's experiences: "she stood with her eyes raised" which shows "raised" as a state of conditions rather than a process (consider, for example, an alternative such as "she stood and raised her eyes"). These examples demonstrate that the ES presents and accepts such claims as true.

6.1.2.3 Stage Three. 
The Explanatory: Social Action, Social Institution and Higher Social Formation

**Action.** When compared with "oppression", the action carried out by woman is very limited: she is involved in a display of strength which only demonstrates her aptitude. Moreover, there is not a single incident where she infringes on the territory of any animate entity except herself. Her actions are, therefore, not aggressive and do not draw condemnation.

**Social Institution.** The institutional matrix is very thin but associated with power; it almost solely involves the institutions of the environment, tourism and weather (there is ample reference to, among others, entities such as "wild pony", earthquake and thunder). These are forces which are peaceful but potentially destructive.
Higher Social Formation (or Structure). The above institutional values are held with reverence, at least as far as Arabic and English are concerned.

6.2 The Old Man and the Sea: an Overview of the Discoursal Themes

FsOS in "The Old Man and the Sea" have been grouped under eleven discoursal themes. As is the case with "Two Women in One", these fall into two inextricably intertwined main sets: man-related discoursal themes and sea-related discoursal themes (themes will be in square brackets).

The old man expresses contradictory themes of satisfaction [relief] at, and worries [apprehension] about his fishing capabilities and circumstances. The following are two examples, one from each discoursal thread.

In "relief", the ES imparts a feeling of comfort that his damaged skiff was still functioning and which he personifies: "She's [the skiff] good, he thought, she is sound and not harmed in any way except for the tillers". In "apprehension", he is worried by, among other things, the clouds which rose like mountains, by the sharks' jaws which were like claws and razor-sharp, and even by the possibility of his powers failing him in time of hardship: "You must keep your head clear. Keep your head clear and know how to suffer like a man". He is also apprehensive of some lower sea creatures and of sea predators. Nevertheless he pours scorn [contempt] on them: addressing an inferior sea creature, the agua mala, he calls her whore, the predatory shark: like a pig.

On the contrary, the magnificent, powerful sea and sea creatures are held with respect [admiration], probably to accord himself and his effort with power and nobility, on the one hand, and to encourage others to face a strong adversary, on the other hand. Addressing the big fish he says: "Never have I seen a greater, or more beautiful, or a
calmer, or more noble thing than you my brother". Or when he addresses the sea which he personifies as a lover: "He always thought of the sea as la mar which is what people call her in Spanish when they love her". So strongly does he feel about them that he imparts a strong feeling of sympathy towards them [sympathy]: "God help him [the big fish] to take it [the bait]". Indeed, so strong is his sympathy towards them that he calls them his friends and he animates the sea, the fish, the stars and the wind calling each of these things a friend [companionship].

At the same time he expresses, though quite thinly, a feeling of loneliness [solitude] and [boredom]. "Boredom" may be demonstrated by the sole example: "He could not see the green of the shore now but only the tops of the blue hills that showed white as though they were snow-capped and the clouds that looked like high snow mountains above them"; "solitude" by "He commenced to say his prayers mechanically".

He is also torn by two conflicting feelings: one which holds him back from going it alone [resignation] and one which urges him on [hope]. The first theme can be demonstrated by the following example: "The sail was patched...like the flag of permanent defeat", the second by "His hope and confidence had never gone. But now they were freshening as when the breeze rises". There is also a theme which expresses joy at some of the acts of fun which were going on [pleasure]: "They [lions which he day-dreamt of] played like young cats" (for the discoursal themes see figure v).

From the number of the occurrences of Fs0S, it can be concluded that "apprehension" gains prominence among all other discoursal themes. This is probably for the ES to provide his audience with "manly" challenge. Next comes "admiration"; a theme in my opinion necessary to glorify the adversary, and hence the challenger himself.

Having provided an overview of the discoursal themes in "The Old Man and the Sea", I shall now proceed to specifically examine "admiration" (see appendix C).
Figure (v) showing the condensity and distribution of both FsOS and discoursal themes in "The Old Man and the Sea"

Code: figures refer to page number
* refers to end of novel
Appendix C: Admiration

1- His sword was as long as a baseball bat and tapered like a rapier.

2- And he rose his full length from the water and re-entered it, smoothly like a diver.

3- And the old man saw the scythe-blade of his tail go under the line commenced to race out.

4- Never have I seen a greater, or more beautiful or a calmer, or more noble thing than you, my brother.

5-...and the fish's eye looked as detached as the mirrors in a periscope or as a saint in a procession.

6- He was so big it was like lashing a much bigger skiff alongside.

7- He [the old man] always thought of the sea as la mar which is what people call her when they love her.

8- He [the big fish] took the bait like a mail and he pulls like a mail.

9- The dolphins were cutting through the water below the flight of the fish.

CODE

S = simile
Ma = metaphor
P = personification (i.e. a type of metaphor)

Underlining locates or signals figure of speech
6.2.1 Admiration.

This discoursal theme is one of the longest themes. It starts in the first quarter of the novel (i.e. p. 23) and continues up almost to the end of the third quarter. I have selected "admiration" for analysis because it reveals an attitude of nobility on the part of the old man (i.e. challenger) that his opponent is not less courageous, and therefore, that he is worthy of the adventure. This theme intrigues all who seek highly prized adventures.

In this discoursal thread the ES expresses his admiration of his rival the big fish and their habitat, the sea. The thread consists of [11] statements which are made up of [12] FsOS, [8] of which are similes and [4] are metaphors. All metaphors are established metaphors which pose no difficulty for their interpretation, a fact signalling an already established relationship between the ES and the audience: "The dolphins were cutting through the water". "Admiration" overlaps heavily with "companionship" as there are [5] instances of personification where both the (big) fish and the sea are characterized respectively as "he" and "she" out of a sense of affection and lack of human company.

6.2.1.1 Stage One:
The Descriptive (Syntax): Actionals, Relationals and Transformations:

Actionals. There are only [5] actionals in "admiration", [2] of which portray the noble nature of the rival, the fish, and help demonstrate that there is no aggression from him: "He rose Pr his full length Pr and re-entered it [water]" and "The dolphins A were cutting through Pr the water F", where the personified agent "he" acts on himself: "his full length", and "the dolphins" act on an inanimate, "the water", with the preposition "through" mitigating the effect of the transactive actional. There are two other
actionals which are, functionally, patientive: "He $A$ [the fish] took $Pr$ the bait $P$ like a male, and he pulls like a male" where the agent brings harm rather than benefit to himself.

While demonstrating the peaceful nature of the fish, these four instances show but little trace of man's "sport" activity, for it is he who has laid the bait for the fish (but this can only be arrived at by careful examination). However, there is only one explicit reference to this type of activity: "People $A$ call $Pr$ her [the sea] la mar when they love her", though "call" rates very low on the scale of actionals as it involves very little, if any, physical action.

**Relational**s. These promptly hammer out the attitude of the ES that the big fish and the sea are worthy of admiration and respect because they are powerful but peaceful: "His sword [the big fish's] was...tapered like a rapier", "He rose...smoothly like a diver", "The fish's eye looked...as a saint in a procession, and, "He took the bait like a male". This is a clear invitation for the audience to go for the challenge the Es is providing for him. On the other hand, the sea, the fish's habitat, is viewed as a female that is worthy of love: "He [the old man] always thought of the sea as la mar which is what people call her in Spanish when they love her".

**Transformations.** Only [1] instance of passivization can be located: "His sword [the fish's] was tapered like a rapier"; the agent of "tapered" must refer to the fish's creator. The recovery of the agent shows that there has been some certain design behind endowing such magnificent power on the fish. There is also one instance of compounding: "The old man saw the scythe-blade of his tail" which also gives the impression that the fish is admirably equipped with lethal armour.
6.2.2.2 Stage Two.
The Interpretative: the Experiential, Relational and Expressive Values of Vocabulary and Grammar.

Vocabulary:

The Experiential Values. There is ample reference to kinds of sport that are practised, enjoyed and/or watched, all of which involve power and peace. One kind is a parade carried out by the big fish: "The big fish rose his full length and re-entered smoothly like...", "...his eye is like a saint in a procession", "The dolphins were cutting through the water"; another kind is fishing: "He took the bait". There is also mention of sports experiences which require power, challenge and skill but which are nevertheless free from violence as they are not actionals but rather relationals: "His sword was like a rapier", "The old man saw the scythe-blade of his tail", "He rose...and re-entered...smoothly like a diver" (where the adverb smoothly qualifies the fish's activity). Furthermore, there is the experience of occasional love (where sea is merited for being worthy of love: "They call her la mar which is what people call her when they love her".

The Relational Values. Relations between the old man and his rivals, the fish and the sea, are generally speaking sound and intact: there are five personifications of the fish and the sea. The fish is compared to a "male" in admiration, and the sea is equated with a female. The lack of explicit rivalry is probably due to the fact that the reigns of power are almost totally in the hands of the old man, and therefore, he finds no motive to bear any grudge against the fish. On the contrary, there is every reason for him to pay compliments to his rival on "whose" very well-being his own almost wholly hinges; and this is, if not for the sake of the fish, for the sake of crediting his efforts with resilience.

I would like to point out, however, that the old man does not show complete solidarity with his rival. After all, the big fish is described as a thing vs a creature: "Never have
I seen a greater...thing than you my brother". This shows that there are signs of rivalry between both parties. But it is an honourable type which is free from unnecessary treachery (after all, it was the old man who hooked the big fish).

**The Expressive Values.** The characterization of the fish's tail as a "scythe" in "the old man saw the scythe-blade of his tail", plus the personifications of the fish and the sea indicate that the old man is sincere in his attitude towards both. However, sincerity is not absolute. After all, the fish is distanced when called a "thing", and the sea is made patient through an actional and people are portrayed as acting on her; thus both the fish and the sea are made inferior.

**Grammar:**

**The Experiential Values.** As we have seen, only a small number of processes are two-participant transactives. These involve little and peaceful action, e.g. "He rose his full length". There are only two parties that are mentioned throughout the whole discoursal thread: the old man (and his skiff) on one side, and the fish (and the sea) on the other. For this reason, the range of experiences given is very limited but impressive.

All statements are, with the exception of one, in the positive; they, therefore, involve no recovery of any underlying structure. The only negative statement there is embodies a summary of the whole theme of admiration, i.e. "Never have I seen a greater, or more beautiful, or...more noble thing than you". Transformations are kept to a minimum. This is because in such a literary discourse type, ideas (as encoded in transformations) should not be abundant or put in a straightforward manner; rather, they should be presented in such a way that suits those who have time to reflect on them.

There is one ideological claim that is worth mentioning; this has to do with a universal belief on the durability of the male (and the fragility of the female): "He took the bait
like a male". Other claims about the power or size of the fish are yet to be practically proved.

The Relational Values. The fact that there are but few two-participant processes can be taken to signal that the degree of constraint by one of the two parties on the other is limited. Compounded with this is the fact that in the processes involved, the agent either acts on and makes of himself a patient (patients are underlined): "He rose his full length" or he acts on a patient which is inanimate: "The dolphins were cutting through the water", or because the actional process involved rates very low on the scale of actionality: "...Which is what people call her"; thus aggression is kept to a minimum. There is even one mention of a "love" process which should eliminate much of the rivalry between the "forces" involved, i.e. "...when they love her". However, this affection is muted by the temporal clause "when..." which signals that people do not always love her [the sea].

The Expressive Values. The limited range of experience acts as a censorial principle which both excludes other experiences from coming in and hammers home the idea that the ES is truthful in what he says. The fact that all processes, except one, are in the past hammers home the message that the ES is reminiscing and that he, therefore, is honest in what he claims to have happened.

6.2.2.3 Stage Three.

The Explanatory: Social Action, Social Institution and Higher Social Formation

Social Action. The type of actions carried out in "admiration" are enchanting and violence-free. They are typical of parades of strength, sports and tourism where beautiful and calm sceneries are most enjoyed. The sea and its inhabitants are picturesque and provide challenge.
Social Institutions. The institutional matrix is thin involving primarily sports, particularly tournaments whether worldly or sacred (e.g. "He rose...and re-entered... smoothly...like a diver" vs "the fish's eye looked...as a saint in a procession", travel, fisheries, and economics. All such institutions involve mental challenge and provide enjoyment.

Social Structure. The social structure involved is revealing of a society with a picturesque, natural habitat where (masculine) people can enjoy themselves. It can be argued that the society is a sociable one where everyone, even rivals, are each given their due rights.

6.3 Conclusion.

It can be concluded that the FsOS in "Two Women in One" are amply diversified and of great density: they include all types of figurative language and these occur in great numbers. In "The Old man and the Sea" they are relatively sparse in terms of quality (i.e. types) and quantity.

The implication of this divergence in terms of "intimacy" and of "politeness" can be worked out as follows. "Intimacy" is, as has been illustrated in Chapter Three, an invitation by the ES to his audience to see and experience what he himself has seen and experienced, i.e. to create with them, out of interest and affection, a bond of insight and new discovery. This discovery is not a new fact, rather, a new relationship between, say, "fathers" and "the jaws of fate" as opposed to "fathers" and "guardians". This invitation involves some sort of effort (i.e. "face") by both parties, with the first wishing to preserve his face and his invitation to be accepted, and the audience wishing to oblige and preserve their faces. It is primarily, therefore, the ES's job to use the most adequate "politeness" strategy to exact his request.
The seriousness of the FTA is determined, as we have seen, by sociological variables. The most important of which are: the social distance between the ES and the audience, the relative power of the ES and the absolute ranking of the imposition (FTA). The first two variables in respect to both novels are, more or less, the same. The third variable is not. In "Two Women in One" the FTAs are intensively and extensively wide-ranging. Undaunted, the ES asks his audience to see what he sees with regard to a plethora of institutionally empowered subjects as well as authorized actions, and this requires him to use a wide diversity of FsOS in recognition that each one fulfils a different function. This hopefully accounts for the diversity of FsOS.

But, as if to guard against the audience losing sight of his request, especially that FsOS are all off-record, though with differing degrees of off-recordedness, the ES incessantly gives them hint after hint as to his intentions. This hopefully accounts for the density of FsOS. This means that in the feminist novel the ES applies more power over his audience than in the other novel to ensure that his request will not go unnoticed. This is due to the nature of the FTA.

In "The Old Man and the Sea", on the other hand, the FTAs are not as heavy-handed: the ES issues an invitation for the audience simply to see what he sees on a challenging fishing trip and, among other things, to "admire" the big fish and the sea (and consequently to admire the old man's resilience). To "admire" one man is practically one FTA. It is far less serious than to hate "the world of man" and to sympathize with the "world of woman". In fact, these are two requests or symbolic actions encapsulated dialectically in one FTA.

There probably remains one issue to be accounted for: the considerably frequent recourse to simile in both novels. The reason for this is due, I believe, to its violation of (some of) the Gricean maxims at the cost of the ES and to the benefit of the hearer, the thing which makes it easier to process by the audience. This is shared by both novels. This should not of course be taken to mean that it is only the simile that predetermines
readership, other FsOS do determine readership as well; but the recourse to one particular FOS varies as "politeness" strategy varies. This is determined by real world conditions which are governed by the social variables mentioned above.

It remains the case, however, that the oscillation between various types of FsOS is intrinsically discoursal. It reflects a shift of discoursal tenor on the part of the ES towards his audience. At one moment he sees it more appropriate to go for clarity (i.e. simile), at another, he might prefer a higher degree of less polite clarity (i.e. metaphor), at a third, might go for, particularly, appeal (i.e. analogy) or evidence (i.e. kināya), and so on.

One important question remains unanswered: How do FsOS help discourse to emerge? As has been demonstrated, FsOS gave substance to discoursal themes. These make up the whole message or vision of the ES as to what is going on in each of the two novels. All FsOS create an ensemble of points of view which give rise to the whole novel: in "Two Women in One" the discoursal themes express and stand for the agonies which are of concern to women in their relationship, particularly with the world of man, a relationship which colonises almost every aspect of life.

In "The Old Man and the Sea", on the other hand, the discoursal themes express the agonies that concern particularly an old fisherman who daringly goes on a trip alone. They also spell out an attitude towards these experiences. This attitude is one which aims at enhancing the masculinity of man. The issues at hand nevertheless do not have the urgency of those of "Two Women in One". This might account for the abundance of figurative expressions in one novel and their scarcity in another, though it certainly does not account for their excessive over-use.

So far I have accounted for, among other things, the following: (i) the anatomy of FsOS [Chapter Two], (ii) the ultimate goal of the ES as well as mechanism adopted, i.e. intimacy and politeness [Chapter Three], (iii) the technical and specialised use of
"discourse" as referring to attitude or point of view [Chapter Four], (iv) the general linguistic underpinnings underlying this dissertation [Chapter Five], and (vi) the new, emerging and substantiated fact that FsOS are not ornamental. Rather, they are functional in the sense that they give rise to discourse [Chapter Six]. I shall now devote Chapter Seven to a translation assessment from a discourse point of view based on an empirical approach.
Notes to Chapter Six

1- This also can make a motive for woman to refuse and rebel against man's oppressing actions.

2- Only one of these similes is (tashbih baligh) "expressive simile": (Al-qadar huwa abūhā) "Fate is her father".

3- Reversed expressive simile is a type of simile which has no explicit particle, and the tenor and vehicle of which are reversed. For example, instead of saying "Her cheeks are a red rose" one can say "The red rose is her cheeks" on the proviso that the now-tenor is much-vaunted for its traits.

4- See, for example, G. R. Kress and A. A. Trew (1978); see also Kress, G. and B. Hodge (1979).

5- This division can be carried out rather differently though with almost identical results. This is because some FsOS can be allocated simultaneously to more than one institution. For example, I have allocated "her real wish to die looked like a desire that is taboo" to the religious institution on the basis that "taboo" is a purely religious word. However, it could be argued that it has acquired social connotations, and therefore, can be allocated differently.

6- The designation is intended to point to the phenomenon that the relationship between the social and religious institutions cannot be unravelled and that the reference to one is necessarily a reference to the other in the Middle East.

7-(ṣīn yāqīn) "For sure" is formally relational; functionally, however, it is transactive the underlying syntax of which is (tūqinu) "she makes sure".
Chapter Seven

TRANSLATION ASSESSMENT

7. Introduction

This chapter assesses whether translators are discourse-conscious; and if they are, to what degree. Discourse, it has been pointed out, is a point of view expressed by the ES with respect to a particular (social) experience. This chapter, therefore, attempts to assess whether translators take into consideration the attitude of the ES towards the experience(s) he expresses. The chapter concludes with conclusions and recommendations. These will be followed with Appendix D which includes both “Oppression” and “Admiration” and combines both the official and proposed translation of the figurative expressions of these themes.

Proceeding from general to specific, I shall develop the argument along the following lines: (i) what translation is, (ii) translation debates, (iii) literature review and assessment of both theoretical discussions and empirical translations of figurative language, (iv) empirical assessment of the translation of figurative expression from a discourse point of view.

As I have been dealing with FsOS in their chains, regardless of their type, emphasis will be placed on the accumulative effect of the discoursal chain as a single unified unit which expresses one attitude by the ES towards a particular experience. This emphasis, of course, is based on attention paid by the translator to FsOS in their individual capacity.
7.1 Definition of Translation

There is some confusion over what translation involves. Catford (1965: 49), for example, defines translation as a "process of substituting a text in one language for a text in another". By "text" Catford seems to suggest "sentence". Nida (1959: 19) claims that "translating consists in producing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent to the message of the source language, first in meaning and secondly in style" (bold mine). By "natural" is meant that the equivalent text should not be foreign in form or in meaning. House (1977: 29-30) defines translation as "the replacement of a text in the source language by a semantically and pragmatically equivalent text in the target language" (bold mine).

Catford's definition takes translation as a basically linguistic exercise. This is only partly true: for in addition to the language component, translation also involves contextual factors which have a bearing on the production and reception of texts. These factors exist outside language. The definition, therefore, is inadequate and rather mechanical. Nida recognizes the impossibility of producing an identical text in the receptor language, thus the term "equivalent". He also takes note of two components: meaning (i.e. roughly what the speaker wants to communicate) and style (i.e. systematic, motivated choices of language patterns such as foregrounding). House has the added advantage of recognizing the pragmatic component (i.e. the intention of the ES) in the process of translating.

Despite the confusion over what translation is, it can be concluded that translation involves (i) a linguistic replacement of a text in one language (source text) by another text in another (target text), (ii) the creation by the translator of a target text (TT) which should be as equivalent as possible to the source text (ST), not only in terms of meaning and style, but also in terms of what the source text producer intends to say. (Equivalence means the closest approximation).
7.2 Translation Debates

Equivalence between texts in the receptor and target languages is difficult to achieve because experiences (as encoded in languages) are differently expressed and do not have the same value across languages. However, experiences tend to come closer when the two languages involved belong to the same family or if there has been sustained contact between them.

This likelihood of incongruence between languages is no longer a subject for controversy. Nida (1964: 159) confirms that no translation in the receptor language can be the exact equivalent of the model in the source language: "...there are no such things as identical equivalents". All translations, Nida (1959: 13) claims, involve one of the following:

(i) loss of information
(ii) addition of information
(iii) skewing of information

Indeed, though Arabic and English have been in contact for a relatively long period of time, translation problems are in some cases insurmountable. As Al-Najjar (1984) demonstrates, there are many aspects which defy translation. There are, among others, grammatical, lexical and gender non-correspondences. This can result in one, or more, of the above losses. This incongruence inevitably leads to "stylistic" losses. (Stylistic features, it has been demonstrated, enhance the meaning of the text).

Recognizing this, Nida (1964: 159) distinguished between two types of equivalence: "formal equivalence" and "dynamic equivalence". Formal equivalence focuses attention on the message itself in both form and content (e.g. sentence to sentence, poetry to poetry). This kind of translation is receptor-language centered. It allows the reader of the TT access to the source-language text. Dynamic equivalence aims at naturalness
of expression, and is therefore, source-language centered. It is based on the principle of equivalent effect: the manner in which receptors of the translation text respond, must be equivalent to the manner in which the receptors of the ST respond. Nida, however, does not explain how this response can be tested.

According to Nida (1964: 166-70) a natural translation involves three areas of adaptation: (i) grammar and lexicon, (ii) adaptation of the message within the context, and (iii) audience of the receptor language.

The first point calls for attention to be paid by the translator so that the lexical items and grammatical structures selected do not alienate the receptor-language reader from his language. It also calls for attention to be paid to motivated stylistic features which enhance the message. The second point calls the translator to place the new TT within a context approximate to the context of the source-language text. For example, I have demonstrated that the discoursal theme of oppression is put to the Arab reader in a very straightforward manner (via predominantly chain of similes and metaphors). This air of straightforwardness should be, as closely as possible, preserved for the English reader.

The third point calls for attention to be paid to the target-language readership. It is interesting to note that el-Sædfawi's "Two women in One" aims at effecting a change in the behaviour of man towards woman in the conservative Middle East. It is highly likely that this is not the objective of the TT. This is simply because man-woman relationships in the liberal West are different. The long-term objective, I think, is to examine the work as a social product, and consequently to enable the TT audience to gauge the social change taking place in that part of the world. This, of course, does not mean that the novel will not be read by lay people who will think through relationships between man and woman in the Middle East.
This principle also applies to Hemingway's "The Old man and the Sea" which was intended to address a leisured audience so that they can conceive for themselves the sort of hardship an old man would face while going about his daily business. To an Arab audience, this is rather irrelevant. To the Arab reader, the novel belongs to, and rates high on, the (leisure) literary discourse continuum; though he fully appreciates the seriousness of this Nobel prize-winning novel.

To produce an equivalent text, the translator must not only have good command of both languages involved, but he also has to act like a good actor, i.e. empathize with the text producer (ibid. 150-6). The procedures the translator should follow are:

(i) analysis of ST in terms of lexico-grammatical features,
(ii) discourse context: the meaning of a particular unit in relation to a wider context of the whole relevant discourse (for example, "oppression" in relation to the whole feminist discourse),
(iii) communicative context such as the background of the author, mode of discourse (oral or written), type of discourse (factual vs fictitious),
(iv) cultural context of the source language. This is because the meaning of any message is embedded in, and intelligible as a part of, a wider cultural setting. (For example, it is almost impossible to understand what el-Sa‘dawi wants to communicate without first coming to grips with social practices in the Middle East),
(v) cultural context of the receptor language. This has to do with the relevance of the ST to the receptor language.

7.3 Assessment of Translation Quality

Not only is there confusion over what translation is, there is also confusion over what a good translation is, even sometimes by the same critic. For example, Nida (1964: 164) claims that a good translation has to meet four basic requirements. These are
(slightly modified): (i) making sense, (ii) conveying the spirit and manner of the original, (iii) naturalness, and (iv) producing an equivalent response.

These requirements were later revised into three points. Nida and Taber (1969: 173), suggest three criteria for the ultimate test of translation. These are (worded slightly differently): (i) Faithfulness to the ST, (ii) readability, and (iii) the involvement of the reader of the TT in the experiences of the ST.

7.4 The Translator: Motivation, Position and Loyalties

There can be more than one incentive for the translator which tempts him to translate a particular work. These incentives can be market-driven such as when a need is felt for a particular work to be translated, or client-driven such as when a translator is paid for his work. They can also be humanitarian, such as when a book (e.g. the Quran) is addressed to humanity and is translated into other languages in order to spread its message.

The translator occupies two positions; the position of a reader and the position of a translator. In his first capacity, he decodes the ST; in his second capacity he has to ensure that he has encoded the attitude of the ES in the target language. His reading is the one which is imposed on the target-language reader.

The job of the translator is by no means easy. Nida (1964: 1-3) sums up the translator's problems in three points: (i) he is under constant pressure from the conflict between form and meaning, (ii) he is torn by the conflict between "the letter and the spirit", i.e. between what is talked about and the tone of the message, and (iii) he is torn by the conflict between translation as an art (which requires creativity on his part) and translation as a science (which can be described).
Having accounted for what translation generally involves and for the translator's concerns, I shall, in the following, narrow down the research to the translation of figurative expression. After that, I shall make an empirical translation assessment of figurative expression from a discourse point of view.

7.5 Translators and Figurative Expression

FsOS have been, for a considerably long time, the subject of detailed examination by both theorists and experimenters. Newmark (1979, 1981, 1988), Beekman (1969, 1974) and Nida (1959, 1964) are just three prominent names. Newmark theorized on the translation of FsOS. Nida and Beekman experimented with the translation of the Bible which understandably abounds with FsOS. They all have the common factor between them in that they concentrate their efforts on the translation of metaphor proper. Other FsOS cause far less acute problems for the translator. This is understandable: metaphor is an admirably very curt FOS which very often defies translation.

Beekman (1974) attributes misunderstanding of metaphors to one or more of the following: (i) experiences which differ across cultures: there is no one-to-one correspondence (for example, in Arabic the figurative expression (ṣaynāḥa ḥallat marfūṣtān) "She kept her eyes raised", i.e. she remained dignified and did not feel insulted, means in English that she was unfocused or not looking. Therefore, a natural equivalent expression would be "she kept her head high"; (ii) topic (i.e. tenor) is unknown in the receptor language (for example, "snow" does not exist in all languages); (iii) point of similarity is implicit (or indeterminate), such as where "fox" can mean either a good hunter or cunning.

Beekman insists that if the metaphor is live, it should be retained if at all possible. Otherwise there are two principal modifications of the form that are permissible to the translator: (i) the adjustment of metaphor to a simile or to a non-figurative comparison, (ii) making explicit some parts of the implicit information which is carried by the FOS.
Newmark's (1988: 114) approach to FsOS is more comprehensive. He takes figurative expression to include all types of FsOS: "By metaphor, I mean figurative expression...Metaphors may be "single"-viz. one word, or extended (a collocation, an idiom, a sentence, a proverb, an allegory, a complete imaginative text". Conceding that there is some difference with regard to what should be included in figurative expression (e.g. "idiom" is not taken as a FOS in this dissertation) the definition roughly meets the requirements of this dissertation. But this holistic approach towards figurative expression soon breaks down when we realise that Newmark's methods concern primarily the translation of metaphor (proper).

Newmark (ibid. p. 39) proposes that all translations should be based on a theory of language functions. Following Buhler (1965), he claims that there are three major such functions: expressive, informative and vocative. He designates a particular text-type after one of these functions which the text-type most predominantly fulfils. For example, (serious) literary texts, political speeches and autobiographies are expressive text-types, text-books are primarily informative, while instrumental texts (e.g. advertisements) are primarily vocative.

Newmark (ibid. pp. 104-14) proposes six methods for the translation of figurative expression. A method is selected according to (a) whether the figurative expression is part of a distinguished (literary) work (or text), (b) whether it constitutes an essential semantic part of a literary work, and (c) whether it is dead, cliché, stock, adapted, recent and original (i.e. creative) The method selected is determined by the parameters mentioned above. I will first discuss the viability of these parameters and then question the adequacy of Newmark's methods for the translating of figurative expression.

The first point calls for assessing a literary work (or text). If a metaphor is a member of a distinguished literary work, then it must be translated literally; otherwise the translator is permitted to reduce the metaphor to a simile or even
paraphrase it. The classification of literary works on the basis of prestige is rejected offhand on two grounds: it allows for subjective judgements by translators on literary works which are normally rated on a continuum.

The second point calls for determining whether or not a metaphor plays an important role in the text of which it is part. If this role is important, it should be translated literally; otherwise it should be reduced to a simile or even paraphrased. This parameter is also unjustified: what is the difference between an important metaphor and an unimportant metaphor, and who determines this importance. All metaphors are tools for giving expression to a given experience and fleshing out the attitude of their ES. Furthermore, metaphor is not, as I have demonstrated, of a higher status than simile as the term reduce suggests. It simply fulfils a different function and addresses a different type of audience.

Newmark goes to the extreme when he suggests that the translator can omit a metaphor if he deems it unimportant (ibid. p. 111). This could have the consequence of depriving the TT reader an opportunity to experience what the ST reader has experienced; equivalence could be impaired. The third point calls for determining the importance of metaphor on the basis of age. This also can differ from one individual to another.

Beekman and Newmark sensitize the reader to the importance of figurative language. Nevertheless their methodology is programmatic, biased and atomistic at one and the same time. It is programmatic because it deals with translation as if it were machine-like. In other words, and to quote Widdowson (1979), it deals with FsOS as a product (vs process). This distinction was elaborated by Bell (1987: 403): "what is proposed is...an investigation of the psycholinguistic mechanisms of decoding and encoding in the context of the bi- rather than monolingual information exchange"(bold mine). Thus Bell emphasizes the importance of negotiating the meaning of the text, of taking into consideration the linguistic choices that were available to the text-producer and why he has opted for that particular form. Similarly, the
The view that I am adopting in my empirical assessment is that translation is a process where meaning between producers and receivers of texts is negotiated. As Hatim and Mason (1990: 4) put it "the resulted translated text is to be seen as evidence of a transaction". There is little point in trying to adopt a word-for-word or even sentence-for-sentence method without first capturing the text-producer's intentions. These could be captured only after careful examination and good knowledge of the text-producer's world view. In other words, there is need to recognize that linguistic choice is motivated. This is especially so with figurative expressions which are highly attitudinal and which have the ability to give expression to human experience.

It can be concluded therefore, that the methodology of both theorists and experimenters is atomistic. It is adequate only for short texts in which FsOS are very rarely encountered. It also deals with FsOS in their individual capacity and takes no notice of their potential, accumulative effect. Finally, it is biased because of its preference for particular FsOS over others, thus ignoring the fact that each one of them addresses a particular audience.

Having accounted for contributions on the translation of figurative language, I shall now embark on a translation assessment of figurative expression from a discourse point of view. Before this takes place, however, I find it useful to refer to a translation which was refused because it failed to account for the discourse aspect of a book by Freud.

The Times Higher Education Supplement (15.9.89) relates that the original translators of the works of Freud wanted to produce a translation mainly for pedagogical purposes. This primary concern yielded an unfavourable result: a standardized TT with standardized terminology. This terminology did not reflect the fact that Freud, in his development, went through many experiences. The TT, therefore, failed to
account for the mobility of attitudes and tones that the source text provided for the ST reader. Since Freud's work is mainly known through standard English, the translation has in fact greatly influenced our understanding of the development of Freud. The reader does not see Freud as someone who passed through many stages before he came to a particular conclusion. Rather, the reader sees him as a fully mature psychologist. The reader's attitude towards Freud is not dynamic; rather it is static.

Mobility of tones and attitudes are discoursal by nature. It is particularly this discourse aspect which will dominate my empirical translation assessment: "Did the translators of the two novels involved succeed in accounting for this aspect? and, to what extent?"

7.6 Empirical Assessment of Figurative Expression from a Discourse Point of View

As has been demonstrated in Chapter Six, the discoursal themes of oppression in "Two Women in One" and admiration in "The Old Man and the Sea" were conveyed at two levels: (i) a deep level (of foregrounding) where the syntax of the figurative expression systematically displayed a consistent point of view by the ES towards the experience he is describing (for example, the world of man as an oppressor and the world of woman oppressed), and (ii) surface level where a series of judgements were passed on the experience(s) described through various types of FsOS. These judgements comprised a variety of tones (for example, in terms of formality and informality) and shifting attitudes.

Attitudes, in both novels, ranged from extreme, motivated disapproval in some instances, to a mild, motivated approval of the same object in other instances. These mobile tones and attitudes were encoded in different types of FsOS which differ in terms of politeness: the degree of imposition and explicitness. It follows therefore that
the adherence to the identical type of FOS in the TT practically means preservation of the mobility of tones and shifting attitudes by the ES.

I shall, in the following, attempt to gauge how far the translator has been successful in preserving these mobile tones and shifting attitudes. I shall assess the discourse-aspect in terms of three main intertwined dimensions. These are presented in a descending order of importance:

(i) the formal aspect, i.e. simile to simile, metaphor to metaphor,
(ii) constituents of the figurative expression, in terms of what relevant lexical items mean in both languages involved,
(iii) foregrounding.

The first accounts for change of attitude as encoded in the degree of imposition and explicitness. For example, similes are more explicit, more elaborate than metaphors. This elaboration is in the interest of the audience. Metaphors are explicit, but curt; this curtness is detrimental to a wider audience. Therefore, the shift from one FOS to another would mean a discoursal shift; it also means a different degree of imposition.

The second point should account for minor discourse aspects which have been taken care of by the constituents of the figurative statement. The significance of this point becomes clear if we recollect that transformations, for example, are realizations of an attitude by the ES towards his audience: the less you see, the less you think.

The third point is of secondary importance because it primarily concerns the material component of discourse, i.e. experience. Nevertheless it marks an attitude (of imposition) by the ES on his audience: the more he foregrounds, the more imposition on the audience there is.

To avoid prolixity, I shall limit my assessment to the two main discoursal themes examined above: oppression and admiration (relevant items will be underlined
where necessary; figures refer to the number of the figurative statement on the discoursal chain).

7.6.1 Empirical Assessment of the Translation of Figurative Expression in El-Sadawi's "Two Women in One": Oppression, from a Discourse Point of View

(i) The Formal Level

Metaphors. There is only one metaphor missing: (Haraka dūdiya: 1) "worm-like movement" is translated into "unnatural movement". I propose that the FOS be retained.

Kināyas. All Kināyas have been literally translated. They do not figure as FsOS in English because kināyas are culture-specific.

Similes. There are two similes missing (i.e. 8, 34). Five other similes were converted into metaphors (i.e. 14, 17, 18, 22 and 39). This can be interpreted that the ES is addressing a different readership and/or that he is more self-imposing (i.e. situation managing). This is because simile is more explicit or elaborate than metaphor in terms of FTA. The tone, therefore, is different.

However, I would like to point out that the above similes were, when translated literally, not accepted by highly literate native speakers of English. They labelled them "very weak", or "unacceptable". Instead of similes, they preferred metaphors. (Compare, for example, (...al-bait ʕalān aSbaHa ka al-sijn: 17) "her house was like a prison" [ST] and "her house was a prison" [TT]. Similarly, compare "her father was like a guard" [ST] and "her father was a guard". It is quite clear that a formal equivalence which retains the simile particle is not acceptable.
There is also another simile-related phenomenon. There are four cases in which the simile particle is converted to the subordinate conjunction "as if" or "as though" (i.e. 15, 20, 21 and 22). These two devices are normally employed for giving a possible explanation for something, although it is probably not the correct one. Furthermore, they hold two clauses in such a way that one clause is a constituent or part of the other (i.e. dependency relation). This means that the dependent clause (starting with "as though") cannot function on its own 3.

This is not the case with the simile which has (ka) "like" as its particle. Similes with (ka) "like" are a conflation of two independent (coordinate) sentences 4. Subordination weakens the effect of similes. Besides, similes have the advantage of fleshing out the comparison between two entities (i.e. tenor and vehicle); in subordinates, there is only one entity involved. This is bound to deprive the TT reader from co-sharing an experience with the ST reader.

(ii) Constituents of Figurative Expression

The discoursal thread of oppression is indented at several nodes and on more than one level:

(a) A higher ideological level. In (1) (al-lijām al-jildī) "leather chain", is translated into "link in a chain". This item, I believe, is of a significant, ideological importance; and therefore needs to be fleshed out. This is because in Arabic (lijām), "reins" (lit.) is fitted in the mouth of, particularly, a horse, to control its movements and is usually made of metal. Though it establishes a higher-to-lower relationship between man and woman (which is parallel to the spatial relationship between a horseman and his mount, the horse), it still preserves an element of dignified nobility between both (i.e. any of the pairs man and woman, horseman and horse). (Lijām) "reins", therefore, cannot be replaced by, say, "leash" which is used to control dogs. A horse is a nobler beast than a dog.
The qualifier (Jildī) "Leather", therefore, serves as a sign of encouragement for females: it is cuttable. This should prompt women to resist man's hegemony. If this interpretation is correct, this lexical item links, on a remote but perceptible ideological layer, "Oppression" with two discoursal themes, i.e. “freedom” (vs oppression) and "strength".

Given this, I propose one of two options: firstly, that the item be translated straightforwardly into "leather chain". This, while showing loyalty to the ST, would alert the reader to the fact that the translator wishes to convey to him the intention of the text-producer. Or secondly, that the item be translated into simply "reins"; leather would be redundant since all reins are made of leather. This would naturalize the expression to the TT reader, though it might weaken its effect.

(b) **A lower ideological level.** This level has two components: a local, discoursal theme level and a quasi-local level. These will be dealt with in tandem.

**Local, discoursal level.**
(a) in (17, 18) (al-bait... ka al-sijn, and wa abūhā ka al-sajjān) were translated into "...prison" and "...guard". "Guard" is associated with protection rather than oppression. To maintain the discoursal theme, I propose "jail" and "jailer" which happily collocate.

(b) (al-qadar: 7) was translated into "destiny". Destiny is not a symbol of oppression; fate is.

(c) in (Ṣārū...ila ʿarāba: 23) "and led them to a big box-like car", emphasis in the ST is on (Sanduq) "box"; in the TT emphasis is placed on "big". But in fact, it is "box" which primarily oppresses, not the size. I propose "...and led them to a big car which looked like a box".

Similarly, in (24) emphasis is on size (shiq) "slit", rather than on the type of the slit. The TT: *key-hole sized crack* neutralizes oppression. I propose "She sat near a slit the size of a key-hole; or "She sat near a slit no bigger than a key-hole", with the
emphatic negative highlighting oppression. "Crack" denotes damage due to wear and tear; "slit" can denote intentional doing.

d) There is also the emphatic particle in (23) where (inna) "indeed" in the ST shows tension in the relationship between the ES and the audience. This emphatic particle is missing in the TT.

e) The oscillation by the ES between formal and informal (see 6.1.1.2) has not been captured in the TT, nor has been the instance of grammatical incorrectness. These can be taken as indicating a shift in (discoursal) attitudes.

quasi-local, discoursal level. This has to do with particularization. In (6) There are two adjectives attached to (al-Ḥājiz) "barrier". These are (ka al-Ḥājiz al-Tawīl al-Dakhm). They are translated into "high vast barrier". "Vast" creates a feeling of freedom and liberty and contrasts with "oppression". I propose "massive" instead.

(iii) Foregrounding.

This is relevant only as discourse-theme enhancer. It contains a degree of imposition by the ES on his audience. The problems involved will be more difficult to assess as some linguistic concepts such as tense, aspect and idiomaticity come into play. Therefore, I shall be brief in my examination of this linguistic concept. I shall examine foregrounding in terms of processes and transformations.

Processes. There is only one instance where the heroine unnecessarily occupied the position of patient. In (ḤaSarāthā al-ṣuyūn: 12) "Eyes besieged her from every corner" the patient/suffix (ha) "her" occupies the slot of the patient in the ST; (al-ṣuyūn) "eyes" is agent. In the TT, however, Bahiah is made agent in a mental transactive process, while "eyes" are made patient to the process "felt": "She felt eyes staring at her".
Transformations. Several transformations were inadequately translated: This weakens the effect of the discoursal thread of oppression.

(a) (muDâfa: 2) "attached" is of ideological importance: it is highly likely that the ES wishes to express his unfavourable attitude to the social system which deliberately attaches (feminine) endings to girls' names in order to segregate them from boys' names. Instead of the possessive "of" "the feminine ending of her name" in the TT which indicates that feminine endings are inherent in girls' names. I propose that (muDâfa) be translated as "attached".

(b) There is one transformation unnecessarily omitted (i.e. (mutaqaTTâa )"broken": 3).

(c) (maftûHatain: 7) "open" (lit.), is translated into "gaped". This expression is alien to the English reader. "Open", on the other hand, would signal wholeheartedness which conflicts with "oppression". Two alternatives are proposed: the addition of "menacingly" to convey the attitude of the ES towards both policeman and fate, or to leave it to the discretion of the reader to sort it out for himself, especially that "fate" is symbol of oppression.

(d) The transformations (mustaslima wa mustamti a: 19) were translated into "as if she abandoned herself to" and "...she realised her dissolution and annihilation...". This is overtranslation (i.e. unnecessarily lengthy), and could dilute the effect of the Fs0S. I propose "...like someone resigned" and "...like someone who enjoys...".

(e) Another factor has to do with thematization: the distribution of information in the text. Text-producers follow a theme-rheme sequence (i.e. given and new information, respectively). In the Arabic text (al-Ḥâjîz: 6) "barrier" is rheme, (abûhâ) "her father" is theme. This is a reversed simile intended to impress the reader. This theme-rheme order was unnecessarily reversed in the TT. The reversed simile, therefore, was flattened into an ordinary simile: "her father is like a...barrier". To
express the same attitude of the ES, I propose "Like a high massive barrier, her father stood...". (For the translation of "oppression" see p. 246).

7.6.2 Empirical Assessment of the Translation of Figurative Expression in Hemingway's "The Old Man and the Sea": Admiration from a Discourse Point of View.

(i) The Formal Level

All FsOS are retained. Types of FsOS are also observed. This means that mobility of tones and shifting attitudes are apparently maintained. However, there are some problems which are relatively different from those encountered in "Two Women in One".

(a) a literal simile is inadvertently converted into a figurative simile: in (1) there is a comparison between the length of the sword of the fish and the length of a baseball bat. There is no intention of finding a similarity between these two objects. To distinguish between the figurative and literal similes I propose that the particle (ka) "like" be omitted. This should tone down the literal comparison and highlight the simile. Compare:

ST: His sword was as long as a baseball bat and tapered like a rapier.

TT: هما رجحا مكان طويل كعشر السيف كالرسوم
PT: هما رجحا مكان طويل مثل سيف كالرسوم

(b) in many cases, the ground was incorrectly interpreted and translated. For example:

(a) in (2)

ST: And he [the fish] rose... and re-entered it, smoothly like a diver.

TT: وانتسب السماكة بكمالها في الماء ثم عاصمة من جريد نمش

مرونة الغواص

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What happened is that the ground \( G \) was mistaken for the vehicle \( V \). This limited the scope and weakened the already weak simile. (For the norm is to liken something which lacks a particular property to something already known for possession of that particular property and not vice versa). I propose the following:

The dummy verb (yaf alu) "does" does not specify what the ground exactly refer to. Rather, it deflects the attention of the reader and widens the scope of similarity.

(b) in (6) The translator used (ka'anna) "as if" for the simile particle "like". The former particle is used to dissipate doubt about similarity between tenor and vehicle; with "like", similarity is more explicit.

(ii) Constituents of Figurative Expression

In addition to the above observations, the translation of figurative expression is characterized by over-literariness. In general terms, the language of novels, though formally literary, occupies a middle position between formal and informal, so that it can read, when (Harakat) movements are suspended, like informal.

There are many lexical items which could have been reduced to a less formal tone: e.g. (baligha: 4) "so [big]", (inbathaqaqat: 1) "rose", (arSan: 2) "calmer", (ashhad: 2) "seen"). These could be changed respectively into, for example, (jiddan), (wa zaharat), (ahda') and (ara). These lexical items are accessible to a less educated audience.

Furthermore, there is a sign of tension which is not present in the ST but which can be detected in the TT. For example, there are two emphatic particles (la and qad: 4) "verily" and "indeed" positioned before the verb. One of the functions of emphasis in Arabic is for the ES to dissipate doubt that he deems existing in the mind of his
audience. The presence of two emphatic particles in the TT, therefore, indicates tension between the ES and the audience.

However, there are other lexical items which admirably capture the discoursal thread of admiration. For example, (yatāshaqūnah) "[they] admire him [the ocean]" combines both love and admiration. This is more than just "love". Also (al-baHra) "a small sea" is very intimate, and rather informal. (For the translation of "Admiration" see p. 252).

7.7 Conclusions and Recommendations

The findings of the study are summed up as follows:

(1) The study corroborates that FsOS are functional in that they specifically help discourse emerge and help distinguish one discourse type from another. They also, in their diversity, present adequate devices to express different tones and shifting attitudes by the ES. These are discoursal by nature. They also have many advantages over literal language and present a sound device for persuasion.

(2) The present studies by theorists and experimenters of figurative expression are not sufficiently sensitive to the discourse function of FsOS. Nor are the empirical translations of the two novels which form the data for this study. This does not of course conflict with the substantiated fact that there is a degree of consciousness of discourse on the part of translators. This degree of awareness understandably cannot be rigorously gauged with mathematical precision. This is due to the indeterminacy inherent in the translation process itself.

(3) The study brings into relief the need to examine and analyse figurative expression and break it down into its basic constituents before the translator embarks on his work. It also accentuates the need to examine language as a social practice and to refer it to its
roots with the aim of working out the factors which determine and are determined by verbal interaction.

(4) Though the study highlights the fact that the feminist novel by el-Sa‘dawi is more packed with FsOS than the American novel by Hemingway, it does not necessarily follow that the feminist novel is typical of Arabic culture, or that Hemingway's novel is typical of American culture. The tendency towards using a particular pattern, though motivated, might remain idiosyncratic. Politeness across cultures has to be more intensively and extensively investigated. This does not of course invalidate or trivialize any of the findings of the dissertation, especially with regards to politeness.

(5) There is a risk of confusing especially the figurative simile with the literal simile, as has been demonstrated in the translation from English into Arabic. At the same time, there is a tendency to change similes into metaphors and to reduce figurative similes to one-participant similes starting with "as though" or "as if". Reasons for this have to be investigated.

(6) The adoption of a critical linguistic approach should help the translation-trainee to understand how language functions and to find an explanation for linguistic phenomena. However, the critical linguistic model developed in this dissertation can regrettably be interpreted as advocating conflict. It also would not be difficult to claim that the model segments truth into many regimes. It allows the institutionally empowered subject to get away with manipulating the situation for his own interest.

These allegations can be counter-argued by claiming that discourse is a social practice, viz. this is how people linguistically behave. But this is obviously not sufficient. For by merely advocating such a model, we naturalize it as the legitimate, valid type of social practice. Therefore, I take this dissertation as the first step in my academic life. My efforts will concentrate on developing a "peaceful" model
of discourse. This must be a model which does not advocate tension and conflict, nor should it segment truth into many regimes.

This is a moral duty. My mind goes back to the era when Islam organized all aspects of life in the early centuries, and where tension was at its lowest. This enterprise, however, needs linguistic investigation.
Notes to Chapter Seven

(1) For an objective assessment of translation, see House (1977).

(2) I suspect that the metaphor was omitted because the Arabic text was misread.

(3) See for example, Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: 310).

(4) I have ignored in this particular instance the difference between statement and sentence.

(5) See, for example, al-Jurjānī (1983b).
Appendix D:

Official and Proposed Translations of “Oppression” and “Admiration”.

OPPRESSION

ST: لتم تكن الساقان تنفصلان ابدا في حركة الخطوات المألوفة للإدمينين، ومنهما في حركة دودية غريبة تنتقل بها قدمها المغطاة فوق الأرض وتشق ساقاهما متصلتين وركبتها متصلتين كأنما تضغط بين فكيهما على شيء حفظه سقوطها.

TT: Their skirts wound tightly..., so that their legs remained bound together whether they were sitting, or walking producing an unnatural movement. Girls walked with a strange, mechanical gait, their feet shuffling along while legs and knees remained clamped, as if they were pressing their thighs together to protect something they were afraid might fall.

PT: Their skirts wound tightly..., so that their legs remained bound together whether they were sitting, or walking producing a worm-like movement. Girls walked with a strange, mechanical gait, their feet shuffling along while legs and knees remained clamped, as if they were pressing their thighs together to protect something they were afraid might fall.

ST: التلاها مربوطة مضافة إلى اسمها شربتها بقوائم البنات: كالنجاح الكندي.

TT: Bahiah Shaheen: the feminine ending of her name bound it like a link in a chain into lists of girls' names.

PT: Bahiah Shaheen: the feminine ending attached to her name bound it into lists of girls' names like a link in a leather chain.

ST: وتنفتح الأفواه السعة في مكافة إصيغة مكتوبة ومتلفحة: كانما شهل بحرمان عامر عن الأرثاء.

TT: Seven mouths then opened with suppressed, feminine laughter like gasps of eternally unquenchable deprivation.

PT: Seven mouths then opened with suppressed, broken feminine laughter like gasps of eternally unquenchable deprivation.
She longed to confide in somebody about that strange sensation building up inside her, like a foetus growing day by day to reach its climax on the fourth of September every year, confirming to her that she was definitely not Bahiah Shaheen.

The moment her head showed, this force would pull her with a magnetic power stronger than gravity.

Her father stood like a vast, high barrier between her and her real self, blocking her way, guarding the entrance to the house with the bulk of his body...

...With puny arms and legs, the child struck at the big legs, but they were strong and opened like destiny's jaws.

She wanted to say: "until my pulse stops", but her secret death wish once put in the open, would have seemed taboo...

PT: No Change.
TT: The alarm clock woke her in the morning. Her father's great eyes loomed over her bed drawing her up, out of her room and out of her house. They followed her to the tram and the college. Then his thick palms shoved her into the dissecting room.

PP: No Change.

TT: She felt eyes staring at her.

PP: Eyes besieged her from every corner.

TT: Moans, groans, sighs, and gasps, a hidden burning desire buried within her like a germ that sought to torture her body, rip it apart...

PP: No Change.

TT: The street lengthened and protruded from the body of the mountain like an outstretched arm. Above it, caught between the mountains and the buildings, a strip of sky formed a second arm. The two huge arms, like those of a mythical god, stretched out before her like the gaping jaws of fate, extending toward the horizon, lying in wait for her, willing her body to turn to them.

PP: No Change?

TT: He saw her eyes staring at him from beneath the sky of the mountain like a weed from a grave.
TT: And when she saw her house in the distance her heart sank, as though she were a lifer being led to prison, driven by an irresistible force as strong as steel.

PP: TT: And when she saw her house in the distance her heart sank, like a lifer being led to prison, driven by an irresistible force as strong as steel.

ST: لكن البيت الآن أصبح كسجن وأبوها كمماط راض في الصالة. يمرّ حركاتها في غير إحوائها من حولها في كل مكان نحاصرها بالأسئلة.

TT: But now her house had become a prison, her father a guard, sitting on his bamboo chair watching her every movement.

PP: But now her house had become a jail, her father a jailer, sitting on his bamboo chair watching her every movement.

ST: نبدو من الخارج كمستسلم تماما للصاع.

TT: It may have seemed as if she had abandoned herself to the sensation of being lost, as though she realised her dissolution and annihilation...

PP: Outwardly, she looked like someone resigned to the sensation of being lost, like someone who realised his dissolution and annihilation.

ST: صعد الدم إلى قلبيّها. وتراقصت انفاسها كالدّيّع في البحر. وكانما شحّلت الحياة كلّها من حولها إلى سيلّة داّامة.

TT: The blood pounded through her heart. Her breath came in great gulps as if she were drowning. Life around her turned into permanent liquidity, water above and below.

PP: No Change.

ST: ...وساروا أمامهم إلى عربة كبيرة كالصندوق، كالكنزة المتحرّكة جاء مدفعها إلى جوار شق مفتوح في جدار العربة كشك المفتاح في الباب.

TT:...and three men surrounded them and led them to a big box-like car: it was closed on all sides and dark as a prison cell inside. She sat near a key-hole sized crack in the side of the car.

PP:...and three men surrounded them and led them to a car which looked like a big box: it was closed on all sides and dark as a prison cell inside. She sat near a slit the size of a key-hole in the side of the car.
ST:

A wide barrier of thick, dark wood separated her from Saleem; it stood between her and life, preventing her from moving and thwarting her will like her mother’s big arms when they pulled her towards her, her father’s voice scolding her, the sound of the tram as it crawled along the rails, the iron gate of the college, the dissecting room with its marble tables..., the crooked legs of male students, the beaten eyes of the female students, and Dr Elwi’s eyes with their hidden greed.

PP: No Change

ST:

TT: She was in the grip of fate. Iron fingers held her relentlessly... Fate was her father.

PT: Indeed? She was in the grip of fate. Iron fingers held her relentlessly... Fate was her father.

ST:

TT: Her white silk dress stretched tightly over her chest, smothering her breasts. A long tail folded like a coffin around her bottom and legs... A bridal stage, surrounded by roses, looked like the grave of the unknown soldier.
The drums' slow, heavy beat sounded heavy strains.
Her small cold hand lay in the bridegroom's large palm. His fingers were strange. They coiled around her like the fingers of fate.
Under the folds of the coffin her legs moved slowly as if she was heading for an unknown disaster.

PP: No Change.

ST: سهية! سمعت الصوت . . . وراء وجهها يظل من سبارة طويلة

TT: Bahiah! A face peered out of a big black car like a police vehicle.

PP: No Change

ST: ولكن ان نعيش في قبيلة خطين متوازيين لا يلتقيان.

TT: ...But to live in the grip of parallel lines that never meet, to be trapped between two jaws never knowing when they will snap shut: this is our tragedy.

PP: No Change

ST: واحست انها تغرق في بحر . . .

TT: She felt she was drowning with no one to see or recognize her and that her face was becoming like that of Alialia, Zakiah.

PP: No Change.
ADMIRATION

1- His sword was as long as a baseball bat and tapered like a rapier.

2- And he rose his full length from the water and re-entered it, smoothly like a diver.

3- And the old man saw the scythe-blade of his tail go under the line commenced to race out.

4- Never have I seen a greater, or more beautiful or a calmer, or more noble thing than you my brother

5- and the fish’s eye looked as detached as the mirrors in a periscope or as a saint in a procession.

6- He was so big it was lashing a much bigger skiff alongside.
7. He [the old man] always thought of the sea as la mar which is what people call her when they love her.

8. He [the big fish] took the bait like a male and he pulls like a male.

9. The dolphins were cutting through the water below the flight of the fish.
Appendix E

Discoursal Themes from el-Saadawi's Two Women in One.

N.B.
1- Appendix E contains all discoursal themes except "admiration". This is to be found in Chapter Six and at the end of Chapter Seven.
2- discoursal themes are arranged in the same order as in figure (IV).
3- underlining indicates or locates FOS.
4- figures between brackets refer the reader to page number in the novel.

Boredom

1- وآرقت بهيئة المساعدة وعرفت لنارا بفضي الإنسان رعبانة
الحقيقة لأنها الرعبات العديدة السائحة في علماً ولأن
الإنسان لا يرقد أن ينسحق وهو يفضل الحياة الفاشلة (63)
2- كانت حياتها تسير في خط كفيف (64)

Contempt

1- ... واحدهم السفلي دائرة منبسطة فوق المشاعر
وانتهاءهم العليا تنبأ بحركة بطيئة مثيرة كحركة الترام
ووزن كلهم... وملابسهم وبدلهم وإصابههم واحذيتهم كلها اتبعت
وامرأة كحترم الحكومة سماههم كما شعك الحقوق
وكلهم مثلاصة مشرقة بعض الثقيء... كانوا يحملون فوق
كلهم عيناً ابديًا إبرازًا بالعين (11)
6- كتبت لههم وشكره سراويلهم... وسورة الكتة
التي تبدو كالآبارات السوداء الميتة (111)
16- والرجال بسرائهم وسيرتهم الساحة بروحهم وهميون
متشتلين بذكرى مرحلة شدة كالمضاءة المريضة (112)
17- ... ورتن عادة الشكر اسمل بطنه [العربي] ونيل
القزحية فوق السرير كفزة مرنة (11)
18- اضفى سعداء [العربي] كحمل الأعراوات ليلة
الزمان (115)
19- وارفع مشغيرة... فأذكر أشخبر الأرواح مشغرة
الليالي (116)
20- استمع [د.علوي] فاعل: اشتفى طول النهار في
الكليّة والمستشفى والعبادة من أجل حذرات سعيدة في مقوم
هذا (134)
21- ومن هن إلى حين تحمر سيارة طويلة سورة
كسيارات البوليبي... ومن حكة الزجاج اللامع نبع الوجوه...
سنيتها المشحونة (133)
22- ومن نوافر التراب والثقوب فيهم الرووس المشحونة
والأخلاقي المشحونة نابضة الهوى والعبود الجاهزة
المذيرة (133)
23- ... ورتن الشيح المجوز... والإضايع المشبوهة المسيرة
... تتحرك بسرعة وانتظام كالركعية الدائمة... وإنفتاحها
... سراعان ما تخلوّى كمشارجة الاضطرار الأذى وتشيرهما فوق
السرير... كالجدين الهامدين.

256
Intimidation

1. The face of a boy in a white shirt is turned away from the camera.

2. The eyes of the young man are closed.

3. The young man is lying on the ground.

4. The young man is being beaten by several people.

5. The young man is wearing a white shirt.

Malfunction

1. It is known that the facial muscles are affected (4).

2. All the faces are similar (lookalikes)...

3. The government is in control and its actions are visible...

4. The organization of the movement of the people is in control.
الثناء على الدكتور علوى حتى بين في المشهورة صوت

1. لما ان يسال الدكتور علوى حتى بين في المشهورة صوت

2. كنت تجلس في مقعها الطيف لاثرى عيونهم وما شا

3. وقفر من الكتاب بصوت عال مكن في المبكي كعمة واحة

4. كلمة كتب كانت حين تصل الى سمعها بين في الانتها

5. وجلس في كلمته كحب لبسبطة اخرى صبيحة البوليس

وكلها من ذات وعبده من ناحية أخرى كبرياء الشرطة...

لا يقتضيان جاهتهما تمام كنفرة تعيش عنها (107)

Alineation

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Disorientation

1ـ ما لنا ودُرها [نوبة في الخارج] حتى تدخل مجالها الكهربائي
2ـ ودور في ملكها قنبلة مجموعه يزعج عنها فرحها...
3ـ كالمهاجمة كانت تسير من شارع جذرة حواء ضئيلة...
4ـ وسارت المهاجمة في الشارع...

Disillusionment

1ـ كالحالة بين مصدقة وعنصصر مصدقة كانت تطبع في الحضره المجاورة لحيرة العمليات في مستشفى القصر المبدي...

Split

1ـ لو كانت بيئة شاهين حقيقية لإستنار وسارا ضوء...
2ـ لم تكن بيئة شاهين شفية [بيئة شاهين]...
3ـ يملك الحضره... التي لا تستنار إلى الأشياء...
4ـ الإشياط تعكس عليها كشفة ماء...
5ـ بيئة شاهين كانت تشاع من نفسها الحقيقية...
6ـ بيئة شاهين ستملك دائمًا عاجزة عن بلوع إجمال...
7ـ يمتعين داكنًا في مستشفى الطريق...
8ـ عمل بيئة شاهين لم يكن غلبها ان لها غلبها الآن...
9ـ يمثيلها... لأنها تريت شبهًا آخر...
10ـ خسر في قباليها ذلك الخيار الحجري الذي يمتعها...
11ـ حياها كلها من ظفه ومن 24 حياها ليست حياها ولا خاما حياها الإحساسية خري...
12ـ أحسنت بفترات الغرق في كفها... ويشربنها أصبحت شاهية...
Loss of Identity

1. Lost from the skull and sash in شارع القصر العيني شحشش
   في الوجه كأنما صحت عن وجهها الحقيقي (11)
2. And we shall make the body and its dress in the skull by the
   right and left hand... we will cut it (20)

Escape

1. Since it is cut off from the skull between and between the
   body (15)
2. And that... is what it is between it and between the cut
   [which it describes] the body of the body or the middle of the
   body (25)

Pain

1. This moment is not visible to any of them, and in its place
   جزار body (1)
2. And he is not visible in his face and he is not visible in the
   body... of the body... and its shape... and the white of the
   eye... has a white... and its body... has a white... and its body... (14)
3. It is not, which is not, but it is a small... and it is... A white... a white...
   and a white... has a white... and a white... white... (20)

Edge of the body (40)
شفافية كثيفة رقيقة من الهواء (١٧٦)
- براها حين غربتها وهي طفيلة... أثار عاصفتها الكبيرة...
- شامة فوق الجبل كلاهيم (٨٤)
- إن هذه اللحظات تبدو كالحلم... فقد اثبت على موت الرسول (٩٤)
٣٧ - حين أصبحت في الشارع الواسع أحسنت بفطرية الهواء على ضربها الساخرين كالصحبة المفاجئة (١٣٧)

Freedom

١٠ - الآن شيء غريب يحدث لجسدها وهي تبتعد عن الأرض ان اشعاع
نافذة هواء... كأنها تحضر من أعمال غير مرحكة بل إن جلائها
الحديدي حول رؤفتها (٤٤-٤٥)
١٠٣ - و祈نها في تلك اللحظة إن للإنسان حواس أخرى سهولة...
- كأنه طبيعي... والآخر المستمر من السماء بلا هواجر (٧٣)
- تراها في حركتها الحاشدة التي كان فاعلاً. وتمزقت
الغشاء الذي يفصل بينها وبين الصدى (٥٢)
٤٥ - صعودي الشفر... وتصرخ عن المرحين حين تحمر جسمها
琰اراً في الهواء... تظينها كأنها هواء والأرض لم تدع تثمرها
اليها ووزر حصول إلى الآخر من فيضتها الحزينة (٤٥)
٦٠ - فيفه بالحروبه والكلمات في الوجه... وتعود من البعد
تفجر فوق الأرض كعصور (١٣٣)

Viability

١٠ - وحين تعرق في عينيها [عيبك لامها] كانت تتعلق ان ترى رحمة
ويتالي عضلاتها وهي تشفي وتبسط كعب الليل في سكون الليل
وبحركة لا مريضة... كحركة الأرض (١٦)
٢٥ - من براها في تلك اللحظة بنال أنها حكيمة لكمها بكافة... عيناها

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Rebellion

... When the people [− upwards] under the shade of the palm ... (15)

... They were ... [− upwards] under the shade of the palm ... (16)

... All of them [− upwards] under the shade of the palm ... (17)

... They were under the shade of the palm ... (18)

... They were under the shade of the palm ... (19)

... They were under the shade of the palm ... (20)

... And others ... (21)
لا تذكرها [حركة عسكرية السامة] أن الزمن يمضي ولا يعود وأن لحظات حياتها تسقط في الفرد وتهبط من الظلم (87)
9- ...وأذا لب كلما فلايد الفجر طارء عشته تذهب بينهم (88)
10- ...لكن الشاهد ضمها آخر وولدتها ابنها أو لعلها لم تكن تابعة واسمه اسمها هي الدينيه المرضة التي جعلتها عشة (89)
11- ...وعين تشل ترعى قدرها فوق أي كرسي أو منفزة... بكل دقة...
12- ... كما يفعل أبوها (90)
13- ... تلى وأميها السعداويين المرموعين إلى أعلى (90)
14- وفتح الشرقي في الباب... تشوب [بيئة]... عينه السعداويين في طريق إلى الأردن (111)
15- في حق عائشة... يدعو لرجل من الرجال (112)
16- صاح بغضب: كنت نسنت أبي (114)
17- فات... عليك أن تستمر الأيام (115)
18- فات... كان عليك أن تخدم القدر قبل شراها (114)
19- (الزواج) اخت نفسي في التاريخ (115)
20- عقل الرجل... رته بجرة هي سافية (116)

الدكتور كمال الصبي و البكر الصغير في نصها
تحت برود كالصبي والصبر الشموعة كالحرير من نحلها
مع امل كنج الألب (138)

Discovery

أولاً و حسباً كماتي كانت تدرك أن هذا الحادث الطارئ هو
الشيء الوحيد الحقيقي في حياتها (80)
2- شرحت في حركتها الحبوزة الذي كان شامها ومزقت القشأ...
الذي كان يقل بينها وبين الحياة. عشاء رفيق غير محسوس...
نهرالدبي كليهم من الزجاج يفصلها عن عمارها... شنامه...
الزجاج بريق من خلاله نفسها... كالزجاج معرش للكسير.
أبود: "النفواء في الكون" (٨) 

٢- دهشته لموت عين إمامها وللمها بسمة ألبان شديد 

الضوئية لي笠 كاسم بهية أي بهية (١٨) 

٣— وكفوفيا الارض حين شدد لها الجسد لا يبقى بينهم 

وبينت مادة مهاء اللفنت درائش حولها وذراعها حولها ... 

والضهر حين يلامس اتشتها يصبح كفوفا قليها وكل شيء حين 

يلامس حواسها يصبح كفوم جسرها (٢٤) 

٤- وحرة نفسها كفوفة منهم (المتظاهرين) كجزء من حسر 

فظم حرارة من حراثها (٩٤) 

٥- وشركت حسرها زاكي في الهواء منسخها كفيم في لب 

وجفتها كفيف راسي ... ومروتها ليلى هناما وأداها 

(٨٦) 

٦- وكلمة حبي تسيل عن صدرها كفوفة حية من لديها 

كشفت ساهدة من دمها 

Pity 

١٠- لكنها ليست إلا نفحة حاطمة ... دم سحرة الارض ايا بها بموها 

المجنونة وشهبها بسورة كفيم بهوي وبرغسط حسدة بالاري كفيفة 

(٨٤) 

١٢- وتجمع مشكوكات مساعفات وسّر سن نحو الامام بروكسيمن المطردة 

(٨٩)
Penetration

1. Usayn [Sulaym] نغطى وجهها وسطراً وسطراً من خلال عينيها إلى السرير، (37)

2. رفعت رأسها... فالتلفت عينيها بيبيبه عينان سوداوان... (40)

3. توزع على وجهها الشماغ... وتصبح بهما مركبة (40)

4. كان يغب عينها وأفقاً اجتازا كمساح وعيناه السوداوان... (40)

5. أدخل السرير الضيق الطويل في عضالها (40)

6. والسودار ليس أسود تماماً وانها تشوية زرقة

7. واصبحت عيناه في عينيها، عينان عفيفتان سوداويتان شادوبة

船上 تطفى كتلة من حولها يبهر فاغ

8. أصبح جسدتها ممدوداً وعيناه... هملاً في الظلام...

9. وملايين الزرات... تسبح في الشماغ وتوزع في حركة دائرة مستمرة كحركة الكوكب الأزرقة. كلما المستمر في الردود

10. تبسط إلى عنقها... ويسري في سماميها تتميزا كخيفاً كسرابان

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الرم ويمضي في نفيها وينضم في أطراف اشتهاها... كروسي الأبيض...
كأي حل للملل... يغشي ويتكاد تمسك ذنبيها كالأزر حالف المنزل (51)
كما ضاقت بهما اشتهاها على الفرشاة لحشت روعات الربابيس...
وفي كل ضفة تستشف الأتام كوزر الأبر (52)
- ٨ رئة عامة حارقة دهس جسدها وبين الأرق من جسدها يتسدري من أصابعها إلى دراغيها إلى... كأنما حل سلك كهربى مشدود (53)
٩ - رئة أثامها العيدين السوداوي... بيزعان عنها الشاغر...
وهفنان يعبر ريق ولترى إلى السرداب الطويل الضيق في أعمها (54)
١٠ - تحسستها (اسبان المفاج) ... فسرت في جسدها مشعرة
- كعبات برم الشام المساهتنا... (55)
١١ - هر... يشف (المفاج) في الجسر جدران دسري ذو الجثر
- كمشعرة البرور (56)
١٢ - وقلت أصابعها حول الفرشاة... ضاقت عليها منس للحفظ...
١٣ - وقلت أصابعها حول الفرشاة... ضاقت عليها منس للحفظ...
١٤ - حل سلك كهربى مشدود (57)
Appendix F

Discoursal Themes from Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea.

N.B.
1- Appendix F contains all discoursal themes except "admiration". This is to be found in Chapter Six and at the end of Chapter Seven.
2- discoursal themes are arranged in the same order as in figure (V).
3- underlining indicates or locates FOS.
4- figures between brackets refer the reader to page number in the novel.

Relief

1- Everything about him was old except his eyes, and they were the same colour as the sea and were cheerful and undefeated (5).
2- The sack cushioned the line (38).
3- I must cushion the pull of the line with my body and at all times be ready to give the line with both hands (65).
4- He leaned his back against the stern and knew he was not dead. His shoulders told him (100).
5- She's [the skiff] good, he thought, she is sound and harmed in any way except for the tillers (103).

Resignation

1- The sail was patched... like the flag of permanent defeat (5).
2- His shirt had been patched so many times that it was like the sail (13).
3- But now I have killed this fish which is my brother and now I must do the slave work (81).

Hope

1- His hope and confidence had never gone. But now they were freshening as when the breeze rises (8).
2- I hope no fish will come along so great that he prove as strong (17).
3- "Albacore", he said aloud. He'll make a beautiful bait. He'll weigh ten pounds (31).
4-...And blessed is the fruit of thy womb (54).
Apprehension

1- He never went turt-ling. That what kills the eyes (9).
2- The boy was asleep on ...and the old man could see him...with the light that came from the dying moon (19).
3- The clouds over the land rose like mountains (27).
4- But these poisonings from the agua male came quickly and struck like a whiplash (29).
5- You must keep your head clear. Keep your head clear and know how to suffer like a man (19).
6- He [the fish] had stayed so close that the old man was afraid he would cut the line with his tail which was as sharp as a scythe and almost of that size and shape (40).
7- First it was dark as a shoal in the blue water that was more than a mile deep. then it spread like a cloud (81).
8- He was built as a sword fish except for his huge jaws...with high dorsal fin knifing through the water without wavering (86).
9- He had come up so fast and absolutely without caution that he broke the surface of the blue water and was in the sun (86).
10- They [the sharks] were shaped like a man's fingers when they were crisped like claws. they were nearly as long as the fingers of the old man and they had razor-sharp...cutting edges on both (86).
11- He had seen the second fin now coming up behind the first (92).
12-...and [the old man] drove it into the shark's yellow cat-like eyes (93).

Pleasure

1- They [lions] played like cats (19).
2- It floated cheerfully as a bubble with its long deadly purple filaments (28).

companionship

1- He always thought of the sea...which is what people call her when they love her (23).
2- But the old man always thought of her as feminine and as something that gave or withheld great favours (23).
3- Al bacore, he said aloud, He'll make a beautiful bait. He'll weigh ten pounds (31).
4- They [two fish] are our brothers, like the flying fish (39).
5- I am as clear as the stars that are my brothers (65).
6- The wind is our friend, anyway, he thought (104).
Contempt

1- "Agua mala", the man said, you *whore* (28)
2- ...clubbing her across the top of her head until her colour turned to a colour almost *like* the backing of a mirror (40).
3- They...swam fast, they slashed their whole bodies *like* eels (77)
4- There were more than a dozen of them [fish] and they jumped and kicked *like* sea fleas (84).
5- Then, on his back, with his tail lashing and his jaws clicking, the shark *ploughed* over the water as a speed boat does (88).
6- *He*, a shark came *like* a pig to the trough (96).
7- In the night, sharks hit he carcass *as* someone might pick up crumbs from the table (103).

Solitude

1- He could not see the green of the shore now but only the tops of the blue hills that showed white *as* though they were snow-capped and the clouds *looked like* high snow mountains above them (32).

Sympathy

1- He'll take it! the old man said. God help *him* to take it (34).
2- I wish I could feed the fish. He is *my brother* (40).
3- It is enough to live on the sea and kill *our true brothers* (64).
4- When the fish was hit, it was *as though* he himself were hit (86).

Boredom

1- He commenced to say his prayers *mechanically* (54).
Bibliography

N.B. * means unidentified.


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**Author's address:**
As'ad Abu Libdeh.
College of Arts, Translation Section.

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